Cover
Title Page
Copyright
Contents
Introduction: Hilary Putnam: Artisanal Polymath of Philosophy
Part One. On the Relations between Philosophy and Science
Chapter 1. Science and Philosophy (2010)
Chapter 2. From Quantum Mechanics to Ethics and Back Again (2012)
Chapter 3. Corresponding with Reality (2011)
Chapter 4. On Not Writing Off Scientific Realism (2010)
Chapter 5. The Content and Appeal of “Naturalism” (2004)
Chapter 6. A Philosopher Looks at Quantum Mechanics (Again) (2005)
Chapter 7. Quantum Mechanics and Ontology (2011)
Chapter 8. The Curious Story of Quantum Logic (2011)
Part Two. Mathematics and Logic
Chapter 9. Indispensability Arguments in the Philosophy of Mathematics (2006)
Chapter 10. Revisiting the Liar Paradox (2000)
Chapter 11. Set Theory: Realism, Replacement, and Modality (2007)
Chapter 12. On Axioms of Set Existence (2011)
Chapter 13. The Gödel Theorem and Human Nature (2011)
Chapter 14. After Gödel (2006)
Chapter 15. Nonstandard Models and Kripke’s Proof of the Gödel Theorem (2000)
Chapter 16. A Proof of the Underdetermination “Doctrine” (2011)
Chapter 17. A Theorem of Craig’s about Ramsey Sentences (2011)
Part Three. Values and Ethics
Chapter 18. The Fact/Value Dichotomy and Its Critics (2011)
Chapter 19. Capabilities and Two Ethical Theories (2008)
Chapter 20. The Epistemology of Unjust War (2006)
Chapter 21. Cloning People (1999)
Part Four. Wittgenstein: Pro and Con
Chapter 22. Wittgenstein and Realism (2007)
Chapter 23. Was Wittgenstein Really an Antirealist about Mathematics? (2001)
Chapter 24. Rules, Attunement, and “Applying Words to the World”: The Struggle to Understand Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language (2001)
Chapter 25. Wittgenstein, Realism, and Mathematics (2002)
Chapter 26. Wittgenstein and the Real Numbers (2007)
Chapter 27. (With Juliet Floyd) Wittgenstein’s “Notorious” Paragraph about the Gödel Theorem: Recent Discussions (2008)
Chapter 28. Wittgenstein: A Reappraisal (2011)
Part Five. The Problems and Pathos of Skepticism
Chapter 29. Skepticism, Stroud, and the Contextuality of Knowledge (2001)
Chapter 30. Skepticism and Occasion- Sensitive Semantics (1998)
Chapter 31. Strawson and Skepticism (1998)
Chapter 32. Philosophy as the Education of Grownups: Stanley Cavell and Skepticism (2006)
Part Six. Experience and Mind
Chapter 33. The Depths and Shallows of Experience (2005)
Chapter 34. Aristotle’s Mind and the Contemporary Mind (2000)
Chapter 35. Functionalism: Cognitive Science or Science Fiction? (1997)
Chapter 36. How to Be a Sophisticated “Naïve Realist” (2011)
Acknowledgments
Index