Owen Flanagan argues in this book for a more psychologically realistic ethical reflection and spells out the ways in which psychology can enrich moral philosophy. Beginning with a discussion of such “moral saints” as Gandhi, Mother Teresa, and Oskar Schindler, Flanagan charts a middle course between an ethics that is too realistic and socially parochial and one that is too idealistic, giving no weight to our natures.

• Contents 
• PART I 
• Ethics and Pshychological Realism
• Prologue: Saints
• 1. 
• Ethics and Psychology
• The Topic
• Ethics, Psychology, and the Human Sciences
• The Autonomy Thesis
• 2. 
• The Principle of Minimal Psychological Realism
• Minimal Psychological Realism
• Psychological Distance
• Natural and Social Psychological Traits
• Environmental Sensitivity
• Natural Teleology and the Naturalistic Fallacy
• 3. 
• Psychological Realism and the Personal Point of View
• The Argument from the Personal Point of View
• Minimal Persons
• Persons and Plans
• Characters, Commitments, and Projects
• Separateness and Impersonality
• 4. 
• Abstraction, Alienation, and Integrity
• Strong Realism and Socially Fortified Persons
• Abstraction and Kinds of Impartiality
• Integrity, Alienation, and Virtues of Form
• PART II 
• Liberal and Communitarian Philosophical Psychology
• 5. 
• Community and the Liberal Self
• The Social Construction of Persons
• The Classical Picture and the Primacy of Justice
• Community, Friendship, and Flourishing
• Appreciation, Emulation, and Self-Respect
• Social Union
• 6. 
• Identity and Community
• Actual and Self-Represented Identity
• Identity, Self-Esteem, and Effective Agency
• Self-Understanding, Encumbered Identity, and Psychological Realism
• Self-Understanding and Like-Mindedness
• Narrativity and Homogeneity
• PART III 
• Moral Psychology
• 7. 
• Moral Cognition: Development and Deep Structure
• Psychological Realism and Deep Structure
• The Moral Judgment of the Child
• Moral Consciousness, Speech Acting, and Opacity
• Rules and Autonomy: The Marble Study
• Games and Gender
• Consequences and Intentions
• The “Consciousness of Something Attractive”
• 8. 
• Modern Cognition: Development and Deep Structure
• Stage Theory
• Stage Holism and Globality
• Moral Stage, Character Assessment, and Unified Justification
• Development and Improvement
• The Adequacy of the Highest Stage
• 9. 
• Virtue, Gender, and Identity
• Identity and Morality
• Psychological Realism and Gender
• Two Different Global Voices?
• Gestalt Shifts
• 10. 
• Gender Differences: The Current Status of the Debate
• The No-Difference Claim
• The Relation of Justice and Care
• Further Empirical Questions
• 11. 
• Gender, Normative Adequacy, Content, and Cognitivism
• Six Theses
• The Separate-but-Equal Doctrine
• The Integration Doctrine
• The Hammer-Wrench Doctrine
• Impartialism
• Noncognitivist Care
• Context-Sensitive Care
• PART IV 
• Situations, Dispositions, and Well-Being
• 12. 
• Invisible Shepherds, Sensible Knaves, and the Modularity of the Moral
• Two Thought Experiments about Character
• Persons in Situations
• Moral Gaps and the Unity of Character
• Moral Modularity
• 13. 
• Characters and Their Traits
• Traits and Traitology
• Individual Trait Globality and Situation Sensitivity
• The Trait-Inference Network and Evaluative Consistency
• Evaluative Consistency, the Authoritarian Personality, and Authoritarian Behavior
• Moral Traits
• 14. 
• Situations, Sympathy, and Attribution Theory
• Character and Coercion
• Milgram's “One Great Unchanging Result”
• Coercion and Rebellion in Groups
• Situations and Samaritans
• Attribution Theory and Moral Personality
• 15. 
• Virtue, Mental Health, and Happiness
• Illusion and Well-Being
• The Traditional View Meets the Facts
• The Traditional View versus the Classical View
• Virtue, Again
• Epilogue
• Notes
• References
• Index