Martin Shubik brings classical oligopoly theory and research in mathematical economics close to new studies in industrial organization and simple game experiments in this imaginative and important new work. He engages the reader by creating a market model and by explaining its availability as a computer program, thus promoting interest in game experiments. In all, he admirably succeeds in increasing our understanding of the meaning of competitive and cooperative behavior and of market structure.

This unusual book covers a variety of topics: economic explanation, model building, analyses of duopoly and oligopoly, product differentiation, contingent demand, demand fluctuations, the study of non-symmetric markets, and advertising. All of these parts of Shubik's overall pattern of interpretation may also be used in a game which, more or less, coincides with the exposition of theory and the subject matter of accounting. A complete linking of basic accounting items to the oligopoly model and theory is made. Shubik bridges the gap between information as it appears to the businessman—the player in the game—and the economic model and abstraction of the market as it appears to the economic theorist.

This book examines, in rigorous, quantitative detail, the structure of trade between Japan and the United States, tracing the evolution of trade interdependence and the causes of its increasing intensity. It also looks at sectoral differences in interdependence—at the patterns behind changes in the composition of trade and the complex factors that determine how individual sectors of each economy respond to economic change in all the others.

In the first part, the author designs and estimates a multicountry, multisectoral general equilibrium model. The model is operationalized with careful estimates of the parameters that govern demand, production, and trade in both economies. In the second part, the model is employed to explore various aspects of interdependence and commercial policy. Peter Petri's findings indicate, among other things, that the American and Japanese economies are more closely related than one might judge from the size of their trade. As a result of differences in the structures of the two economies, their interdependence is sharply asymmetric, with economic events in the United States having a greater impact on Japan than vice versa. The study also shows that the roots of bilateral conflict can be traced to structural causes, and suggests that recent structural changes may have increased the incentives for protectionism.

This volume is the latest research report from the Harvard Water Program in the series that began with Design of Water-Resource Systems and includes Simulation Techniques for Design of Water-Resource Systems and Streamflow Synthesis. The emphasis is on the systems analysis of the control of water quality in a river basin or watershed. Classical methods such as low-flow augmentation are analyzed as well as novel ones such as instream aeration and piping of effluents from their point of origin to less harmful points of discharge. Particular attention is paid to the economic evaluation of the methods studied and to the resolution of the political conflicts that are likely to arise in a situation where the costs of combating pollution are borne by different people from those who benefit from the improvement.

The main thesis is that the technical, economic, and political aspects of water quality management have to be considered together in the search for effective, economical, and politically acceptable solutions to the problems of deteriorating water quality. Some practical methods for integrating these diverse considerations in a systems analysis are presented.