Cover
Title Page
Copyright
Preface
Contents
Figures and Tables
Summary
Acknowledgments
Abbreviations
Introduction
How to Reach a Negotiated Settlement in Counterinsurgency Warfare
The Notion of a Master Narrative
Previous RAND Research: Paths to Victory
The Master Narrative
Step 1: Military Stalemate and War-Weariness
Step 2: Acceptance of Insurgents as Legitimate Negotiating Partners or Non-Adversaries
Step 4: Official Intermediate Agreements
Step 5: Power-Sharing Offers
Step 7: Third-Party Guarantors
Sequences in the Individual Cases
Step 1: Military Stalemate and War-Weariness
Step 2: Acceptance of Insurgents as Legitimate Negotiating Partners
Step 3: Brokered Cease-Fires (Not Always Respected)
Step 4: Official Intermediate Agreements
Step 5: Power-Sharing Offers
Step 6: Moderation of Insurgent Leadership
Step 7: Third-Party Guarantor
Yemen, 1962–1970
Philippines (MNLF), 1971–1996
Lebanese Civil War, 1975–1990
Western Sahara, 1975–1991
Mozambique (RENAMO), 1976–1995
Indonesia (Aceh), 1976–2005
Kampuchea, 1978–1992
Bosnia, 1992–1995
Tajikistan, 1992–1997
Burundi, 1993–2003
Chechnya I, 1994–1996
Democratic Republic of the Congo (Anti-Kabila), 1998–2003
Following the Master Narrative Toward an End Game in Afghanistan
Step 2: Acceptance of Insurgents as Legitimate Negotiating Partners
Step 3: Brokered Cease-Fires
Step 4: Official Intermediate Agreements
Step 5: Power-Sharing Offers
Step 6: Moderation in Leadership
Step 7: Third-Party Guarantors
Conclusion
References