Harvard University Press, 1999 Paper: 978-0-674-12778-4 Library of Congress Classification HB846.S46 1999 Dewey Decimal Classification 330.1556
ABOUT THIS BOOK | REVIEWS | TOC
ABOUT THIS BOOK Choice, Welfare and Measurement contains many of Amartya Sen's most important contributions to economic analysis and methods, including papers on choice, preference, rationality, aggregation, and measurement. A substantial introductory essay interrelates his diverse concerns, and also analyzes discussions generated by the original papers, focusing on the underlying issues.
REVIEWS
Amartya Sen, [the 1998] Nobel Prizewinner in Economics, has helped give voice to the world's poor. And that is no small matter, for the very lives of the world's poor may depend on having their voices heard. In a lifetime of careful scholarship, Sen has repeatedly returned to a basic theme: even impoverished societies can improve the well-being of their least advantaged members. Societies that attend to the poorest of the poor can save their lives, promote their longevity and increase their opportunities through education and productive work. Societies that neglect the poor, on the other hand, may inadvertently allow millions to die of famine--even in the middle of an economic boom, as occurred during the great famine in Bengal, India, in 1943, the subject of Sen's most famous case study...Sen [delivers a] powerful message: annual income growth is not enough to achieve development. Societies must pay attention to social goals as well, always leaning toward their most vulnerable citizens, and overcoming deep-rooted biases to invest in the health and well-being of girls as well as boys. In a world in which 1.5 billion people subsist on less than $1 a day, this Nobel Prize can be not just a celebration of a wonderful scholar but also a clarion call to attend to the urgent needs and hopes of the world's poor.
-- Jeffrey Sachs Time
Many of these papers are classics that one consults again and again. But [the collection] is more than a convenience: one gains something from reading these essays together.
-- Robert Sugden Times Higher Education Supplement
Sen’s mastery in the fields of social choice, the foundation of welfare economics, and, more broadly, distributive ethics and the measurement problems associated with these fields is unquestioned. This selection of articles fully reflects his work in these areas… A number of papers are classics.
-- Kenneth J. Arrow
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preface vii
Introduction 1
Part I: Choice and Preference
1 Choice Functions and Revealed Preference 41
2 Behaviour and the Concept of Preference 54
3 Choice, Orderings and Morality 74
4 Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioural Foundations of
Economic Theory 84
Part II: Preference Aggregation
5 A Possibility Theorem on Majority Decisions 109
6 Quasi-transitivity, Rational Choice and Collective Decisions 118
7 Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Rational Choice under
Majority Decision with P. K. Pattanaik 134
8 Social Choice Theory: A Re-examination 158
Part III: Welfare Comparisons and Social Choice
9 Interpersonal Aggregation and Partial Comparability 203
10 On Ignorance and Equal Distribution 222
11 On Weights and Measures: Informational Constraints in Social
Welfare Analysis 226
12 Interpersonal Comparisons of Welfare 264
Part IV: Non-utility Information
13 The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal 285
14 Liberty, Unanimity and Rights 291
15 Personal Utilities and Public Judgements: or What's Wrong
with Welfare Economics? 327
16 Equality of What? 353
Part V: Social Measurement
17 Poverty: An Ordinal Approach to Measurement 373
18 Real National Income 388
19 Ethical Measurement of Inequality: Some Difficulties 416
20 Description as Choice 432
Harvard University Press, 1999 Paper: 978-0-674-12778-4
Choice, Welfare and Measurement contains many of Amartya Sen's most important contributions to economic analysis and methods, including papers on choice, preference, rationality, aggregation, and measurement. A substantial introductory essay interrelates his diverse concerns, and also analyzes discussions generated by the original papers, focusing on the underlying issues.
REVIEWS
Amartya Sen, [the 1998] Nobel Prizewinner in Economics, has helped give voice to the world's poor. And that is no small matter, for the very lives of the world's poor may depend on having their voices heard. In a lifetime of careful scholarship, Sen has repeatedly returned to a basic theme: even impoverished societies can improve the well-being of their least advantaged members. Societies that attend to the poorest of the poor can save their lives, promote their longevity and increase their opportunities through education and productive work. Societies that neglect the poor, on the other hand, may inadvertently allow millions to die of famine--even in the middle of an economic boom, as occurred during the great famine in Bengal, India, in 1943, the subject of Sen's most famous case study...Sen [delivers a] powerful message: annual income growth is not enough to achieve development. Societies must pay attention to social goals as well, always leaning toward their most vulnerable citizens, and overcoming deep-rooted biases to invest in the health and well-being of girls as well as boys. In a world in which 1.5 billion people subsist on less than $1 a day, this Nobel Prize can be not just a celebration of a wonderful scholar but also a clarion call to attend to the urgent needs and hopes of the world's poor.
-- Jeffrey Sachs Time
Many of these papers are classics that one consults again and again. But [the collection] is more than a convenience: one gains something from reading these essays together.
-- Robert Sugden Times Higher Education Supplement
Sen’s mastery in the fields of social choice, the foundation of welfare economics, and, more broadly, distributive ethics and the measurement problems associated with these fields is unquestioned. This selection of articles fully reflects his work in these areas… A number of papers are classics.
-- Kenneth J. Arrow
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preface vii
Introduction 1
Part I: Choice and Preference
1 Choice Functions and Revealed Preference 41
2 Behaviour and the Concept of Preference 54
3 Choice, Orderings and Morality 74
4 Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioural Foundations of
Economic Theory 84
Part II: Preference Aggregation
5 A Possibility Theorem on Majority Decisions 109
6 Quasi-transitivity, Rational Choice and Collective Decisions 118
7 Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Rational Choice under
Majority Decision with P. K. Pattanaik 134
8 Social Choice Theory: A Re-examination 158
Part III: Welfare Comparisons and Social Choice
9 Interpersonal Aggregation and Partial Comparability 203
10 On Ignorance and Equal Distribution 222
11 On Weights and Measures: Informational Constraints in Social
Welfare Analysis 226
12 Interpersonal Comparisons of Welfare 264
Part IV: Non-utility Information
13 The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal 285
14 Liberty, Unanimity and Rights 291
15 Personal Utilities and Public Judgements: or What's Wrong
with Welfare Economics? 327
16 Equality of What? 353
Part V: Social Measurement
17 Poverty: An Ordinal Approach to Measurement 373
18 Real National Income 388
19 Ethical Measurement of Inequality: Some Difficulties 416
20 Description as Choice 432