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TABLE OF CONTENTS

One / Group Identities and Politics in the United States
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226555812.003.0001
[religion and politics;partisanship;social identities;polarization;political parties]
Instead of asking how individuals’ group membership and identities influence political affiliations and vote choice, Chapter 1 begins by turning this question on its head: Can politics and political identities influence individuals’ social identities? In particular, can partisanship affect religious attachments, which political science has largely assumed to be stable and predictive of political preferences but impervious to politics’ influence? The chapter describes the current state of religious polarization in American politics; compared to Democrats, Republicans are much more religious on every dimension of religiosity, including identifying with a religious faith, church attendance, frequency of prayer, and believing that religion is important. The chapter then goes on to discuss the numerous ways in which our understanding of the political landscape is limited by thinking about group identities as solely affecting, but not also being affected by, politics. The chapter concludes by discussing the book’s primary contributions and summarizing the remaining chapters.
This chapter is available at:
    https://academic.oup.com/chica...

Two / Putting Things in Context: Religious and Political Attachments over Time
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226555812.003.0002
[religion and politics;"God gap";morality politics;Religious Right]
Chapter 2 provides an overview of religion’s role in American politics. In the 1970s and 1980s, Democratic and Republican elites for the first time staked out divergent positions on moral issues and used religious faith to varying degrees when reaching out to voters. At the same time, voters shifted from being politically divided along mainly denominational lines—for example, most Catholics were Democrats and most Protestants Republicans—to being divided along lines of religiosity—with devout Catholics and Protestants being Republicans and less religious Catholics and Protestants being Democrats. After describing the received wisdom on how this so-called “God gap” came about—religious individuals sorted into the Republican Party and the less religious became Democrats—the chapter concludes by explaining why this explanation is intuitively appealing yet ultimately unsatisfactory.
This chapter is available at:
    https://academic.oup.com/chica...

Three / A Life-Cycle Theory of Religion and Politics
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226555812.003.0003
[religion and politics;partisanship;socialization;impressionable years;religiosity over time]
Chapter 3 describes the life-cycle theory, which builds on two well-established ideas in political science and religion. First, the “impressionable years” hypothesis, from political science, states that outside influences and events shape one’s long-term political outlook, including partisan identity, during adolescence and young adulthood. After this period, the resulting partisan identity is a stable, powerful identity in its own right. Second, scholars of religion have shown that although teenagers and young adults tend to distance themselves from their parents’ religion and religious practice in general, they must then decide whether to remain on the outskirts of religion or to re-enter the religious realm as they emerge into adulthood. Those who return to religion must then also decide 1) to what degree to be involved in religion and 2) what religious beliefs to accept and reject. The timings of the religious and political socialization processes mean that political identities form at the very time when religion is a peripheral concern for many people. Then, when individuals must decide if and how to engage in the religious world, their political identities—solidified earlier in young adulthood—may exert a lasting influence on their religious identities.
This chapter is available at:
    https://academic.oup.com/chica...

Four / Tracking Religious Trajectories over a Lifetime
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226555812.003.0004
[religion and politics;socialization;panel data;"God gap";morality politics;Ronald Reagan;Religious Right]
Chapter 4 offers the first empirical test of the life-cycle theory by showing how partisanship affects religious trajectories over long periods of time. Using both two sets of panel data, the chapter demonstrates two broad trends. First, external political events that happen in childhood that are known to affect the development of party identification are also correlated with religiosity in adulthood. Individuals who came of age politically during a time when the Democrats were electorally popular are less likely to attend church regularly and more likely not to identify with a specific religion than those who came of age when the Republicans were electorally popular. Second, partisan identities exert influence at a specific point in a person’s life. Specifically, partisanship affects religious decisions among those individuals moving from being unmarried and childless to starting a family. This is precisely when, after a natural hiatus from religion, most people are confronted with a decision about whether and how to renew their religious involvement.
This chapter is available at:
    https://academic.oup.com/chica...

