Cloth: 978-0-226-74238-0 | Paper: 978-0-226-74239-7 | Electronic: 978-0-226-74241-0
AVAILABLE FROMUniversity of Chicago Press (paper, ebook)
ProQuest (formerly ebrary and EBL)
ABOUT THIS BOOK
Intended to introduce novices to rational choice theory, this accessible, interdisciplinary book collects writings by leading researchers. The Limits of Rationality illuminates the rational choice paradigm of social and political behavior itself, identifies its limitations, clarifies the nature of current controversies, and offers suggestions for improving current models.
In the first section of the book, contributors consider the theoretical foundations of rational choice. Models of rational choice play an important role in providing a standard of human action and the bases for constitutional design, but do they also succeed as explanatory models of behavior? Do empirical failures of these explanatory models constitute a telling condemnation of rational choice theory or do they open new avenues of investigation and theorizing?
Emphasizing analyses of norms and institutions, the second and third sections of the book investigate areas in which rational choice theory might be extended in order to provide better models. The contributors evaluate the adequacy of analyses based on neoclassical economics, the potential contributions of game theory and cognitive science, and the consequences for the basic framework when unequal bargaining power and hierarchy are introduced.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction: The Limits of Rationality
PART I THE THEORY OF RATIONAL CHOICE
1 When Rationality Fails
Comment: What Might Rationality Fail to Do?
2 Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions
3 Choice Under Uncertainty: Problems Solved and Unsolved
Comment: Should a Rational Agent Maximize Expected Utility?
4 Rational Choice in Experimental Markets
Comment: Individual Decision Making versus Market-Level Predictions: The Applicability of Rational Choice Theory
PART II PREFERENCE FORMATION AND THE ROLE OF NORMS
5 De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum
Comment: De Gustibus Non Est Explanandum
6 Cooperation and Rationality: Notes on the Collective Action Problem and Its Solutions
Comment: On the Inadequacy of Game Theory for the Solution of Real-World Collective Action Problems
7 Norm-Generating Structures
Comment: An Alternative Approach to the Generation and Maintenance of Norms
PART III INSTITUTIONS
8 Reason and Rationality
Comment: Stinchcombe's "Reason and Rationality"
9 Managerial Dilemmas: Political Leadership in Hierarchies
Comment: Applying Rational Choice Theory: The Role of Leadership in Team Production
10 The Social Evolution of Cooperation
Comment: On Russell Hardin's "The Social Evolution of Cooperation"
11 Institutions and Their Consequences for Economic Performance
12 A Logic of Institutional Change
List of Contributors