The Grasping Hand "Kelo v. City of New London" and the Limits of Eminent Domain
by Ilya Somin
University of Chicago Press, 2015
Cloth: 978-0-226-25660-3 | Electronic: 978-0-226-25674-0
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226256740.001.0001

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ABOUT THIS BOOKAUTHOR BIOGRAPHYREVIEWSTABLE OF CONTENTS

ABOUT THIS BOOK

In 2005, the Supreme Court ruled that the city of New London, Connecticut, could condemn fifteen residential properties in order to transfer them to a new private owner. Although the Fifth Amendment only permits the taking of private property for “public use,” the Court ruled that the transfer of condemned land to private parties for “economic development” is permitted by the Constitution—even if the government cannot prove that the expected development will ever actually happen. The Court’s decision in Kelo v. City of New London empowered the grasping hand of the state at the expense of the invisible hand of the market.
           
In this detailed study of one of the most controversial Supreme Court cases in modern times, Ilya Somin argues that Kelo was a grave error. Economic development and “blight” condemnations are unconstitutional under both originalist and most “living constitution” theories of legal interpretation. They also victimize the poor and the politically weak for the benefit of powerful interest groups and often destroy more economic value than they create. Kelo itself exemplifies these patterns. The residents targeted for condemnation lacked the influence needed to combat the formidable government and corporate interests arrayed against them.  Moreover, the city’s poorly conceived development plan ultimately failed: the condemned land lies empty to this day, occupied only by feral cats. The Supreme Court’s unpopular ruling triggered an unprecedented political reaction, with forty-five states passing new laws intended to limit the use of eminent domain. But many of the new laws impose few or no genuine constraints on takings. The Kelo backlash led to significant progress, but not nearly as much as it may have seemed.

Despite its outcome, the closely divided 5-4 ruling shattered what many believed to be a consensus that virtually any condemnation qualifies as a public use under the Fifth Amendment. It also showed that there is widespread public opposition to eminent domain abuse. With controversy over takings sure to continue, The Grasping Hand offers the first book-length analysis of Kelo by a legal scholar, alongside a broader history of the dispute over public use and eminent domain and an evaluation of options for reform.
 

AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY

Ilya Somin is professor of law at the George Mason University School of Law. He is the author of Democracy and Political Ignorance: Why Smaller Government isSmarter and writes regularly for the popular Volokh Conspiracy blog.
 

REVIEWS

"Somin's thorough rebuttal of the constitutional reasoning and philosophical implications of the Supreme Court's Kelo decision demonstrates why that ruling was a constructive disaster: It was so dreadful it has provoked robust defenses of the role of private property in sustaining Americans' liberty."
— George F. Will

The Grasping Hand is likely to be the definitive analysis of the Supreme Court’s controversial decision in the Kelo case. But Somin attends to much more than that. He sets out the political and doctrinal history that led up to Kelo and critiques the legislative and judicial developments provoked by the reaction to it. Somin has long been a champion of strong property rights. What he has to say will be of value to those who share that commitment and perhaps even more to those who don’t.”
— James E. Krier, University of Michigan Law School

“Somin is one of the world’s leading scholars on private property rights, and his analysis of the history of eminent domain and the Kelo decision is extremely thorough and insightful. But The Grasping Hand has something more than just solid legal history and reasoning. With its interviews with property owners and explorations of how eminent domain plays out in the real world, the book, unlike virtually all other scholarly works on eminent domain, compellingly communicates the human dimension and costs of governments teaming up with private interests to take the homes, small businesses, and other property of Americans.”
— Dana Berliner and Scott Bullock, co-counsel for the homeowners in Kelo v. City of New London

"For anyone interested in the Kelo case, I recommend Somin’s book. It is the first book-length discussion of the Kelo appellate proceedings by a legal scholar. It is also by far the most exhaustively researched history of the public use doctrine in the state and federal courts before and since Kelo. While I do not share Somin's opposition to the Kelo decision, I welcome his good scholarship on the subject.”
— Wesley W. Horton, counsel for the city of New London in Kelo v. City of New London

"In this carefully researched and convincingly argued volume, Somin provides a powerful critique of the Supreme Court’s 'public use' jurisprudence and the controversial Kelo decision. He also gives careful attention to the hostile public reaction to the ruling and points out that much of the post-Kelo reform legislation is inadequate to prevent future eminent domain abuse. This insightful book belongs on the shelf of anyone interested in the place of property rights in constitutional law."
— James W. Ely, Jr., author of The Guardian of Every Other Right: A Constitutional History of Property Rights

