ABOUT THIS BOOK

During the Cold War, the political leadership of the Soviet Union avidly sought intelligence about its main adversary, the United States. Although effective on an operational level, Soviet leaders and their intelligence chiefs fell short when it came to analyzing intelligence. Soviet leaders were often not receptive to intelligence that conflicted with their existing beliefs, and analysts were reluctant to put forward assessments that challenged ideological orthodoxy.

There were, however, important changes over time. Ultimately the views of an enlightened Soviet leader, Gorbachev, trumped the ideological blinders of his predecessors and the intelligence service’s dedication to an endless duel with their ideologically spawned “main adversary," making it possible to end the Cold War.

Raymond Garthoff draws on over five decades of personal contact with Soviet diplomats, intelligence officers, military leaders, and scholars during his remarkable career as an analyst, senior diplomat, and historian. He also builds on previous scholarship and examines documents from Soviet and Western archives. Soviet Leaders and Intelligence offers an informed and highly readable assessment of how the Soviets understood—and misunderstood—the intentions and objectives of their Cold War adversary.

AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY

Raymond L. Garthoff is a senior fellow (emeritus) at the Brookings Institution and served as US ambassador to Bulgaria and as a Cold War–era CIA analyst. His many books include A Journey through the Cold War, Détente and Confrontation: American–Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan, and The Great Transition: American–Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War.

REVIEWS

Marvelous

-- The New York Review of Books

There are very few people who can write about Soviet leaders' thinking and the role that intelligence played in shaping their views with the authority that Garthoff can and does in his new book. . . . [He takes] us beyond the available official and declassified record of how Soviet leaders and intelligence officers perceived and at times misperceived U.S. intentions and goals during the Cold War. . . . Fascinating . . . Nuanced, intriguging, and convincing. . . . Makes several important contributions to scholarship on the Cold War, intelligence studies, and international relations theory.

-- Political Science Quarterly

Raymond Garthoff is a towering figure in Cold War studies. . . . Garthoff provides invaluble insight into the bipolar world of the Cold War. . . . For every student of the Cold War, this small volume should be referred to frequently when reading any history of the Cold War. It is an indispensable resource . . . Teachers and scholars alike will benefit immeasurably, as it is useful both in the classroom and as an essential reference.

-- Marine Corps History

An outstanding book which could as well have the title ‘everything you always wanted to know about the Soviet Union not understanding the United States during the Cold War, in five easy but very informative steps’.

-- International Affairs

Mr. Garthoff is uniquely qualified for such a study. . . . Much of his book is based on personal conversations with Soviet officials—including intelligence officers who spoke candidly about their own service—and declassified Soviet documents.

-- Joseph C. Goulden The Washington Times

Garthoff’s contribution is valuable because it places Soviet intelligence deficiencies in the context of state leadership and points to the need for additional comparative research on U.S.-Soviet leaders, perceptions, and intelligence. . . . Measured, insightful, and valuable to students of Cold War or espionage history.

-- Library Journal

A fascinating evaluation of the extent to which clandestine reporting influenced the Soviet leaders’ approach to the [United States]. . . . Both rewarding for experienced readers and potentially useful for undergraduate teaching.

-- The Russian Review

"A fascinating evaluation of the extent to which clandestine reporting influenced the Soviet leaders’ approach to the [United States]. . . . Both rewarding for experienced readers and potentially useful for undergraduate teaching."

-- The Russian Review

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface

Introduction

1. Stalin: Emergence of the Cold War, 1945–1953

2. Khrushchev: Thaw and Crisis, 1954–1964

3. Brezhnev: Engagement and Détente, 1965–1979

4. Brezhnev, Adropov: Tensions Revived, 1979–1984

5. Gorbachev: Back to Détente—and Beyond, 1985–1991

Conclusions

Appendix 1: Soviet Leaders, 1945–1991Appendix 2: Heads of the Soviet State Security Organization, 1945–1991Appendix 3: Heads of the Soviet Foreign Intelligence Service, 1945–1991Appendix 4: US-Soviet Summit Meetings, 1945–1991