Cloth: 978-0-226-32082-3 | Paper: 978-0-226-32083-0 | Electronic: 978-0-226-32125-7
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226321257.001.0001
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ABOUT THIS BOOK
AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preface
Corrigenda to Volume I
In a free society the general good consists principally in the facilities for the pursuit of unknown purposes
The general interest and collective goods
Rules and ignorance
The significance of abstract rules in a world in which most of the particulars are unknown
Will and opinion, ends and values, commands and rules, and other terminological issues
Abstract rules operate as ultimate values because they serve unknown particular ends
The constructivist fallacy of utilitarianism
All valid criticism or improvement of rules of conduct must proceed within agiven system of rules
'Generalization' and the test of universalizability
To perform their functions rules must be applied throughout the long run
Justice is an attribute of human conduct
Justice and the law
Rules of just conduct are generally prohibitions of unjust conduct
Not only the rules of just conduct, but also the test of their justice, are negative
The significance of the negative character of the test of injustice
The ideology of legal positivism
The 'pure theory of law'
Law and morals
The 'law of nature'
Law and sovereignty
The concept of 'social justice'
The conquest of public imagination by 'social justice'
The inapplicability of the concept of justice to the results of a spontaneous process
The rationale of the economic game in which only the conduct of the players but not the result can be just
The alleged necessity of a belief in the justice of rewards
There is no 'value to society'
The meaning of 'social'
'Social justice' and equality
'Equality of opportunity'
'Social justice' and freedom under the law
The spatial range of 'social justice'
Claims for compensation for distasteful jobs
The resentment of the loss of accustomed positions
Conclusions
Appendix to Chapter Nine: Justice and Individual Rights
The nature of the market order
A free society is a pluralistic society without a common hierarchy of ends
Though not a single economy, the Great Society is still held together by what vulgarly are called economic relations
The aim of policy in a society of free men cannot be a maximum of foreknown results but only an abstract order
The game of catallaxy
In judging the adaptations to changing circumstances comparisons of the new with the former position are irrelevant
Rules of just conduct protect only material domains and not market values
The correspondence of expectations is brought about by a disappointment of some expectations
Abstract rules of conduct can determine only chances and not particular results
Specific commands ('interference') in a catallaxy create disorder and can never be just
The aim of law should be to improve equally the chances of all
The Good Society is one in which the chances of anyone selected at random are likely to be as great as possible
The pursuit of unattainable goals may prevent the achievement of the possible
The causes of the revival of the organizational thinking of the tribe
The immoral consequences of morally inspired efforts
In the Great Society 'social justice' becomes a disruptive force
From the care of the most unfortunate to the protection of vested interests
Attempts to 'correct' the order of the market lead to its destruction
The revolt against the discipline of abstract rules
The morals of the open and of the closed society
The old conflict between loyalty andjustice
The small group in the Open Society
The importance of voluntary associations
Notes
Index