William L. Miller is ‘Edward Caird’ Professor of Politics at Glasgow University and a Fellow of the British Academy

Åse B. Grødeland is researching EU membership conditionality and corruption at the Norwegian Institute of Urban and Regional Research, Oslo.

Tatyana Y.Koshechkina is International Director at GfK-GB, London.

List of Tables List of Figures Preface and Acknowledgements 1. Coping with Government: Democratic Ideals and Street-Level Bureaucrats The Democratic Ideal: A ‘Complete Democracy’ Should Public-Sector Corruption Be Condemned? Does Street-Level Corruption Matter? Do History and Culture Exclude the Possibility of Reform? Why Surveys? What Surveys? Plan of the Book Appendix: The Study Design Notes 2. Context: An Unfinished Transition The Democratisation of Local Government Privatisation and Restitution Economic and Moral Chaos The Political Context Public Perspectives on the Unfinished Transition Conclusion: Victims of a Necessary Transition Notes 3. Public Perceptions and Public Experience of Officials Public Perceptions of Politicians and Top Government Officials Public Perceptions of Street-Level Officials Public Perceptions of Comparative Corruption Public Perceptions of the Need to Use Contacts and Bribes Public Perceptions of Officials’ Motives and Feelings Public Experience of Dealing with Officials Experience of Being Treated with Respect Experience of Favourable Treatment Experience of Fair (or Unfair) Treatment Experience of Extortion The Most Frequent or Most Annoying Problems When Dealing with Street-Level Officials Public Satisfaction with Street-Level Officials Conclusion: Extremely Negative Perceptions, Moderately Negative Experiences Notes 4. Citizen Strategies for Dealing with Officials How Citizens in Focus-Groups Discussed Strategies for Dealing With Officials Different Strategies for Different Objectives: Fair Treatment or Favours Different Strategies in Gossip and Personal Experience Public Perceptions of the Strategies Needed to Deal with Officials: Gossip and Hearsay Personal Experience of Using Different Strategies: Reported Behaviour Combinations of Strategies Influences on Citizens’ Choice of Strategies All Strategies Correlate with Citizen Dissatisfaction Conclusion: Increased Argument, Not Bribery, Is the Main Response to Ill-Treatment Notes 5. Willing Givers? A Moral Imperative to Obey the Law? Public Condemnation of the Use of Contacts, Presents and Bribes A Permanent Part of Our Country’s History and Culture? Would Citizens Give Bribes If Asked, or Accept Them If Offered? Feelings about Giving Bribes: Happy, Angry, Worried or Ashamed? Public Experience of Actually Giving Presents and Bribes to Officials A Difference between Presents and Bribes? The Significance of Size, Timing and Motivation Did ‘Values and Norms’ Affect Behaviour? The Impact of Attempted Extortion The Independent Effects of Values and Extortion: A Regression Analysis Conclusion: Extortion Always Works, but Values Sometimes Moderate Its Impact Notes 6. ‘Try Harder’ or ‘Give Up’: The Choice for Ethnic Minorities? A General Curvilinear Model of Response to Stress Eight Diverse Minorities Negative Attitudes towards Ethnic Minorities: Cross-Country and Cross-Minority Comparisons Suspicions of Ethnic Discrimination Actual Experience of Biased Treatment Comparative International Perspectives Ethnic Values and Norms Ethnic Behaviour The ‘Ecological Effect’: The Impact of Context Conclusion: Most Ethnic Minorities Are Located in the ‘Try Harder’ Zone, but Gypsies in the ‘Give Up’ Zone, and Turks on the Boundary Appendix: The Ethnic Samples Notes 7. Street-Level Bureaucrats: Caught between State and Citizen Officials ‘As Citizens’--in Relation to Other Officials Officials ‘As Employees’--in Relation to the State Officials ‘As Officials’--in Relation to Their Clients How Did Their Experience ‘As Employees’ Affect Officials’ Relationships with Clients? Conclusion: Benign and Pernicious Institutional Cultures Notes 8. Willing Takers? Temptations, Excuses and Justifications Doubts, Fears and Inhibitions Confessions Opportunity and Motivation Why Did Some Officials Accept while Others Did Not? A Causal Model Conclusion: Bargaining Power Rather Than Poverty Leads to Bribe Taking Notes 9. A Culture of Corruption? Support, ....