How to Save a Constitutional Democracy
by Tom Ginsburg and Aziz Z. Huq
University of Chicago Press, 2018
Cloth: 978-0-226-56438-8 | Paper: 978-0-226-75507-6 | Electronic: 978-0-226-56441-8
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226564418.001.0001
ABOUT THIS BOOKAUTHOR BIOGRAPHYREVIEWSTABLE OF CONTENTS

ABOUT THIS BOOK

Democracies are in danger. Around the world, a rising wave of populist leaders threatens to erode the core structures of democratic self-rule. In the United States, the tenure of Donald Trump has seemed decisive turning point for many. What kind of president intimidates jurors, calls the news media the “enemy of the American people,” and seeks foreign assistance investigating domestic political rivals? Whatever one thinks of President Trump, many think the Constitution will safeguard us from lasting damage. But is that assumption justified?

How to Save a Constitutional Democracy mounts an urgent argument that we can no longer afford to be complacent. Drawing on a rich array of other countries’ experiences with democratic backsliding, Tom Ginsburg and Aziz Z. Huq show how constitutional rules can both hinder and hasten the decline of democratic institutions. The checks and balances of the federal government, a robust civil society and media, and individual rights—such as those enshrined in the First Amendment—often fail as bulwarks against democratic decline. The sobering reality for the United States, Ginsburg and Huq contend, is that the Constitution’s design makes democratic erosion more, not less, likely. Its structural rigidity has had unforeseen consequence—leaving the presidency weakly regulated and empowering the Supreme Court conjure up doctrines that ultimately facilitate rather than inhibit rights violations. Even the bright spots in the Constitution—the First Amendment, for example—may have perverse consequences in the hands of a deft communicator who can degrade the public sphere by wielding hateful language banned in many other democracies. We—and the rest of the world—can do better. The authors conclude by laying out practical steps for how laws and constitutional design can play a more positive role in managing the risk of democratic decline.

AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY

Tom Ginsburg is the Leo Spitz Professor of International Law and professor of political science at the University of Chicago. He is the author or coauthor of several books, including Judicial Reputation, The Endurance of National Constitutions, and Judicial Review in New Democracies. Aziz Z. Huq is the Frank and Bernice J. Greenberg Professor of Law at the University of Chicago.

REVIEWS

“It is definitely  valuable reading for specialists—who can also exploit an exceptionally detailed critical index—as well as for all responsible citizens.”
— Democratic Audit

“Extremely careful and evidence-based and yet it seeks to reach a broader audience—at a time when, as Huq and Ginsburg themselves note, a great deal of current political debate explicitly rejects the value of arguments and evidence of this kind.”
— Jotwell

“This book makes a huge contribution to our understanding of how democracies erode and what institutional reforms would make it harder for authoritarian populists to entrench their power. It should be required reading for anybody who seeks to bolster the stability of embattled democracies around the world.”
— Yascha Mounk, author of The People vs. Democracy

“Drawing expertly on examples from across the world, Ginsburg and Huq highlight the constitutional mechanisms by which democracies may be undermined—often by elected leaders themselves—in the contemporary era. They make a compelling case that the United States is not immune to democratic backsliding, and they point to various ways in which the US Constitution leaves us vulnerable to such backsliding. Finally, whereas other recent books on the crisis of American democracy focus on what has gone wrong, Ginsburg and Huq provide us with clear-eyed proposals—including some bold constitutional reforms—for how to fix it. I strongly recommend this book.”
— Steven Levitsky, coauthor of How Democracies Die

"This is an important book—probably the most impressive marshaling of comparative literatures I have seen on this crucial set of issues. Using a wide range of examples, Ginsburg and Huq show how healthy democracies can mutate into autocratic or oligarchic systems, and they offer an incisive account of how this might happen in the United States. A cautionary tale told with case studies from around the world, this is a sobering analysis of our trying times."
 
— Jack M. Balkin, Yale Law School

“How to Save a Constitutional Democracy explores the extraordinary challenges democracies face from populist leaders today, above all in the United States. It suggests that our institutions may not be as resilient as we would like to believe, but proposes concrete ways in which they might be strengthened based on wide-ranging knowledge of the experiences of other countries facing similar threats.”
— Francis Fukuyama, Stanford University

“Awe inspiring. How to Save a Constitutional Democracy is masterfully informed, crystal clear, and exceptionally sober. I learned an enormous amount.”
— Adam Przeworski, New York University

"This book surprises because it refuses the solutions that Americans habitually trust: the leadership of presidents, the ethos of judges, a system of checks and balances. At the same time, it is an optimistic book that appeals to American instincts."
— Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts (translated from German)

"Drawing from their vast expertise in comparative constitutional design, Ginsburg and Huq. . . propose changes in US legal texts and jurisprudence that could close the gaps they identify."
— Law & Social Inquiry

TABLE OF CONTENTS


DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226564418.003.0001
[democracy;constitutional Law;constitutional design]
This Introduction identifies the trends in democratic life that make it urgent to ask whether constitutional and institutional design can be used to protect democracies from decay or collapse. The Introduction provides a sketch of the argument of the book on a chapter by chapter basis.


DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226564418.003.0002
[liberal constitutional democracy;democracy;liberalism]
Chapter One defines the central term in the book’s argument: liberal constitutional democracy. There are many ways to define and to use the idea of “democracy.” As this chapter explains, understanding democratic erosion requires a definition that is parsimonious, but that does not reduce democracy to the mere theater of elections. A focus on “liberal constitutional democracy” highlights two necessary components of the project of not just creating but also keeping a democracy. Democracy, in practice, requires substantial protection for individual rights of speech and association—rights that are closely associated with an important liberal tradition of political theory. It also demands a measure of the rule of law, especially in the bureaucratic institutions that administer elections. This approach to thinking about democracy is reasonably parsimonious, but importantly recognizes that elections are not the be all and end all of democracy, and countries can still experience meaningful democratic decline even if they continue to hold them.


DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226564418.003.0003
[democratic erosion;democratic collapse;hybrid regimes]
Chapter Two distinguishes between two distinct pathways away from liberal constitutional democracy: a fast road and a slow one. Historically, fears about the preservation of democracy have focused on the possibility of a sudden and complete collapse, often in the form of a coup or because of the misuse of emergency powers. But the frequency of such collapses globally has declined sharply in recent decades. It is now much more common for democracies to experience a more subtle form of institutional degradation. While this path can sometimes lead to total democratic collapse, the more likely endpoint is a hybrid regime. In the latter, democratic institutions are compromised to some degree and political competition restricted. A close look at some examples of hybrid institutions suggests that this is a disturbing enough prospect to motivate more tailored thinking about remedies and preventative steps.


DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226564418.003.0004
[democratic collapse;military Coups;emergency Powers]
Chapter Three looks closely at the possibility of a complete and sudden collapses of democracy.The quintessential example of such a collapse is the end of Weimar Germany, when Hitler’s Nazi Party used the Reichstag fire as a platform to round up political opponents and to consolidate political power such that whatever election remained were more a matter of show than substance. The threat of democratic collapse has receded over time, but it has not vanished—as the recent military coup in Egypt shows. This chapter explores the two most important mechanisms of democratic collapse—the military coup d’état and the state of emergency.It illuminates the conditions under which those mechanisms are most likely to be triggered, and when the democratic strictures are most likely to fail in response.


DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226564418.003.0005
[constitutional amendment;separation of powers;judicial independence]
This chapter develops a roadmap of the institutional pathways by which a democracy can decay, either leading to a hybrid system of sorts or else leading ultimately to a total collapse. By carefully looking at cases in which democracy has decayed, it is possible to identify with confide a number of constitutional and institutional choices that make it more rather than less likely that democracy will be compromised. For example, would be autocrats often begin their assault by using constitutional amendments to alter basic governance arrangements, and in particular to eliminate checks that operate between different branches of government. This allows the centralization and politicization of executive power as exercised through a captured and corrupted bureaucracy. This in turn is used to pollute the public sphere, while rights of speech and association as well as partisan opposition is suppressed. This chapter also draws attention to a particular style of governing, called charismatic populism, that enables these constitutional changes.


DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226564418.003.0006
[American constitution;separation of powers;bureaucracy]
Chapter 5 argues that the United States is not immune from the risk of democratic recession that other countries around the world have experienced. If forces arise that wish to take the United States down the paths of either fast or slow, it is conventional wisdom that the checks and balances of the federal government, a robust civil society and media, as well as individual rights, such as those included within the First Amendment, will work as bulwarks against democratic backsliding. This claim is seriously wanting. To a greater extent than commonly realized, the Constitution’s text and the Supreme Court’s interpretations of constitutional provisions makes democratic erosion more, not less, likely. The risks are structural, rather than being linked to the specific presidency of Donald Trump. It is true that the Trump presidency suddenly has rendered apparent the political dynamics of erosion, hence revealing the weakness of democracy’s institutional foundation. But it is a mistake to assume that his tenure encapsulates both the beginning and the end of that threat to liberal constitutional democracy.


DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226564418.003.0007
[semi-presidential systems;constitutional reform;amendment rules]
Chapter Six explores the practical steps that can be taken to minimize the risk of democratic erosion by designing a constitution from scratch. The chapter’s focus is on how best to specify the basic institutions and rights of a democracy. To be sure, technocratic fixes are no panacea. Indeed, in many instances, the only way to defend liberal democracy is to fight in elections against those who seek to erode it—and to win. But there are many ways in to do better rather than worse when it comes to amendment rules, the balance of power between the branches, the protections of bureaucracy from political capture, and the sheltering of liberal speech rights and political association. Skepticism about the effects of institutional design on the risk of democratic erosion, in short, is completely unwarranted.


DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226564418.003.0008
[US Supreme Court;congress;presidency]
Chapter Seven focuses on steps, short of amending the Constitution, that can be taken to avoid backsliding in the United States. Building on our analysis of how existing constitutional law not only fails to prevent erosion, but in many cases can facilitate it, the chapter explores solutions do not require the grand heights of constitutional amendment, but still entail some sort of formal change. At present, many of the safeguards that do obtain in the US system against democratic erosion are subconstitutional in character, taking the form of unwritten norms and conventions. There are ways in which these can be strengthened. There are also interpretations of the Constitution, developed by the US Supreme Court, that pose a material risk to democracy’s survival. These too could be changed, without a formal textual amendment to the Constitution, to minimize erosion risk.


DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226564418.003.0009
[political mobilization;constitutional change;the law/politics distinction]
This conclusion draws together the ideas of institutional reform and constitutional change that have come before. It asks how such reform happens, and explores some of the conditions of public action necessary to see change in the US and elsewhere.