ABOUT THIS BOOK

Castles, Battles, and Bombs reconsiders key episodes of military history from the point of view of economics—with dramatically insightful results. For example, when looked at as a question of sheer cost, the building of castles in the High Middle Ages seems almost inevitable: though stunningly expensive, a strong castle was far cheaper to maintain than a standing army. The authors also reexamine the strategic bombing of Germany in World War II and provide new insights into France’s decision to develop nuclear weapons. Drawing on these examples and more, Brauer and Van Tuyll suggest lessons for today’s military, from counterterrorist strategy and military manpower planning to the use of private military companies in Afghanistan and Iraq.

"In bringing economics into assessments of military history, [the authors] also bring illumination. . . . [The authors] turn their interdisciplinary lens on the mercenary arrangements of Renaissance Italy; the wars of Marlborough, Frederick the Great, and Napoleon; Grant's campaigns in the Civil War; and the strategic bombings of World War II. The results are invariably stimulating."—Martin Walker, Wilson Quarterly

"This study is serious, creative, important. As an economist I am happy to see economics so professionally applied to illuminate major decisions in the history of warfare."—Thomas C. Schelling, Winner of the 2005 Nobel Prize in Economics

AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY

Jurgen Brauer is professor of economics in the James M. Hull College of Business at Augusta State University and the author of Arms Trade and Economic Development. Hubert P. van Tuyll is professor of history and chair of the Department of History, Anthropology, and Philosophy at Augusta State University. He is the author of The Netherlands and World War I.

REVIEWS

"My skepticism was relieved by the preface, my expectations enhanced by the first chapter, my confidence assured by the second. This study is serious, creative, important. As an economist I am happy to see economics so professionally applied to illuminate major decisions in the history of warfare."

— Thomas C. Schelling, University of Maryland, winner of the 2005 Nobel Prize in Economics

“Rarely does reading a book offer such rewards. Unarguably scholarly, cast in Jared Diamond’s mold, Brauer and van Tuyll’s work transported this economic historian across centuries and into realms that opened my eyes and engaged my imagination, both as an historian and an economist. My understanding of a past I thought I knew has been broadened and deepened and my teaching of that past forever altered. I enjoyed the journey. I am in the authors’ debt.”

— John J. McCusker, Trinity University

"In bringing economics into assessments of military history, [the authors] also bring illumination. . . . [The authors] turn their interdisciplinary lens on the mercenary arrangements of Renaissance Italy; the wars of Marlborough, Frederick the Great, and Napoleon; Grant's campaigns in the Civil War; and the strategic bombings of World War II. The results are invariably stimulating."

— Martin Walker, Wilson Quarterly

"The authors have cogently synthesized an extensive literature to effectively demonstrate to nonspecialists how basic economic concepts can provide insights into the nature of war."

— Choice

“[Brauer and van Tuyll’s] analysis and discussion of military history is fascinating and mirrors the substantial recent interest on the economic dimensions of conflicts and the fiscal important of strategic choices. . . . The strengths of this book include the clarity of the material and the writing style, the accessibility of both the economic theory and historical cases used, and the various illustrations and additional materials. . . . I can heartily recommend this for everyone interested in military history and on how economics theory can help us understand historical outcomes better.”

— Jari Eloranta, Journal of Economic History

"[The authors] are to be congratulated for adding an imaginative, logical, and hitherto mostly ignored explanation for the apparent irrationality of wars and warmaking. When they apply their theories to the present, [they] take much of the emotion and partisanship out of contemporary discussions, showing how many controversial choices are in fact guided by economic necessities rather than supposedly shallow and bad men."

— Victo Davis Hanson, Claremont Review of Books

"There is a need for a closer study of the historical relationship between economics and war....This is not that book. Its title suggests that it might be something else, at once more narrow and yet possibly more instructive: an attempt to explain decisions taken in war as a product of economic considerations."

— The International History Review

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Figures and Tables
Preface

Chapter 1. Economics

Economics
Principle I: Opportunity Cost
Principle II: Expected Marginal Costs and Benefits
Principle III: Substitution
Principle IV: Diminishing Marginal Returns
Principle V: Asymmetric Information and Hidden Characteristics
Principle VI: Hidden Actions and Incentive Alignments
Conclusion: Economics—and Military History

Chapter 2. The High Middle Ages, 1000–1300: The Case of the Medieval Castle and the Opportunity Cost of Warfare

Opportunity Cost and Warfare
The Ubiquity of Castles
The Cost of Castling
The Advantages of Castles
The Cost of Armies
Castle Building and the Other Principles of Economics
Conclusion

Chapter 3. The Renaissance, 1300–1600: The Case of the Condottieri and the Military

Labor Market
The Principal-Agent Problem
Demand, Supply, and Recruitment
Contracts and Pay
Control and Contract Evolution
The Development of Permanent Armies
Condottieri and the Other Principles of Economics
Conclusion

Chapter 4. The Age of Battle, 1618–1815: The Case of Costs, Benefits, and the Decision to Offer Battle

Expected Marginal Costs and Benefits of Battle
The 1600s: Gustavus Adolphus and Raimondo de Montecuccoli
The 1700s: Marlborough, de Saxe, and Frederick the Great
Napoleonic Warfare
The Age of Battle and the Other Principles of Economics
Conclusion

Chapter 5. The Age of Revolution, 1789–1914: The Case of the American Civil War and the Economics of Information Asymmetry

Information and Warfare
North, South, and the Search for Information
Major Eastern Campaigns through Gettysburg
Grant in Virginia
The American Civil War and the Other Principles of Economics
Conclusion

Chapter 6. The Age of the World Wars, 1914–1945: The Case of Diminishing Marginal Returns to the Strategic Bombing of Germany in World War II

A Strategic Bombing Production Function
Bombing German War Production
Bombing the Supply Chain and the Civilian Economy
Bombing German Morale
Assessing the Effect of Strategic Bombing
Strategic Bombing and the Other Principles of Economics
Conclusion

Chapter 7. The Age of the Cold War, 1945–1991: The Case of Capital-Labor Substitution and France’s Force de Frappe

History of the Force de Frappe
The Force Post–De Gaulle
Justifying the Force
The Force’s Effect on France’s Conventional Arms
Substituting Nuclear for Conventional Forces
The Force de Frappe and the Other Principles of Economics
Conclusion

Chapter 8. Economics and Military History in the Twenty-first Century Economics of Terrorism

Economics of Military Manpower
Economics of Private Military Companies
Economics, Historiography, and Military History
Conclusion

Notes
References
Index

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