ABOUT THIS BOOK

In Unselfishness, Nicholas Rescher criticizes the stance of many contemporary moral philosophers and social theorists-that rationality conflicts with morality, and instead defends the position of historical thinkers who believed that the worth of altruism is irreducible and that its rationalization does not require recourse to prudential self-interest. To support his position, Rescher provides detailed examples, and a theoretical critique of utilitarian morality.

AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY

Nicholas Rescher is Distinguished University Professor of Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh and co-chairman of the Center for Philosophy of Science. A member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, he has served as president of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association, the Leibniz Society of North America, the Charles S. Peirce Society, the American Catholic Philosophical Association, and the Metaphysical Society of America. Rescher is the author or editor of more than one hundred books, including Ignorance (On the Wider Implications of Deficient Knowledge), Philosophical Inquiries: An Introduction to Problems of Philosophy, and A Journey through Philosophy in 101 Anecdotes.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contents

Preface

1. The Vicarious Affects and the Modalities of Unselfishness

2. The Workings of the Vicarious

3. Rationality and the "Prisoner's Dilemma"

4. Conflict Situations and the Social Point of View

5. Vicarious Affects and the Critique of Utlilaterianism

6. The Social Rationale of Benvolence

Bibliography

Name Index

Subject Index

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