The Ascent of Affect Genealogy and Critique
by Ruth Leys
University of Chicago Press, 2017
Cloth: 978-0-226-48842-4 | Paper: 978-0-226-48856-1 | Electronic: 978-0-226-48873-8
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226488738.001.0001
ABOUT THIS BOOKAUTHOR BIOGRAPHYREVIEWSTABLE OF CONTENTS

ABOUT THIS BOOK

In recent years, emotions have become a major, vibrant topic of research not merely in the biological and psychological sciences but throughout a wide swath of the humanities and social sciences as well. Yet, surprisingly, there is still no consensus on their basic nature or workings.
 
Ruth Leys’s brilliant, much anticipated history, therefore, is a story of controversy and disagreement. The Ascent of Affect focuses on the post–World War II period, when interest in emotions as an object of study began to revive. Leys analyzes the ongoing debate over how to understand emotions, paying particular attention to the continual conflict between camps that argue for the intentionality or meaning of emotions but have trouble explaining their presence in non-human animals and those that argue for the universality of emotions but struggle when the question turns to meaning. Addressing the work of key figures from across the spectrum, considering the potentially misleading appeal of neuroscience for those working in the humanities, and bringing her story fully up to date by taking in the latest debates, Leys presents here the most thorough analysis available of how we have tried to think about how we feel.
 

AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY

Ruth Leys is the Henry M. and Elizabeth P. Wiesenfeld Professor Emerita in the Humanities Center at Johns Hopkins University.

REVIEWS

"If you are fed up with the binariness of emotion theories, read Ruth Leys' The Ascent of Affect . . . . Refreshingly, she doesn't start from the view that emotions are visceral, sensation-like and universal or from the view that they depend on meaning, culture and (specifically human) cognition. Instead, she evaluates the development, difficulties and merits of both these two opposed approaches, as well as elucidating the inadequacies of neuroscientific analysis."
— Times Higher Education

"Psychologists have excelled in the study of simple rat behavior, in part because the behavior is simple. But when behaviorism declined and psychologists became interested in more complex constructs, the research as well as the concepts became very complex very quickly. In The Ascent of Affect, Leys (emer., Johns Hopkins Univ.) fascinatingly elucidates the research and theory on the emotions that people display and experience. She discusses the evolution of ideas on emotion, blending philosophical and psychological arguments and counterarguments about the nature of emotions that, after half a century, still defy explanation. There is no shortage of models, with each successive theory identifying the problems of its predecessors and trying to correct them. Some problems are methodological, so psychologists develop complex laboratory approaches to reconcile discrepancies, but the concept of emotion does not keep still. Rather, it wiggles in ways that force researchers to blend social, mental, and neurological ideas to capture the depth of people’s emotional lives. This complex book should make students of emotion happy—even if they have not yet solved the mystery of what that emotion really is. Recommended."
— Choice

"[A] brilliant analysis of the rise and internal contradictions of affect theory. Leys's project mostly addresses the history of psychology--discussions of Sedgwick and Massumi notwithstanding. She devastates Massumi's 'The Autonomy of Affect,' to which Berlant refers. Leys reveals the mistakes on which Massumi's use of psychological research depends to justify his central claim; namely, that affect precedes both emotion and cognition. . . . She offers a detailed, critical review of developments following Tomkins's affect program theory. . . . [and] goes on to explain the most recent debates, which involve many more researchers and many more arguments . . . . meticulous history and analysis."
— Modern Language Notes

"Leys’s book is an instructive and engaging account of the history of important theories of, and debates in, recent emotion research."
— Evolutionary Studies in Imaginative Culture

“There are books and there are earthquakes. The Ascent of Affect is an earthquake—it shakes the very foundations of a wide range of edifices of thought, from affect theory to Hardt and Negri’s Post-Marxism to trauma theory. All of these theoretical movements, Ruth Leys shows, are united in their elision of human intentionality. But anti-intentionalism is based on bad—indeed, wrong—science. Trenchant, razor-sharp, and always lucid, this book is bound to send shock waves through some of the most pressing intellectual debates of our time. A tour de force.”
— Jan Plamper, Goldsmiths, University of London

“A masterfully told story, not simply of the history of one modern object, emotion, but of much larger shifts in human self-understanding in late modernity. The clarity of Leys’ writing makes the text accessible to the literature scholar who has modest scientific training and to the research psychologist who likely is unfamiliar with the turn to affect in the humanities and arts.”
— Jill Morawski, Wesleyan University

“Anyone wishing to know more about emotions has to read this amazingly smart and well-argued book. Ruth Leys, the eminent historian of science, has written a critical genealogy of the emotion sciences as they evolved after World War II. She engages with both theoretical and experimental approaches, and takes particular aim at affect studies that have, very successfully, promoted emotions as non-intentional, non-cognitive, and non-cultural. Leys challenges such views by confronting them with critical voices that have previously gone unheard or been neglected.”
— Ute Frevert, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin

TABLE OF CONTENTS

- Ruth Leys
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226488738.003.0001
[affect programs;basic emotions;concepts;Craig DeLancey;Paul E. Griffiths;Alan J. Fridlund;Phil Hutchinson;intentionality;John McDowell]
The conflict between cognitivists and non-cognitivists in the emotion field is briefly explored by examining recent publications by leading advocates of both positions. These publications suggest that today's research on the emotions is haunted by issues that go back well over fifty years. Those issues concern not only the nature of human emotions but the question of non-human animal emotion as well. Scientists and philosophers who favor a cognitive or intentionalist account of the emotions are said to have trouble accounting for non-human animal emotions; those who favor a non-cognitive or non-intentional account of the emotions are said to have difficulty in explaining the meaningful character of the emotions. The author intervenes in this dispute in order to show that an intentionalist or cognitivist account of the emotions can explain the behavior of many non-human animals as well. (pages 1 - 25)
This chapter is available at:
    https://academic.oup.com/chica...

- Ruth Leys
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226488738.003.0002
[affect programs;Duchenne de Boulogne;cybernetics;Charles Darwin;the face;ideology;judgments of facial expressions;posed expressions;Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick;Silvan S. Tomkins]
A discussion of the work of Silvan S. Tomkins, who helped reinvigorate the study of the emotions in the 1960s by proposing a new theory of affect. Through the twin influences of Darwin and the new science of cybernetics, Tomkins proposed the existence of a limited number of universal "affect programs" or basic emotions, which he theorized as innately triggered responses that function independently of objects or cognitions. Through his influence especially on Paul Ekman and Carroll E. Izard, Tomkins set the stage for the emergence of an influential non-cognitive paradigm of the emotions. (pages 26 - 75)
This chapter is available at:
    https://academic.oup.com/chica...

- Ruth Leys
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226488738.003.0003
[Basic Emotion Theory;cross-cultural judgment studies;Antonio Damasio;Paul Ekman;false smiles;felt smiles;Margaret Mead;posed expressions;spontaneous expressions;Silvan S. Tomkins]
An analysis of the work of Paul Ekman, arguably the most influential figure in the emotion field today. According to Ekman's "neurocultural" version of Tomkins's affect theory, through socialization we expand the range of stimuli that can elicit our basic emotions and can learn to deliberately moderate our facial movements according to the conventions of "display rules." But under certain conditions the underlying basic emotions will betray themselves in micro-movements of the face discernible only to the trained expert. To clarify the methodological issues at stake in Ekman's research, the chapter discusses problems raised by his use of photographs of posed facial expressions as an experimental tool. It also explores the implications of Ekman's fundamental physiognomic assumption that a distinction can be strictly maintained between authentic and artificial expressions of emotion based on a differences between the faces we make when we are alone and those we make when we are with others. Throughout the discussion the aim is to bring out some of the tensions and contradictions inherent in Ekman's affect program model. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the influential neuroscientist Antonio Damasio's related claims about the emotions. (pages 76 - 128)
This chapter is available at:
    https://academic.oup.com/chica...

- Ruth Leys
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226488738.003.0004
[appraisal;Magda Arnold;Hubert Dreyfus;Paul Ekman;Anthony Kenny;intentionality;perceptual defense;stress films;subliminal perception;Ludwig Wittgenstein]
The American psychologist Richard Lazarus played an important role in the post-World War II history of research on the emotions. This chapter offers an analysis of the challenges he faced in his attempts to account for the meaning of the emotions. Lazarus's ideas about the role of "appraisal" or cognition in emotion were often tentative and confused, in part because of the difficulty he had in deciding what kind of claim it is that emotions are intentional states or actions. Is the claim fundamentally a constitutive-conceptual one, according to which it belongs to the very "grammar" of the emotions that they are intentional states? Or is the claim a causal argument about how emotions are aroused? Are those two kinds of claims incompatible, or can one adopt both a conceptual-grammatical and a causal explanation of the affects? Lazarus did not find it easy to answer these questions, even as he pursued a major research program designed to do so. The aim of this chapter is to examine Lazarus's experiments on the emotions and appraisal in the light of these difficulties. (pages 129 - 171)
This chapter is available at:
    https://academic.oup.com/chica...

- Ruth Leys
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226488738.003.0005
[automaticity of affect;John A. Bargh;computational models of the mind;cognitive unconscious;Hubert Dreyfus;the exposure effect;Joseph LeDoux;Robert Nisbett;unintended thought;Timothy Wilson]
This chapter examines the important 1980s debate between Richard Lazarus and Robert Zajonc over the role of cognition in emotion. It emphasizes the role of information-processing theories of the mind in enabling Zajonc to propose a non-cognitive theory of the affects in terms not unlike those of Silvan S. Tomkins. It thus places the debate between Lazarus and Zajonc in the context of ideas about the automaticity and non-intentionality of many mental functions. It also analyses Lazarus's several attempts to rebut Zajonc, based in part on his criticisms of computer models of mentation, models to which, somewhat incoherently, his own thought also fell captive. Throughout this chapter, the goal is to make clear the difficulties facing Lazarus in his attempt to incorporate intentionality and meaning into a science of the emotions. (pages 172 - 219)
This chapter is available at:
    https://academic.oup.com/chica...