"By dint of his uncommon thoroughness, Somin has become the leading and most persuasive critic of the Supreme Court’s ill-fated Kelo decision. His close examination of the case’s factual backdrop offers chilling confirmation of his central thesis: weak constitutional protection of property rights opens the door to political intrigue that exacts its greatest toll on the poor and vulnerable in society. Somin’s gripping account confirms your worst fears about big government."
— Richard Epstein, New York University School of Law, author of Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain

“The definitive treatment of eminent domain and the Kelo case. As you might expect, Somin discusses the legal issues with aplomb [and] offers . . . an eye-opening investigation of the history behind many of the major cases.”
— Alex Tabarrok, Marginal Revolution

"[A] key contribution to the literature on property rights. I dare say that this is the most important book on eminent domain since Epstein’s classic, Takings. . . . [Somin's] voice is the voice of reason, precisely the kind of scholarship that is sorely needed in our polarized society. And this book is, today, the leading authority on Kelo."
— Fernando Teson, Florida State University College of Law

“Sharp legal, economic, and historical analysis of the eminent domain debate. . . . The Grasping Hand tells the story of the battle in fascinating detail. Somin succinctly recounts the facts that many readers will remember but adds a great deal of additional detail to show many ugly but unknown truths about it."
— Forbes

“Somin provides a fine tour of the case and of the intellectual history of eminent-domain law. More important, he provides a framework for thinking about the future of eminent domain and private property. . . . Somin has written an important book that maps the road ahead for those who believe that individual freedom cannot be separated from the protection of private property.”
— Edward Glaeser, Wall Street Journal

“Somin has written what is likely to be the definitive legal analysis of Kelo, its aftermath, and its future prospects. . . . The Grasping Hand is excellent at laying out the political and doctrinal developments that led up to Kelo and at canvassing the backlash and legislative response to it.”
— Weekly Standard

Kelo v. The City of New London, perhaps the most derided Supreme Court case in recent memory, has finally received the thorough review it deserves. . . . The Grasping Hand chronicles what led to the infamous decision a decade ago. More importantly, it shows why people of all political persuasions should care about eminent-domain abuse. Somin also adds to the literature by evaluating the effectiveness of the many state laws passed in Kelo’s wake to curtail government abuse of eminent domain.”
— Federalist

“A thorough exploration of Kelo v. City of New London  and the power of eminent domain generally. . . . If the goal of The Grasping Hand was to retrieve the original meaning of ‘public use’ from scholarly and jurisprudential oblivion, Somin has succeeded. Will the Court recognize its error and eventually overrule Kelo? One can only hope.”
 
— Library of Law and Liberty

“An absorbing study not only of the Kelo case, but of the legal and historical context in which it arose; it reveals the fragility of our individual rights against the seemingly boundless power of the modern state and reminds us that we must continue to challenge this kind of arbitrary power in the courts and in the political forum.”
 
— David S. D'Amato, Future of Freedom Foundation

“An in-depth legal analysis of one of the most controversial Supreme Court decisions in recent times. . . . The book provides a very well-written review of the background of the case, a close legal analysis of the relevant case law leading up to it, a detailed review of the legislative and judicial responses to the decision, and a discussion of possible safeguards against excessive use of eminent domain in the face of the Court’s ruling.”
— Thomas J. Miceli, Public Choice

"[A] must-read for anyone interested in the politics and history of property rights and property law in the United States. Its appeal is even broader though, and it would be fruitfully read by anyone with an interest in constitutional theory, judicial impact, or cause lawyering."
 
— Law and Politics Book Review

“For much of America’s past, the rhetoric of property rights was the dominant trope for advocates of democratic and egalitarian economic policies. The anti-Kelo backlash provides a brief glimpse of what a revived, populist property rights rhetoric might look like. Building on that moment would involve some uncomfortable adjustments by both libertarians and liberals. Somin’s intriguing book illustrates both the promise and the challenges of that effort.”
— Eduardo M. Peñalver, Alan R. Tessler Dean of Cornell Law School, New Rambler

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgments

- Ilya Somin
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226256740.003.0009
[Kelo, property rights, judicial protection, public use, takings]
This chapter briefly describes the Kelo v. New Londoncase and situates it in the context of the longstanding debate over the appropriate scope of judicial protection for constitutional property rights. It explains that Americans have long believed that property rights are vitally important. But in the decades preceding Kelo, the judiciary often treated them as second-class rights deserving far less protection than other parts of the Bill of Rights. The Kelocase is a vehicle for examining the narrower, but still vital issue, of what kinds of takings are forbidden by the federal Constitution because they are not for a “public use.” The Introduction concludes with a brief description of each of the chapters. (pages 1 - 10)
This chapter is available at:
    https://academic.oup.com/chica...

