When Hitler assumed the German chancellorship in January 1933, 34 percent of Germany’s work force was unemployed. By 1936, before Hitler’s rearmament program took hold of the economy, most of the jobless had disappeared from official unemployment statistics. How did the Nazis put Germany back to work? Was the recovery genuine? If so, how and why was it so much more successful than that of other industrialized nations? Hitler’s Economy addresses these questions and contributes to our understanding of the internal dynamics and power structure of the Nazi regime in the early years of the Third Reich.

Dan Silverman focuses on Nazi direct work creation programs, utilizing rich archival sources to trace the development and implementation of these programs at the regional and local level. He rigorously evaluates the validity of Nazi labor market statistics and reassesses the relative importance of road construction, housing, land reclamation, and resettlement in Germany’s economic recovery, while providing new insights into how these projects were financed. He illuminates the connection between work creation and Nazi race, agriculture, and resettlement policies. Capping his work is a comparative analysis of economic recovery during the 1930s in Germany, Britain, and the United States.

Silverman concludes that the recovery in Germany between 1933 and 1936 was real, not simply the product of statistical trickery and the stimulus of rearmament, and that Nazi work creation programs played a significant role. However, he argues, it was ultimately the workers themselves, toiling under inhumane conditions in labor camps, who paid the price for this recovery. Nazi propaganda glorifying the “dignity of work” masked the brutal reality of Hitler’s “economic miracle.”

The prudent administrator clearly recognizes the differences between authority and power. The first is the right to wield power and the second is the actual exercise of power. Joseph B. Eastman, as federal coordinator of transportation, had the authority to require acts of railroad coordination but lacked the power. When he tried to exercise authority as though it were power, the railroads combined with the unions and deprived him of his authority.

Earl Latham, in this analysis of the politics of administration, makes use of hitherto unpublished letters and memoranda written by Eastman. Coming at a time when the railroad industry is suffering acutely from its chronic problem of excessive separatism, The Politics of Railroad Coordination is a thought-provoking application of power group analysis to a major problem of administration. It will be of particular interest to persons concerned with problems of the regulation of industry, public administration, the transportation industry, and the method of power group analysis.