- Ruth Leys
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226488738.003.0006
[audience effects;Janet Bavelas;Behavior Ecology View;Richard Dawkins;deception;display rule thesis;Paul Ekman;facial displays as intentional movements;the new ethology;solitary expressions]
This chapter focuses on Alan J. Fridlund's critique of Ekman's Basic Emotion Theory. One reason for the success of Ekman's theory is that it appears to solve the problem of deception in everyday life by suggesting that expressions have evolved to convey accurate information to others about our internal emotional states. On this model, although we are able to disguise our feelings through the voluntary management of our facial signals, under the right conditions the emotional truth of our inner states will betray itself. It is on the basis of this model that Ekman has played an influential role in federally-funded post-9/11 surveillance research. Ekman's goal is to ameliorate fears about our own tendencies to dissimulate, by providing a technological means by which authentic facial expressions can be reliably distinguished from false ones. In opposition to Ekman, and based on experiments demonstrating the influence of context and audience on emotional expressions, Fridlund denies that emotions can be divided up into a limited set of affect programs or categories. On Darwinian principles, he offers instead an intentionalist, ethological or "behavioral ecology" account of human and non-human animal behavior that challenges the entirety of Ekman's neurocultural model of the emotions. (pages 220 - 265)
This chapter is available at:
    https://academic.oup.com/chica...

- Ruth Leys
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226488738.003.0007
[audience effects;Lisa Feldman Barrett;Alan J. Fridlund;homology;Machiavellian expressions;psychological constructionism;Paul E. Griffiths;Brian Parkinson;James A. Russell;Andrea Scarantino]
This chapter addresses the question as to whether Alan Fridlund's interventions, as well as the contributions of others who have recently criticized Ekman's model of the emotions, herald a paradigm change in the emotion field or whether instead business as usual prevails, in the sense that the affect program theory continues to dominate the field. In order to understand the current situation, certain features of Fridlund's position are defined, features that, in his own words, make it a "tough sell" even if they reflect something incontestably right about his arguments. In order to throw further light on these issues, the recent writings of the author Paul Griffiths and his colleague Andrea Scarantino are discussed. Both offer a spirited defense of the basic emotion approach. It is suggested that their writings are interesting because they reveal how fundamental is the need to deflate claims about the intentionality of the emotions by retheorizing the intentional behaviors emphasized by Fridlund in non-intentional terms. How successful these authors are in this effort at retheorization is another matter. (pages 266 - 306)
This chapter is available at:
    https://academic.oup.com/chica...

- Ruth Leys
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226488738.003.0008
[autonomy of affect;William C. Connolly;Brian Massumi;Walter Benn Michaels;missing half second;dualism;neuroaesthetics;neurohistory;neuropolitics;Nigel Thrift]
In recent years, the topic of emotion has attracted more and more attention from cultural critics and theorists, and the purpose of chapter 7 is to explore the terms in which this turn to affect has been taking place. The question posed is why the anti-intentionalism that has informed so much of the work on the emotions in the psychological sciences now exerts such a fascination on scholars in the humanities and social sciences. The analysis is offered in the spirit of a "history of the present," that is, as an attempt to understand the rise of a non-intentionalist "affect theory" in the light of the genealogy charted in this book and to explain why the views being forwarded must be characterized as mistaken. Throughout the chapter, the author seeks to draw out the aesthetic, political and philosophical implications of the new affect theorists' views. (pages 307 - 350)
This chapter is available at:
    https://academic.oup.com/chica...

- Ruth Leys
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226488738.003.0009
[Daniel Cordaro;core affect;Alan J. Fridlund;Dacher Keltner;multicomponential responses;psychological constructionism;James A. Russell;Andrea Scarantino;solitary expressions]
In 2015 some of the chief scientists in the long-standing dispute over the nature of the emotions -- Fridlund, Russell, Dacher Keltner and Daniel Cordaro (the last are followers of Ekman's Basic Emotions model) -- were invited by Andrea Scarantino, editor of Emotion Researcher, the Newsletter of the International Society for Research on the Emotions, to publish online statements concerning their respective views. In addition, Scarantino posed questions to these scientists and the statements and the exchanges that ensued were also posted online. If Scarantino hoped that the debate would generate a consensus about the nature of emotion he must have been disappointed, since no such consensus emerged. The Epilogue explains why this outcome was inevitable. (pages 351 - 368)
This chapter is available at:
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