The Myth of the Imperial Presidency
How Public Opinion Checks the Unilateral Executive
by Dino P. Christenson and Douglas L. Kriner
University of Chicago Press, 2020
Cloth: 978-0-226-70422-7 | Paper: 978-0-226-70436-4 | Electronic: 978-0-226-70453-1
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226704531.001.0001
ABOUT THIS BOOKAUTHOR BIOGRAPHYREVIEWSTABLE OF CONTENTS
ABOUT THIS BOOK
Throughout American history, presidents have shown a startling power to act independently of Congress and the courts. On their own initiative, presidents have taken the country to war, abolished slavery, shielded undocumented immigrants from deportation, declared a national emergency at the border, and more, leading many to decry the rise of an imperial presidency. But given the steep barriers that usually prevent Congress and the courts from formally checking unilateral power, what stops presidents from going it alone even more aggressively? The answer, Dino P. Christenson and Douglas L. Kriner argue, lies in the power of public opinion.
With robust empirical data and compelling case studies, the authors reveal the extent to which domestic public opinion limits executive might. Presidents are emboldened to pursue their own agendas when they enjoy strong public support, and constrained when they don’t, since unilateral action risks inciting political pushback, jeopardizing future initiatives, and further eroding their political capital. Although few Americans instinctively recoil against unilateralism, Congress and the courts can sway the public’s view via their criticism of unilateral policies. Thus, other branches can still check the executive branch through political means. As long as presidents are concerned with public opinion, Christenson and Kriner contend that fears of an imperial presidency are overblown.
AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY
Dino P. Christenson is associate professor in the Department of Political Science at Boston University and an institute fellow at the Hariri Institute for Computational Science and Engineering. He is a coauthor of Applied Social Science Methodology. Douglas L. Kriner is the Clinton Rossiter Professor in American Institutions in the Department of Government at Cornell University. He is the author of multiple books, including After the Rubicon, also published by the University of Chicago Press.
REVIEWS
“If unilateralism is so tempting and so effective, Christenson and Kriner ask, why is it so rare? The key dynamics, they show, are less in other branches of government but in politics and public opinion. Christenson and Kriner unify strands of presidency research that have been treated by too many as competitors and even as opposites, and the book will make a crucial contribution.”
— Andrew Rudalevige, Bowdoin College
“American democracy only works if the populace controls those who they elect. There is no more fundamental question then whether citizens can in fact exert such control. Yet, for more than one hundred years, scholars and pundits have worried about an imperial presidency that evades institutional and popular checks. This seminal book offers remarkable evidence that the public—with the help of the Congress and the courts—do in fact hold the president accountable. In that sense, democracy can work and has worked. Alas, the book also points to concerns of responsiveness to a narrow base. In so doing, Christenson and Kriner not only resolve a hundred-year-old puzzle but also set an agenda for the next generation of scholarship on American democracy.”
— James N. Druckman, Northwestern University
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter 1: An Imperial Presidency? - Dino P. Christenson, Douglas L. Kriner
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226704531.003.0001
[imperial presidency;Congress;executive orders;formal checks;political costs]
This chapter presents a puzzle: while the Constitution entrusts Congress and the courts with ample formal powers to check presidential unilateralism, in practice institutional barriers all but preclude their effective use. And yet, while presidents do at times effect significant policy changes unilaterally, we show empirically that major unilateral actions are relatively rare. Why are presidents so restrained if the formal checks on their power are practically so limited? We argue that political checks, not formal constitutional checks and balances, are the most important constraints on the unilateral president. Foremost among these checks is the constraining power of public opinion. (pages 1 - 25)
This chapter is available at:
https://academic.oup.com/chica...
Chapter 2: How Americans Think about Unilateral Action - Dino P. Christenson, Douglas L. Kriner, Dino P. Christenson, Douglas L. Kriner
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226704531.003.0002
[unilateral action;partisanship;policy preferences;public opinion;Constitution;ends vs means]
Unilateral action challenges most Americans’ understanding of how policy-making should work in our constitutional system. But do most Americans instinctively oppose unilateralism as a threat to checks and balances? Through a series of survey experiments we find they do not. Rather, Americans evaluate unilateralism through the same partisan and policy-based lenses they use to make other political judgements. They tend to support unilateral actions taken by presidents of their party and oppose actions taken by the opposition. And they back executive actions that move policy in their preferred direction and oppose those that move policy further from their preferences. Relatively few Americans oppose presidential action solely because of the means through which it is achieved. (pages 26 - 68)
This chapter is available at:
https://academic.oup.com/chica...
