Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments
Harvard University Press, 1998
Cloth: 978-0-674-76622-8 | Paper: 978-0-674-76623-5 | eISBN: 978-0-674-26820-3
Library of Congress Classification BJ1451.W27 1994
Dewey Decimal Classification 170
Cloth: 978-0-674-76622-8 | Paper: 978-0-674-76623-5 | eISBN: 978-0-674-26820-3
Library of Congress Classification BJ1451.W27 1994
Dewey Decimal Classification 170
ABOUT THIS BOOK | REVIEWS
ABOUT THIS BOOK
R. Jay Wallace advances a powerful and sustained argument against the common view that accountability requires freedom of will. Instead, he maintains, the fairness of holding people responsible depends on their rational competence: the power to grasp moral reasons and to control their behavior accordingly. He shows how these forms of rational competence are compatible with determinism. At the same time, giving serious consideration to incompatibilist concerns, Wallace develops a compelling diagnosis of the common assumption that freedom is necessary for responsibility.
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