TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preface
The Theoretician's Laboratory - Richard Mcelreath, Robert Boyd
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226558288.003.0001
[mathematical models, experiments, evolutionary biology, computer simulations, viability selection, mating table, social learning, social evolution, behavior, theoretician's laboratory]
Mathematical models and the tools used to analyze them constitute the theoretician's laboratory. Simple mathematical models are experiments aimed at understanding the causal relationships that drive important natural phenomena. Theoreticians in evolutionary biology use a variety of tools to study such models, divining their secrets to reveal how interactions that take place over long time spans shape the evolution of behavior. These models are almost always too simple to make accurate predictions or even accurately represent how any real behavior evolves. This chapter focuses on the theoretician's laboratory and the utility of mathematical models used to study social evolution. It also discusses some of the reasons why computer simulations are poor substitutes for analytic models. It then describes a simple model of evolutionary changes that result from variation in probability of survival—a form of natural selection that populations geneticists call viability selection. Finally, the chapter introduces a very useful tool called a mating table and shows that social learning dynamics can be very similar to viability selection dynamics for simple genetic models. (pages 1 - 36)
This chapter is available at:
https://academic.oup.com/chica...
1.1 The structure of evolutionary theory
1.2 The utility of simple models
1.3 Why not just simulate?
1.4 A model of viability selection
1.5 Determining long-term consequences
1.6 Nongenetic replication
Animal Conflict - Richard Mcelreath, Robert Boyd
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226558288.003.0002
[conflicts, John Maynard Smith, George Price, Hawk-Dove game, animal contests, social behavior, individual fitness, evolutionary game theory, retaliation, evolutionary stable strategies]
Resources are often scarce, and scarcity often leads to conflict. The form of conflict ranges from subtle supplants in which one animal departs at the other's approach to escalated fights in which participants are seriously wounded. Interestingly, conflicts in a wide range of species are often resolved without dangerous escalation. In 1973, the eminent geneticist John Maynard Smith and an eccentric retired engineer named George Price explained why sometimes selection favored restraint, and why sometimes it didn't. This model, called the Hawk-Dove game, illustrates the power of simple models and changed the way biologists viewed animal contests. The Hawk-Dove game provides a simple introduction to a key feature of social behavior—individual fitness typically depends on the behavior of others. This chapter examines the Hawk-Dove game and some of its many descendants. It first introduces the basic ideas of evolutionary game theory and applies them to the understanding of the evolution of animal contests. It then discusses the results of the Hawk-Dove game for retaliation, evolutionary stable strategies, continuous stable strategies, ownership, resource holding power, and sequential play. (pages 37 - 70)
This chapter is available at:
https://academic.oup.com/chica...
2.1 The Hawk-Dove game
2.2 Retaliation
2.3 Continuous stable strategies
2.4 Ownership, an asymmetry
2.5 Resource holding power
2.6 Sequential play
Altruism and Inclusive Fitness - Richard Mcelreath, Robert Boyd
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226558288.003.0003
[ground squirrels, alarm calls, altruism, inclusive fitness, natural selection, George Price, covariance genetics, population genetics, analytical models, Hamilton's rule]
Ground squirrels don't always dive for safety at the first sign of a predator, but instead sometimes they stand stiffly and give a shrill alarm call that alerts other squirrels to the predator. Evolutionary biologists refer to behaviors like alarm calls that increase the fitness of the recipients but lower the fitness of the actor as altruism. The evolution of altruistic behavior had a strong role in defining sociobiology, and it continues to be one of its core problems. This chapter shows why natural selection can favor altruism when relatives interact. It introduces several new tools for building and solving analytical models, including George Price's covariance genetics framework. It also considers the prisoner's dilemma, positive assortment, common descent, and inclusive fitness. It reconstructs Hamilton's rule, using more-detailed genetic models of the evolution of altruism, and demonstrates why it can be used to understand the evolution of social behavior. It then derives Hamilton's rule using Price's method. (pages 71 - 122)
This chapter is available at:
https://academic.oup.com/chica...
3.1 The prisoner’s dilemma
3.2 Positive assortment
3.3 Common descent and inclusive fitness
3.4 Rediscovering Hamilton’s rule
3.5 Justifying Hamilton’s rule
3.6 Using Hamilton’s rule
Reciprocity - Richard Mcelreath, Robert Boyd
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226558288.003.0004
[Axelrod-Hamilton model, mutants, mistakes, partner choice, indirect reciprocity, reciprocity, collective action, Tit-for-Tat strategy, altruistic punishment, kinship]
In most primate societies, individuals have long-lasting relationships with other members of their groups. Individual monkeys often have preferred grooming partners and reliable allies. If allies and grooming partners were always relatives, we could explain such cooperation with inclusive fitness and move on. But these cooperative relationships involve unrelated individuals. How can natural selection lead to such behavior in the absence of kinship? One answer is reciprocity: I'll scratch your back if you scratch mine. The essential feature of reciprocity is contingent cooperation. The concept of reciprocity took off in 1981 when Robert Axelrod and W. D. Hamilton published a paper in Science that analyzed a formal model of reciprocal altruism. This chapter examines both the basic Axelrod-Hamilton model of reciprocity and some of the more important developments since, including the importance of mistakes, the effect of partner choice, indirect reciprocity, kinship, mutants, Tit-for-Tat strategy, and the roles of reciprocity and altruistic punishment in solving collective action problems. The chapter also explains how to build and solve models of repeated interactions. (pages 123 - 172)
This chapter is available at:
https://academic.oup.com/chica...
