Timing and Turnout

Timing and Turnout How Off-Cycle Elections Favor Organized Groups

by Sarah F. Anzia

University of Chicago Press, 2013
Cloth: 978-0-226-08678-1 | Paper: 978-0-226-08681-1 | Electronic: 978-0-226-08695-8
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226086958.001.0001

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ABOUT THIS BOOKAUTHOR BIOGRAPHYREVIEWSTABLE OF CONTENTS

ABOUT THIS BOOK

Public policy in the United States is the product of decisions made by more than 500,000 elected officials, and the vast majority of those officials are elected on days other than Election Day. And because far fewer voters turn out for off-cycle elections, that means the majority of officials in America are elected by a politically motivated minority of Americans. Sarah F. Anzia is the first to systemically address the effects of election timing on political outcomes, and her findings are eye-opening.

The low turnout for off-cycle elections, Anzia argues, increases the influence of organized interest groups like teachers’ unions and municipal workers. While such groups tend to vote at high rates regardless of when the election is held, the low turnout in off-cycle years enhances the effectiveness of their mobilization efforts and makes them a proportionately larger bloc. Throughout American history, the issue of election timing has been a contentious one. Anzia’s book traces efforts by interest groups and political parties to change the timing of elections to their advantage, resulting in the electoral structures we have today. Ultimately, what might seem at first glance to be mundane matters of scheduling are better understood as tactics designed to distribute political power, determining who has an advantage in the electoral process and who will control government at the municipal, county, and state levels.

AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY

Sarah F. Anzia is assistant professor of public policy at the Goldman School of Public Policy at the University of California, Berkeley. She lives in Berkeley, CA.

REVIEWS

“Political scientists have long lamented the crazy-quilt pattern of American elections but few have systematically studied its effects. In this sharp and careful study, Sarah F. Anzia convincingly demonstrates how oddly timed elections benefit politically organized groups. Timing and Turnout is a valuable addition to the burgeoning literature on local elections.”

— Eric Oliver, University of Chicago, author of Local Elections and the Politics of Small Scale Democracy

"Timing and Turnout offers an authoritative account of the causes and consequences of election timing. Progressive-era reformers argued—and many good-government types today still believe—that separating the timing of local from national elections improves the quality of American local democracy. In a trenchant analysis, Sarah F. Anzia debunks the conventional wisdom, demonstrating how off-cycle elections reduce voter turnout and amplify the power of organized interest groups. Our democracy suffers as a result."

— Stephen P. Erie, University of California, San Diego

“Anzia focuses on a grossly underexamined issue in the study of US politics: the timing of elections. Most are aware that Election Day is the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November in even numbered years, but few political scientists devote any attention to the many elections that occur off-cycle. . . . In this impressive study, Anzia kickstarts the process of rectifying this oversight. . . . Anyone interested in US elections should read this book. Essential.”

— Choice

“A vast literature has asked whether direct democracy, voter registration laws, nonpartisan elections, and even ballot appearance influence voter participation. However, political scientists have tended to ignore the one institutional arrangement that is the most powerful predictor of turnout: the day an election is held. Anzia’s Timing and Turnout offers the first comprehensive account of the causes and consequences of “off-cycle” elections in the United States. . . . Two strengths of the book are its careful attention to causal identification and the fact that Anzia tests her theoretical framework in a variety of contexts across both time and space.”

— Political Science Quarterly

"An outstanding book.”

— FiveThirtyEight

List of Illustrations

Acknowledgments

1. Timing and Turnout: The Basics
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226086958.003.0001
[election, timing, state, local, voter, turnout, interest group, political party, organized, off-cycle]
This chapter summarizes the literature on how off-cycle election timing lowers voter turnout and then introduces the book's main argument that the low turnout of off-cycle elections increases the influence of organized groups. The chapter also presents new data on the rules governing election timing in each of the U.S. states, conveying the complexity of the American electoral calendar: Municipal and school elections are held off-cycle in most states, and county elections are held off-cycle in some states as well. There are even some states that hold state-level elections in the odd-numbered years rather than during national elections. Thus, many states have a steady stream of elections every year rather than a single "Election Day" once every two years. The chapter concludes with a preview of the book and a summary of its implication that organized groups play a far greater role in American politics than the scholarly literature suggests. (pages 1 - 15)

