edited by Daniel P. Kessler
University of Chicago Press, 2010
Paper: 978-0-226-43220-5 | Cloth: 978-0-226-43218-2 | eISBN: 978-0-226-43221-2
Library of Congress Classification KF5407.R44 2010
Dewey Decimal Classification 342.73066

ABOUT THIS BOOK | AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY | TOC | REQUEST ACCESSIBLE FILE
ABOUT THIS BOOK
 
The efficacy of various political institutions is the subject of intense debate between proponents of broad legislative standards enforced through litigation and those who prefer regulation by administrative agencies. This book explores the trade-offs between litigation and regulation, the circumstances in which one approach may outperform the other, and the principles that affect the choice between addressing particular economic activities with one system or the other. Combining theoretical analysis with empirical investigation in a range of industries, including public health, financial markets, medical care, and workplace safety, Regulation versus Litigation sheds light on the costs and benefits of two important instruments of economic policy.