White-Collar Government The Hidden Role of Class in Economic Policy Making
by Nicholas Carnes
University of Chicago Press, 2013
Cloth: 978-0-226-08700-9 | Paper: 978-0-226-08714-6 | Electronic: 978-0-226-08728-3
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226087283.001.0001
ABOUT THIS BOOKAUTHOR BIOGRAPHYREVIEWSTABLE OF CONTENTS

ABOUT THIS BOOK

Eight of the last twelve presidents were millionaires when they took office. Millionaires have a majority on the Supreme Court, and they also make up majorities in Congress, where a background in business or law is the norm and the average member has spent less than two percent of his or her adult life in a working-class job. Why is it that most politicians in America are so much better off than the people who elect them— and does the social class divide between citizens and their representatives matter?

With White-Collar Government, Nicholas Carnes answers this question with a resounding—and disturbing—yes. Legislators’ socioeconomic backgrounds, he shows, have a profound impact on both how they view the issues and the choices they make in office. Scant representation from among the working class almost guarantees that the policymaking process will be skewed toward outcomes that favor the upper class. It matters that the wealthiest Americans set the tax rates for the wealthy, that white-collar professionals choose the minimum wage for blue-collar workers, and that people who have always had health insurance decide whether or not to help those without. And while there is no one cause for this crisis of representation, Carnes shows that the problem does not stem from a lack of qualified candidates from among the working class. The solution, he argues, must involve a variety of changes, from the equalization of campaign funding to a shift in the types of candidates the parties support.

If we want a government for the people, we have to start working toward a government that is truly by the people. White-Collar Government challenges long-held notions about the causes of political inequality in the United States and speaks to enduring questions about representation and political accountability.

AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY

Nicholas Carnes is assistant professor of public policy in the Sanford School of Public Policy at Duke University. He lives in Durham, NC, and he has worked as a bus boy, dishwasher, and construction worker.

REVIEWS

"If you’re wondering 'what’s the matter with Kansas?'—working-class Americans voting against their own class interest—you should be asking, 'what’s the matter with Congress (and state legislatures, the Supreme Court, and basically every other American political institution)?' As Nicholas Carnes engagingly shows, politicians with working-class backgrounds take positions very much in line with working-class interests. The problem is that there are hardly any of them in office. Sure to stir debate, White-Collar Government opens up exciting research vistas and new strategies of reform."
 

— Jacob S. Hacker, Yale University, coauthor of Winner-Take-All Politics: How Washington Made the Rich Richer—And Turned Its Back on the Middle Class

“That Congress contains more than its fair share of millionaires is fairly well known. But I’ve never seen it put quite this vividly. . . . Nicholas Carnes’s research—and common sense—shows that the simple fact of being a white-collar millionaire leads to different priorities. It leads to different social circles. It leads to different bills.”
— Ezra Klein, Washington Post

“A bold, compelling, and much-needed study of how the lack of working class individuals in public life shapes what government does. Nicholas Carnes undertakes a careful analysis to show how the disproportionate representation of people from white-collar professions skews government output toward conservative economic policies. The evidence he presents convinces me!”
— Theda Skocpol, Harvard University

“‘Where you stand depends on where you sit’ is a maxim seldom applied to the economic backgrounds of legislators. But Nicholas Carnes’s eye-opening study shows social class and work experience to be key determinants in shaping how Congress and state legislatures write laws and shape policies.”
— Timothy Noah, author of The Great Divergence: America’s Growing Inequality Crisis and What We Can Do About It

"White-Collar Government is a superb analysis of an important and long-neglected topic. Nicholas Carnes documents the overwhelming underrepresentation of the working class in America's legislatures and shows why it matters. At local, state, and national levels, the dearth of representatives from working-class backgrounds, Carnes shows, has bent public policies toward the interests of business and the well-to-do. This book combines fluid, accessible prose with methodological rigor to make a powerful statement about the causes and consequences of our disproportionately white-collar government. Anyone concerned with the health of American democracy needs to read Carnes' compelling study."

— Martin S. Gilens, Princeton University, author of Affluence and Influence: Economic Inequality and Political Power in America

“Legislators with substantial working-class experience constitute less than two percent of Congress, whose members have a median net worth of $1.5 million, almost twenty times the amount held by the median family in the United States. In White-Collar Government, Carnes carefully documents this reality, which has been hidden in plain sight. And he demonstrates that it matters: politicians from the working classes, it turns out, think and vote differently from those with white collars on economic issues, including taxation, social spending and corporate regulations. With its compelling case that ‘who wins and who loses depends in large part on who governs,’ his rigorous book should command the attention of everyone who is concerned about the state of our democracy.”
— Glenn C. Altschuler, Huffington Post

“America’s relationship to class is complicated, and tracking what is a powerful but often invisible identifier is a challenge. Carnes’s book offers scholars a much-needed jumping-off point for continued research on why the working class is vastly underrepresented in public office and how this affects policy outcomes.”
— Tom Perriello, Democracy