- Ilya Somin
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226256740.003.0001
[Kelo, New London, Institute for Justice, Kelo v. New London, Fort Trumbull, eminent domain, public use constraints]
Chapter one opens with a summary of the events that led to the Supreme Court’s Kelo decision. The New London Development Corporation (NLDC) sought to condemn numerous residential properties for the purpose of promoting economic development in conjunction with the construction of a new headquarters in the area by the Pfizer Corporation. Owners who resisted were subjected to extensive harassment, and ultimately condemnation. The seven owners who held firm against the harassment were aided by the Institute for Justice, a public interest law firm, and chose to fight the takings in court. The condemnations were upheld in a close 4-3 decision by the Connecticut Supreme Court. Taking it to the federal Supreme Court resulted in the same decision. But New London won only by a narrow 5-4 vote, undermining the longstanding view that public use constraints on eminent domain were a thing of the past. (pages 11 - 34)
This chapter is available at:
    https://academic.oup.com/chica...

- Ilya Somin
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226256740.003.0002
[public use, public purpose, eminent domain, constitution]
This chapter summarizes the two hundred year long debate over the meaning of “public use.” During the Founding era and throughout the nineteenth century, most courts and jurists endorsed a relatively narrow definition of public use, under which governments could use eminent domain if the condemned property were to be owned by the state or by a private party with a legal duty to serve the public as a whole, such as a public utility. But, beginning in the early twentieth century, state and federal courts began to move towards a broad definition of public use, which allowed any taking that might create some possible public benefit. The history of public use strongly supports the narrow view as the correct approach from the standpoint of originalist theories of constitutional interpretation. (pages 35 - 72)
This chapter is available at:
    https://academic.oup.com/chica...

- Ilya Somin
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226256740.003.0003
[Blight, economic development, Ronald Dworkin, Bruce Ackerman, popular constitutionalism, living constitution, common law constitutionalism, holdout]
This chapter outlines the harms caused by blight and economic development takings enabled by the court’s endorsement of the broad definition of public use. Such takings often destroy more economic value than they create. Since the 1940s, they have forcibly displaced hundreds of thousands of people, often victimizing the poor, racial minorities, and those with little political influence. The terrible effects of blight and economic development takings strengthen the case for interpreting the Fifth Amendment to ban them under a variety of “living constitution” theories of constitutional interpretation. These include representation-reinforcement theory (which emphasizes the need for judicial intervention to protect groups that cannot fend for themselves in the political process), popular constitutionalism, common law constitutionalism, and Ronald Dworkin’s moral theory of interpretation. (pages 73 - 111)
This chapter is available at:
    https://academic.oup.com/chica...

- Ilya Somin
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226256740.003.0004
[John Paul Stevens, Sandra Day O’Connor, Anthony Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, Kelo, supreme court, public use, judicial deference]
This chapter assesses the Supreme Court’s opinion in the Kelo case. The majority opinion, written Justice John Paul Stevens, has numerous flaws. These include excessive deference to a flawed political process and severe misinterpretation of relevant precedents (a mistake later admitted by Justice Stevens himself). Most of all, it allows the government to define the scope of a constitutional right intended to constrain that government’s own abuses of power. No other right enumerated in the Bill of Rights gets such treatment. Justice Anthony Kennedy’s concurring opinion also has significant weaknesses. The dissenting opinions by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor and Clarence Thomas make a number of strong points, but also have shortcomings of their own. O’Connor’s dissent has difficulty reconciling her position in Kelo with her own earlier opinion for the Court in the 1984 Midkiff case. Despite, their weaknesses, however, the Kelo opinions did shatter the previous seeming consensus in favor of a broad definition of public use. (pages 112 - 134)
This chapter is available at:
    https://academic.oup.com/chica...