4.1 The Axelrod-Hamilton model
4.2 Mutants and mistakes
4.3 Partner choice
4.4 Indirect reciprocity
4.5 Reciprocity and collective action
Animal Communication - Richard Mcelreath, Robert Boyd
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226558288.003.0005
[animal communication, animal signals, repeat play, cheap signaling, altruism, social learning, costly signaling theory, Sir Philip Sidney game, genetic models, evolutionary dynamics]
The basic premise of game theory is that social life is like a giant game. If this is true, it is also true that life is less like chess and more like poker. In games like chess, information is entirely public. In games like poker, however, there is private information, and access to this information strongly determines the outcomes of contests. Communication is at least as important to animals as it is to card players. There are many kinds of communication. Information can be shared intentionally or accidentally, be inherently unfakeable or strategic. This chapter examines animal communication and animal signals, focusing on repeat play and cheap signaling, altruism, and social learning. First, it presents models in which intentional communication, signals, can affect the outcomes of a game. Second, it considers examples of models in which costly signaling theory is put to the test. Third, it looks at the Sir Philip Sidney game to see how costly signaling theory works. Finally, it considers two-locus genetic models and how to model the evolutionary dynamics of information within a population. (pages 173 - 222)
This chapter is available at:
https://academic.oup.com/chica...
5.1 Costly signaling theory
5.2 Cheap, honest signals
5.3 Signaling and altruism
5.4 Social learning
Selection among Groups - Richard Mcelreath, Robert Boyd
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226558288.003.0006
[group selection, Price equation, dispersal, evolution, animal behavior, multilevel selection, inclusive selection, natural selection, personal fitness, inclusive fitness]
In his book Animal Dispersion in Relation to Social Behavior, ornithologist V. C. Wynne-Edwards argued that many enigmatic bird behaviors functioned to prevent over-population. The book generated a storm of controversy, and luminaries like George Williams and John Maynard Smith penned critiques explaining why this mechanism, then called “group selection,” could not work. The result was the beginning of an ongoing and highly successful revolution in our understanding of the evolution of animal behavior, a revolution that is rooted in carefully thinking about the individual and nepotistic functions of behavior. This chapter takes a general look at multilevel selection and shows that the Price equation also leads to a description of natural selection as going on in a series of nested levels: among genes within an individual, among individuals within groups, and among groups. It first discusses three views of selection according to personal fitness, inclusive fitness, and multilevel selection. It concludes by discussing the evolution of dispersal as an example of how multilevel selection can be used to clarify an important biological problem. (pages 223 - 260)
This chapter is available at:
https://academic.oup.com/chica...
6.1 Three views of selection
6.2 Deriving the Price equation
6.3 Selection within and between groups
6.4 Dispersal
Sex Allocation - Richard Mcelreath, Robert Boyd
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226558288.003.0007
[sex allocation, reproductive value, sex ratios, Shaw-Mohler theorem, biased sex ratios, eigen barrier, population structure, matrix methods, parents]
This chapter explains why a 50:50 sex ratio is so common and why sex ratios sometimes deviate from 50:50. It shows that a sex ratio is really about appreciating the ways that parents invest in sons and daughters. There are deep reasons why, under most circumstances, mothers should invest the same amount in their sons and daughters. There are also interesting exceptions to this rule. This chapter also introduces two new tools, the calculus of reproductive value and matrix methods that extend equilibrium analysis to dynamic systems with two or more state variables. It first describes Fisher's theory of sex allocation and then discusses reproductive value and Fisherian sex ratios, biased sex ratios, and the eigen barrier. It also looks at the Shaw-Mohler theorem, which is used in cases when there are limits that force mothers to trade off the number of sons and daughters, so that one of the two terms is positive and the other negative. This chapter also examines how population structure can lead to a biased sex ratio. (pages 261 - 294)
This chapter is available at:
https://academic.oup.com/chica...
7.1 Fisher’s theory of sex allocation
7.2 Reproductive value and Fisherian sex ratios
7.3 Using the Shaw-Mohler theorem
7.4 Biased sex ratios
7.5 Breaking the eigen barrier
Sexual Selection - Richard Mcelreath, Robert Boyd
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226558288.003.0008
[genetic models, Fisher's runaway models, female preferences, male traits, good-genes models, sensory bias models, Russ Lande, game-theoretic model, sexual selection]
Sexual selection refers to selection on individuals of the non-limiting sex (usually males) caused by differential access to the limiting sex (usually females). Following Julian Huxley, most people divide sexual selection into two components: intrasexual selection and intersexual selection. Intrasexual selection refers to selection caused by male-male competition, while intersexual selection refers to selection caused by female preferences. This chapter focuses on the evolution of preferences for seemingly maladaptive, exaggerated male traits. Much of the literature divides explanations for the evolution of female preferences into three distinct categories: Fisherian runaway models, good-genes models, and sensory bias models. This chapter also presents a new set of tools to model the evolution of female preferences. It begins by considering the quantitative genetic models and then looks at Russ Lande's model of the runaway process as well as its descendants. The chapter also examines a game-theoretic model by Hanna Kokko, John McNamara, and their coworkers that provides a very clear understanding of the relationship between Fisherian models and so-called good-genes models. (pages 295 - 332)
This chapter is available at:
https://academic.oup.com/chica...
8.1 Quantitative genetic models
8.2 Fisher’s runaway process
8.3 Costly choice and sensory bias
8.4 Good genes and sexy sons
A Facts about Derivatives
B Facts about Random Variables
C Calculating Binomial Expectations
D Numerical Solution of the Kokko et al. Model
E Solutions to Problems
Bibliography
Index