“In politics, class matters, and it matters immensely. . . .  Carnes offers striking evidence that the class background of legislators profoundly influences the US political system. . . . White-Collar Government demonstrates that the working class is radically underrepresented in all levels of US government, and the consequences are substantial. I hope (and suspect) that Carnes’s findings will ignite a wave of research that builds on these conclusions.”
— Congress and the Presidency

“[Carnes] explores the hidden role of class in economic policy making and presents a solution to the notion that legislators’ socioeconomic backgrounds have a profound impact not only on how they view issues but also on the choices they make in office.”
— Journal of Economic Literature

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgments


DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226087283.003.0001
[Social Class, Political Inequality, Congress, State and Local Politics, Legislative Politics, Descriptive Representation]
This chapter motivates the book by explaining the concept of social class, by carefully showing that lawmakers in every level and branch of government in the United States are better off than the people they represent on a variety of class measures, by summarizing the book's central argument--that the underrepresentation of the working class in public office skews economic policy outcomes in favor of what affluent Americans want--and by outlining the empirical evidence the book marshals to support this claim. (pages 1 - 24)


DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226087283.003.0002
[Congress, Social Class, Roll-call Voting, Substantive Representation]
The first goal of this book is to explore the individual-level relationship between class and legislative conduct. Chapter 2 uses the author's original congressional data and existing data on every postwar Congress to examine the relationship between class and roll call voting on economic issues. The chapter begins by briefly explaining why and how scholars study roll call voting. It then shows that lawmakers from different classes vote differently on economic legislation, that these differences cannot be attributed to other personal or strategic considerations, that these differences have been stable for the last half century, and that they remain stable throughout individual lawmakers' careers. (pages 25 - 58)


DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226087283.003.0003
[Congress, Social Class, Bill Sponsorship, Coalition Leaders, Legislative Entrepreneurs, Legislative Effort, Legislative Effectiveness, Substantive Representation]
Chapter 3 analyzes the links between class and "behind the scenes" legislative activity. It begins by defining the concept of legislative entrepreneurship--advocacy on behalf of an issue or a proposal--and explaining how it can be measured with data on the kinds of bills lawmakers introduce, how hard they work to see them enacted, and how likely they are to see their proposals advance through the legislative process. The chapter then show that lawmakers from the working class introduce more progressive economic bills and work significantly harder to pass them but do not succeed any more often than other legislators. The chapter concludes by discussing the importance of agenda control; lawmakers who are personally acquainted with the realities of working-class life are rare, and the unique perspectives they bring are often weeded out of the legislative process early on. (pages 59 - 84)


DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226087283.003.0004
[Congress, Social Class, State Legislatures, Legislative Attitudes, Legislative Behavior, Substantive Representation]
Chapter 4 shows that lawmakers from different classes behave differently because they think differently about economic issues. The chapter first describes the methodological challenges--there are almost no reliable data on the personal views of politicians--and explains the datasets that the chapter analyzes, including Miller and Stokes's classic American Representation Study. The chapter then uses that study (and more recent surveys of state legislators) to show that lawmakers from different classes have different views about economic issues and that these attitudinal differences are the driving force behind class-based differences in their actual choices in office. (pages 85 - 108)


DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226087283.003.0005
[Congress, Social Class, State Legislatures, City Councils, Urban Politics, Policy-making, Inequality, Substantive Representation]
Chapter 5 asks how imbalances in the class compositions of political institutions affect economic policy outcomes. The chapter first uses individual-level data on members of Congress from different classes to extrapolate how the institution's class composition might have influenced the outcomes of the most significant economic issues Congress has confronted in the last decade, including the minimum wage, the Bush tax cuts, and the early stages of the federal response to the late-2000s recession. The chapter then complements this analysis by examining economic policy in states and cities, where the aggregate class composition of policymaking institutions varies considerably from place to place. Together, these analyses illustrate how individual-level social class differences in our legislatures matter in the aggregate, how inequalities in the makeup of our representatives affect who ultimately wins and loses in the economic policymaking process. (pages 109 - 136)


DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226087283.003.0006
[Inequality, Social Class, Political Reform, Descriptive Representation]
Chapter 6 discusses this book's troubling implications for our understanding of representation, inequality, and political power in the United States. It concludes by considering a second question raised by the existence of imbalances in the class backgrounds of political officeholders (and given added urgency by the finding that those imbalances are politically consequential), namely, Why are there so few working-class people in political office in the first place? Although this chapter stops short of offering a definitive answer, it presents several findings that cast serious doubt on the old idea that the working class is unfit to govern. It concludes by urging readers who care about the political influence of the less fortunate to focus more attention on the factors that discourage working-class people from holding public office. Several recent candidate training programs have succeeded in helping workers run for state and local offices--programs like these hold tremendous potential for improving the quality of representation in the United States. (pages 137 - 152)

Notes

References

Index