- Ilya Somin
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226256740.003.0005
[Kelo, public opinion, state politics, Private Property Rights Protection Act, referenda]
This chapter describes the massive political backlash generated by the Kelodecision, which was in many ways greater than that which resulted from any other modern Supreme Court decision. Polls showed that over 80% of the public opposed the ruling, a sentiment that cut across racial, partisan, and ideological lines. A record 45 states adopted eminent domain reform laws in the wake of the decision, as did the federal government. But while some of these laws were strong and effective, a majority provided little if any meaningful new protection for property owners. Many banned takings for “economic development,” but continued to permit very similar “blight” condemnations, under definitions of blight so broad that virtually any area could be declared blighted and subject to condemnation. However, state reforms enacted by referendum tended to be much stronger than those enacted through the regular legislative process. (pages 135 - 164)
This chapter is available at:
    https://academic.oup.com/chica...

- Ilya Somin
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226256740.003.0006
[political ignorance, knowledge, voting, public opinion, referenda, rational ignorance, state legislatures, state politics]
This chapter describes the massive political backlash generated by the Kelo decision, which was in many ways greater than that which resulted from any other modern Supreme Court decision. Polls showed that over 80% of the public opposed the ruling, a sentiment that cut across racial, partisan, and ideological lines. A record 45 states adopted eminent domain reform laws in the wake of the decision, as did the federal government. But while some of these laws were strong and effective, a majority provided little if any meaningful new protection for property owners. Many banned takings for “economic development,” but continued to permit very similar “blight” condemnations, under definitions of blight so broad that virtually any area could be declared blighted and subject to condemnation. However, state reforms enacted by referendum tended to be much stronger than those enacted through the regular legislative process. (pages 165 - 180)
This chapter is available at:
    https://academic.oup.com/chica...

- Ilya Somin
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226256740.003.0007
[state constitutions, federalism, pretextual takings, judicial review]
This chapter analyzes the judicial reaction to the Kelo decision, which is almost as significant as the much better-known political backlash. In the aftermath of Kelo, several state supreme courts have rejected it as a guide to the interpretation of their state constitutions’ public use clauses. This is significant both for the future of takings in those states and as an indication that there is no longer a judicial consensus supporting the broad interpretation of public use. State and lower federal courts have also sought to make sense of Kelo’s statement that its otherwise highly deferential approach to public use does not apply to “pretextual” takings, whose official rationale is a pretext for a scheme to benefit a private party. Lower courts have come up with five different approaches to determining what qualifies as a pretextual taking. The resulting confusion might well lead to the return of the public use question to the Supreme Court. (pages 181 - 203)
This chapter is available at:
    https://academic.oup.com/chica...

- Ilya Somin
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226256740.003.0008
[competitive federalism, blight, economic development, compensation, scrutiny, legal procedure]
This chapter considers a variety of reform proposals that have been offered as alternatives to banning blight and economic development takings altogether. They include increasing compensation for owners of condemned property, increasing procedural constraints on eminent domain, providing extra protection for residential property only, subjecting economic development takings to heightened judicial scrutiny, and giving communities a greater say in deciding whether land within their boundaries will be taken. Many of these proposals have merit. But none are likely to be as beneficial as a categorical ban on economic development and blight condemnations. It is similarly unlikely that the harms of such takings will be eliminated by interjurisdictional competition in a federal system. The chapter also considers claims that a ban is unlikely to do much good because it does not go far enough. (pages 204 - 231)
This chapter is available at:
    https://academic.oup.com/chica...

- Ilya Somin
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226256740.003.0010
[constitutional reform, public use, precedent, New London, judicial politics, Antonin Scalia, John Paul Stevens]
The Conclusion summarizes events in New London since the Court’s decision, recapitulates some key lessons of the book, and discusses the future of public use. Nine years after the Kelo decision, the condemned property still lies empty. But the controversy sparked by the Kelo takings has led to real progress for property rights. In addition to stimulating effective reforms in some states, it has undermined the seeming consensus in favor of a very broad definition of public use. The controversial and the closely divided nature of the decision also make it more likely that Kelo will ultimately be overruled or limited by the Court, a result that would be consistent with the Court’s current doctrine on how to determine whether a precedent should be reversed. Like previous reform efforts, the Kelo story demonstrates that efforts to strengthen protection for constitutional rights are most likely to succeed if they combine legal and political action rather than focus on one approach exclusively. (pages 232 - 246)
This chapter is available at:
    https://academic.oup.com/chica...

Appendix A

Appendix B

Notes

Index