Politics, Policy, and Organizations: Frontiers in the Scientific Study of Bureaucracy
edited by George Krause and Kenneth J. Meier
University of Michigan Press, 2003 Cloth: 978-0-472-11317-0 | Paper: 978-0-472-03114-6 | eISBN: 978-0-472-02404-9
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ABOUT THIS BOOK
The bureaucracy is the fourth branch of government, often receiving attention in times of emergency or when it is the object of criticism from the media or politicians. Less understood is how bureaucratic institutions function in a democracy, both from an organizational perspective and as institutional participants within the political arena. Drawing on rational choice approaches, computationally intensive data and modeling techniques, and systematic empirical inquiry, this original collection of essays highlights the important role bureaucracies play in shaping public policy-making. The editors of and contributors to this volume demonstrate not only the constraints political officials face in harnessing the bureaucracy but, more important, how bureaucracies function as organizational entities in diverse contexts.
George A. Krause is Associate Professor of Political Science, University of South Carolina.
Kenneth J. Meier is Charles Puryear Professor of Liberal Arts and Professor of Political Science, Texas A&M University.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
The Scientific Study of Bureaucracy: An Overview
Why Do Bureaucrats Delay? Lessons from a Stochastic Optimal Stopping Model of Agency Timing, with Applications to the FDA
Agency Risk Propensities Involving the Demand for Bureaucratic Discretion
Veto Points, Policy Preferences, and Bureaucratic Autonomy in Democratic Systems
The Benefits of Agency Policy-making: Perspectives from Positive Theory
Donut Shops, Speed Traps, and Paperwork: Supervision and the Allocation of Time to Bureaucratic Tasks
Adapting Agencies: Competition, Imitation, and Punishment in the Design of Bureaucratic Performance
Consensual Rule Making and the Time It Takes to Develop Rules
Why It Matters Whether State Bureaucrats as Opposed to Federal Bureaucrats Administer Federal Programs
Structural Choice and Political Control of Bureaucracy: Updating Federal Credit Programs
Administrative Structure and Social Democratic Results: The Case of Education
Bureaucratic Discretion and Regulatory Success without Enforcement
Conclusion: An Agenda for the Scientific Study of Bureaucracy
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