ABOUT THIS BOOK

The Ethiopian popular revolution of 1974 ended a monarchy that claimed descent from King Solomon and the Queen of Sheba, and brought to power a military government that created one of the largest and best-equipped armies in Africa. In his panoramic study of the Ethiopian army, Fantahun Ayele draws upon his unprecedented access to Ethiopian Ministry of Defense archives to study the institution that was able to repel the Somali invasion of 1977 and suppress internal uprisings, but collapsed in 1991 under the combined onslaught of armed insurgencies in Eritrea and Tigray. Besides military operations, The Ethiopian Army discusses tactical areas such as training, equipment, intelligence, and logistics, as well as grand strategic choices such as ending the 1953 Ethio-American Mutual Defense Agreement and signing a treaty of military assistance with the Soviet Union. The result sheds considerable light on the military developments that have shaped Ethiopia and the Horn in the twentieth century.

AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY

Fantahun Ayele is an assistant professor of history at Bahir Dar University in Ethiopia. He was the second recipient of the Global Encounters postdoctoral appointment in African Studies at Northwestern University, funded by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation.

REVIEWS

"...a meticulously researched and well-argued book that scholars of military history in Africa will find useful." --International Journal of African Historical Studies

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"...Fantahun Ayele’s comprehensive study of the Ethiopian army from its triumph in the Ogaden War of 1977-78 to its eventual ignominious collapse against a rebel coalition in 1991 is extraordinarily impressive. Ayele has gathered a massive trove of previously unseen information and synthesized it to produce a singular volume that...should find a home on the shelf of any military historian with an interest in Africa or any Africanist who carries an interest in the Horn of Africa." –H-Net Reviews

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgments
Preface
Introduction
1. Background: The Ethiopian Army 1941–1974
1.1. Organization of the Army
1.2. Training and Equipment
1.3. Operations
2. Recruitment, Training and Equipment 1977–1991
2.1. Recruitment/Conscription and Training
2.2. Equipment
3. Structure, Logistics and Command and Control 1977–1991
3.1. Organization of the Army
3.2. Logistics
3.3. Command and Control
3.3.1. The Triangular Command
3.3.2. The 1989 Abortive Coup
4. Military Intelligence 1977–1991
4.1. Organization of the Military Intelligence Department and its Activities
4.2. Some Limited Achievements of the Military Intelligence Department
4.3. Major Intelligence Failures
4.4. Counter-Intelligence
5. Operations: The Somali-Ethiopian War 1977–1978
6. Operations: Counter-Insurgency Campaigns in Northern Ethiopia
6.1. The Battles for Naqfa 1976–1986
6.2. The Afabét and Sheré Debacles
6.3. From Sheré to Karra Mesheg: Worsening Military Reverses
6.4. The Last Days of the Army
7. The Revolutionary Army and its External Patrons
7.1 The Revolution and the Revolutionary Army
7.2. The Role of Soviet Military Advisers
8. Conclusions: Why did the Army Lose the War?
8.1. Loss of Public Support
8.2. Failure to Apply the Right Counter-Insurgency Strategy and Tactics
8.3. Intelligence Failure
8.4. Problems of Command and Control
8.5. Conscription, Training and Organizational Problems
8.6. War Weariness and Disillusionment

Endnotes
Bibliography
Appendices

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