Five / Partisans’ Religious Responses to the Political Environment
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226555812.003.0005
[religion and politics;gay marriage;immigration;panel data;survey experiments;priming;socialization]
Chapter 5 explains why partisanship can matter for individual religious behaviors and outlooks. The elite-level link between the Republican Party and organized religion allows voters to associate the parties with different levels of religiosity. Evidence from two survey experiments demonstrates that the close relationship between Republicans and organized religion has pushed Democrats out of the organized religious sphere, while bringing Republicans deeper into the religious fold. Panel data provide additional verification of this finding by allowing me to see how partisans respond when the linkages between religion and the Republican Party become more salient. The data show that, thanks to the increasing importance of gay marriage as a political issue in 2004, party identi?cation in?uenced subsequent religious practices: Democrats (Republicans) reported lower (higher) rates of religiosity in 2004 than they did in 2000 or 2002. And, consistent with the life-cycle theory, this relationship is strongest among respondents who were of an age when they were likely considering re-engaging with or increasing participation in religious life.
This chapter is available at:
    https://academic.oup.com/chica...

Six / The Religious and Political Consequences of Political Knowledge
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226555812.003.0006
[religion and politics;political knowledge;"God gap";cross-sectional data]
Chapter 6 explores how political knowledge helps create the religious gap. First, the chapter shows that respondents with medium and high levels of political knowledge drive the findings from the previous chapter. In contrast, partisans with little political knowledge did not update their religious attachments to be consistent with their partisanship. Next, the data show that a political knowledge gap, in addition to a partisan gap, exists within churches. If more knowledgeable Republicans select into religion and more knowledgeable Democrats select out of religion, then Americans affiliated with different religious currents should differ both in terms of partisanship and political knowledge. The results indicate that while Republicans who are politically engaged are also more likely to be involved in religion, Democrats who are politically engaged are less likely to be involved with religion. Republicans, therefore, not only attend church more often than Democrats, but church-going Republicans are also more politically engaged than church-going Democrats. Partisan differences in political knowledge and engagement, in turn, change the likelihood that campaigns can successfully mobilize supporters through churches.
This chapter is available at:
    https://academic.oup.com/chica...

Seven / Faithful Partisans: A Closer Look at African Americans
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226555812.003.0007
[religion and politics;African Americans;survey experiments;panel data;cross-sectional data;the black church]
Chapter 7 tests the life-cycle theory on African Americans and explores the political consequences of their unique constellation of identities—as both ardent Democrats and frequent churchgoers. Because African-American religious traditions are frequently consistent with Democratic economic messages, African Americans may not feel pressure to update their religious or political attachments in the same way that white Americans might. We should therefore expect that the life-cycle theory will have different implications for African Americans. Whereas African Americans should undergo similar religious life-cycle experiences—decreasing religiosity in young adulthood and then increasing religious involvement in adulthood—they should not necessarily feel that their religious and political leanings are in conflict. Empirical tests bear out these expectations. The chapter then considers the political consequences of African Americans’ religious and political attachments. The results from two experiments show that although African Americans are comfortable with religion and politics mixing, as one might expect from a highly religious group, they are not open to this mix when Republicans are doing the mixing. This occurs because the political values valorized in black Protestantism differ from those emphasized by religious denominations and groups associated with the Republican Party.
This chapter is available at:
    https://academic.oup.com/chica...

Eight / Generalizing the Life-Cycle Theory: A Reevaluation of the 1960 Election
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226555812.003.0008
[religion and politics;God gap;Catholics;panel data;church attendance;elections;John F. Kennedy]
Chapter 8 discusses the life-cycle theory’s applicability to other political contexts. The expectations tested throughout this book stem from the contemporary political environment, but the life-cycle theory does not rely on any particular relationship between religion and political parties. The theory should therefore be a useful guide as new issues emerge, new groups form, and the parties change their policy positions and electoral strategies. The chapter offers one example of this by looking at the 1960 presidential election and show evidence of the life-cycle theory at work in a different political environment in which religion and political parties were linked in very different ways than they are today.
This chapter is available at:
    https://academic.oup.com/chica...

Nine / The Religious Sort
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226555812.003.0009
[religion and politics;partisanship;political psychology;socialization;identity;polarization;public opinion]
Chapter 9 concludes by discussing the implications of the book’s main findings. First, the chapter considers how politically driven religious sorting has fundamentally transformed American politics and how politicians mobilize support. The Republican Party can directly target voters who are likely responsive to religious rhetoric and faith-based politics through churches and religious organizations. Democrats, in contrast, increasingly spend their Sundays outside of church and are less interested in religious justifications for public policies. Second, the chapter addresses how the findings change our understanding of identity politics more generally. Identities do not form in a vacuum but rather develop and change over time in response to outside influences. In light of these findings, scholars may have previously overestimated social group’s influence on public opinion. The chapter concludes by offering avenues of future research in light of the book’s main insights.
This chapter is available at:
    https://academic.oup.com/chica...