2. A Theory of Election Timing
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226086958.003.0002
[election, timing, mobilization, interest group, political party, policy, organized, turnout, voter]
This chapter develops a theoretical framework for considering the causes and consequences of election timing. It argues that shifting from on-cycle to off-cycle elections increases the electoral presence of organized groups. Because those who have a large stake in an election vote at high rates regardless of when the election is held, and because low turnout enhances the effectiveness of groups' mobilization efforts, the members and mobilized supporters of organized groups make up a greater proportion of the electorate in off-cycle elections. The second part of the chapter explains how election timing affects election outcomes and policymaking. It argues that groups that seek policies with concentrated benefits and distributed costs and that face little competition should have greater success in off-cycle elections. However, even when groups compete over policy, election timing can still tip the balance of power in favor of one group or its rival, affecting policy outcomes. (pages 16 - 36)

3. Partisan Power Play: Election Timing Politics in the Nineteenth Century
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226086958.003.0003
[American political development, 19th century, Progressive, timing, election, political party, city, local, state, turnout]
This chapter tests the book's theory by examining the politics of city election timing choice during the 19th century. By exploring the histories of three large American cities and tracing what happened to their election schedules between the 1840s and the dawn of the Progressive Era, it finds that the election timing of these large American cities changed frequently--a trend that has not been discussed in the literature on American political development. It also finds that even before the Civil War, voter turnout was much lower in off-cycle local elections than in on-cycle local elections. Most importantly, the chapter's analytic narratives make it clear that the organized groups that competed for local offices in New York, San Francisco, and Philadelphia during the 19th century--political parties--consistently tried to manipulate the timing of elections to their advantage. (pages 37 - 80)

4. Interest Groups and Election Timing Choice in the Twenty-First Century
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226086958.003.0004
[state legislature, public opinion, election, timing, case study, lobby, party, interest group, voter, representation]
This chapter puts the theory of election timing to the test in present-day American politics. It starts with an analysis of voters' preferences on local election timing using data from a nationally representative survey. Then, it introduces a new dataset of election timing bills considered in U.S. state legislatures from 2001 to 2011. Using both case studies and quantitative analysis, the chapter examines whether groups that benefit from off-cycle election timing actively lobby to keep off-cycle elections in place. Because the groups that would be affected by proposed election timing changes are important to state legislators' reelection interests, the chapter also tests predictions about state legislators' positions on election timing bills. Ultimately, it finds that the politics of election timing choice in state legislatures involves a struggle among groups for electoral influence. (pages 81 - 125)

5. Estimating the Effect of Off-Cycle Election Timing: School Board Elections
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226086958.003.0005
[election, timing, teacher, school, salary, union, turnout, voter, state, local]
This chapter estimates the effect of off-cycle school board election timing on the electoral influence of teacher unions. First, using salary schedule data for eight states that have within-state variation in the timing of school board elections, it finds that school districts that hold off-cycle elections pay their teachers more in base salary than districts with on-cycle elections. Next, looking at Minnesota districts, it finds that teacher salaries are negatively related to voter turnout in school board elections. Lastly, it exploits a policy intervention in Texas and finds that school districts that were forced to change their elections from May to November of even-numbered years responded by raising teacher salaries by 1.3 percent less than they had done in years prior to the switch. Together, these findings provide strong evidence of a causal relationship between the timing of elections and the influence of teachers in school board elections. (pages 126 - 166)

6. "What Election?" : Timing, Turnout, and Policy in California Cities
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226086958.003.0006
[city, municipal, election, timing, California, union, fire, police, turnout, salary, benefits]
This chapter examines whether the timing of city elections matters for interest group influence on the policies of city governments. First, it demonstrates that election timing alone explains two-thirds of the variation in voter turnout in California city council elections from 1999 to 2008. Then, it estimates the effect of off-cycle city election timing on the influence of two groups, both of which tend to be active in city politics, but one of which tends to be stronger in organizational capacity than the other: firefighters and police officers. The analysis shows that both types of city employees are better compensated in cities that hold off-cycle elections but that the effect for police officers is much smaller, as the theory predicts. Finally, the chapter shows that cities with off-cycle elections spend more on employee compensation overall, have larger operating budgets, and spend a larger percentage of those budgets on employee compensation. (pages 167 - 199)

7. Implications for Democracy, Representation, and Institutional Stability
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226086958.003.0007
[election, timing, interest group, political party, organized, turnout, representation, democracy, pluralism, institution]
This chapter concludes with a summary of the book's findings, suggestions for future research, and a discussion of the broader implications of election timing for how scholars understand American politics. First, the book suggests that organized groups play a far greater role in shaping American politics than one would think based solely on a review of the recent American politics literature. In addition, it suggests that elections are sometimes not the obstacle to interest group capture that the pluralists had envisioned. Studying election timing also highlights some of the reasons why so many political institutions persist over time, in spite of the fact that they affect political outcomes. Finally, the concluding chapter comments on the normative arguments for and against off-cycle election timing and reflects on its consequences for political representation. (pages 200 - 216)

Appendixes

Notes

Index