Contents
Foreword by John F. Crosby
Acknowledgments
Introduction
1. Moral Epistemology
The Linkage to Brentano
The Influence of Scheler
Epistemic Acts in Which Values Are Given
Concluding Remarks
2. The Concept of Value
The Merely Subjectively Satisfying vs. the Intrinsically Important
The Objective Good for the Person
The Relationship of von Hildebrand's Account of Value to the Accounts of Kant, Brentano, and Scheler
The Intrinsically Important and the Traditional Concept of the Good
Concluding Remarks
3. Akrasia
Von Hildebrand on Akratic Action: A Comparison to Plato
The Five Types of Moral Character
The Three Centers in the Human Being vs. the Theory of Tripartition
Some Remarks on Aristotle's Account of Akrasia
Concluding Remarks
4. Value Blindness
Definition and Moral Accountability of Value Blindness
Total Value Blindness
Partial Value Blindness
Subsumption Blindness
Schematic Overview of and Critical Remarks on the Various Forms of Value Blindness
Concluding Remarks
Love as a Desire for the Good or as a Value Response?
The Indispensability of an Interest in One's Own Happiness in Most Forms of Love
The Supreme Happiness of Love
The Support and Explanation for the Supreme Happiness of Love
Additional Notes on Love and Happiness in Relation to Morality
Concluding Remarks
Conclclusion
Bibliography
Index of Names
General Index