Chapter 3: Congressional Pushback in the Public Sphere - Dino P. Christenson, Douglas L. Kriner, Dino P. Christenson, Douglas L. Kriner
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226704531.003.0003
[unilateral action;Congress;public opinion;constitutional criticism;policy criticism]
The presidential veto renders most congressional efforts to reverse executive actions legislatively all but futile. However, Congress exercises an important, if indirect check on presidential unilateralism through its ability to erode public support for executive action. Through a series of survey experiments we find that congressional criticism on both constitutional and policy grounds can diminish popular support for unilateral action across issue areas, both foreign and domestic. Presidents who anticipate costly congressional push-back and a resulting popular backlash may rationally forgo acting unilaterally to avoid incurring political costs that could jeopardize other aspects of their programmatic agendas. (pages 69 - 104)
This chapter is available at:
https://academic.oup.com/chica...
Chapter 4: Rethinking the Role of the Courts - Dino P. Christenson, Douglas L. Kriner, Dino P. Christenson, Douglas L. Kriner
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226704531.003.0004
[unilateral action;courts;public opinion;constitutional criticism]
Historically, courts have been reticent to check even aggressive assertions of unilateral presidential power. However, this chapter reviews evidence of an increasingly assertive judiciary in recent years. Perhaps more important, it also identifies an oft-overlooked indirect mechanism of judicial constraint: judicial defeats, or even public speculation concerning judicial challenges, can also shape public opinion. Courts need not rule against the White House to undermine popular support for its unilateral initiatives. Rather, even raising the specter of a judicial challenge can undermine popular support for the president and his policies. (pages 105 - 130)
This chapter is available at:
https://academic.oup.com/chica...
Chapter 5: A Popular Check on Unilateralism - Dino P. Christenson, Douglas L. Kriner, Dino P. Christenson, Douglas L. Kriner
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226704531.003.0005
[presidential approval;executive orders;public opinion;political checks;causality;political costs]
But are presidents actually constrained by public opinion when contemplating unilateral action? This chapter outlines in greater detail our theory of anticipated reactions and marshals three strands of evidence for a popular check. First, it shows that presidential approval ratings influence the frequency with which presidents act unilaterally. Popular presidents are emboldened to act unilaterally. By contrast, presidents with weak approval ratings and low political capital are more reticent to go it alone. Second, most executive actions that presidents do take enjoy broad public support. Finally, case studies show that when presidents do pursue unilateral policies that provoke a popular backlash (President Trump is an important outlier in this respect), they routinely suffer considerable political costs. (pages 131 - 176)
This chapter is available at:
https://academic.oup.com/chica...
Chapter 6: Pathways of Political Constraint - Dino P. Christenson, Douglas L. Kriner
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226704531.003.0006
[anticipated reactions;political costs;deferrals;reversals;scope and timing]
Through a series of case studies, this chapter explores how public opinion and anticipated political costs more generally factor into presidents’ strategic calculus when contemplating unilateral action. The chapter begins by analyzing three cases in which presidents explicitly considered, but ultimately decided against taking unilateral action. The chapter then examines a case in which such anticipatory calculations failed. In this case, a strong and swift popular backlash led to a quick administration reversal. The chapter concludes with a pair of case studies showing how presidents can sometimes choose to act unilaterally even when they anticipate political resistance, but that concerns about political costs can affect both the scope and timing of executive action. (pages 177 - 209)
This chapter is available at:
https://academic.oup.com/chica...
Chapter 7: Democratic Decline? - Dino P. Christenson, Douglas L. Kriner
DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226704531.003.0007
[polarization;tribalism;democratic norms;Trump;unilateral power]
The book concludes by examining three developments in contemporary politics that could weaken the political checks on unilateral power: an erosion of democratic norms; partisan polarization in Congress; and increasing partisan “tribalism” in the mass public. While each may ultimately pose some threat to the strength of political checks on unilateral power, recent experience suggests that political checks remain robust, even with the extreme stresses on each of these dimensions that have defined the Trump presidency. (pages 210 - 220)
This chapter is available at:
https://academic.oup.com/chica...
