The Will to Win focuses on the substantial role of US military advisors to the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) from 1946 until 1953 in one of America’s early attempts at nation building.

 

Gibby describes ROKA’s structure, mission, challenges, and successes, thereby linking the South Korean army and their US advisors to the traditional narrative of this “forgotten war.” The work also demonstrates the difficulties inherent in national reconstruction, focusing on barriers in culture and society, and the effects of rapid decolonization combined with intense nationalism and the appeal of communism to East Asia following the destruction of the Japanese empire. Key conclusions include the importance of individual advisors, the significance of the prewar advisory effort, and the depth of the impact these men had on individual Korean units and in a few cases on the entire South Korean army.

 

The success or failure of South Korean government in the decade following the end of World War II hinged on the loyalty, strength, and fighting capability of its army, which in turn relied on its American advisors. Gibby argues that without a proficient ROKA, the 1953 armistice, still in effect today, would not have been possible. He reexamines the Korean conflict from its beginning in 1945—particularly Korean politics, military operations, and armed forces—and demonstrates the crucial role the American military advisory program and personnel played to develop a more competent and reliable Korean army.

Bryan R. Gibby, a lieutenant colonel in the US Army, served in Iraq as the intelligence officer for the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, and at the US Military Academy at West Point as an assistant professor in the Department of History. He has published on military history in Military Advising and Assistance: From Mercenaries to Privatization, 1815–2007 and the International Encyclopedia of Military History.  

“Gibby’s argument for the central role of the KMAG (Korean Military Advisory Group) in the development of the ROK army and for that army’s central role, first in defeating guerrillas in the South prior to June 1950 and then in containing the conventional Communist attacks after that date, is developed with meticulous care and goes well beyond anything currently in the literature on the Korean War.”—William Stueck, author of The Korean War: An International History and Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History