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Parabolic Equation Methods for Electromagnetic Wave Propagation
Mireille Levy
The Institution of Engineering and Technology, 2000
This book is the first to present the application of parabolic equation methods in electromagnetic wave propagation. These powerful numerical techniques have become the dominant tool for assessing clear-air and terrain effects on radiowave propagation and are growing increasingly popular for solving scattering problems.
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front cover of Parental Priorities and Economic Inequality
Parental Priorities and Economic Inequality
Casey B. Mulligan
University of Chicago Press, 1997
What determines whether children grow up to be rich or poor? Arguing that parental actions are some of the most important sources of wealth inequality, Casey B. Mulligan investigates the transmission of economic status from one generation to the next by constructing an economic model of parental preferences.

In Mulligan's model, parents determine the degree of their altruistic concern for their children and spend time with and resources on them accordingly—just as they might make choices about how they spend money. Mulligan tests his model against both old and new evidence on the intergenerational transmission of consumption, earnings, and wealth, including models that emphasize "financial constraints." One major prediction of Mulligan's model confirmed by the evidence is that children of wealthy parents typically spend more than they earn.

Mulligan's innovative approach can also help explain other important behavior, such as charitable giving and "corporate loyalty," and will appeal to a wide range of quantitatively oriented social scientists and sociobiologists.
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front cover of Political Competition
Political Competition
Theory and Applications
John E. Roemer
Harvard University Press, 2001

In this book, John Roemer presents a unified and rigorous theory of political competition between parties. He models the theory under many specifications, including whether parties are policy oriented or oriented toward winning, whether they are certain or uncertain about voter preferences, and whether the policy space is uni- or multidimensional. He examines all eight possible combinations of these choice assumptions, and characterizes their equilibria.

He fleshes out a model in which each party is composed of three different factions concerned with winning, with policy, and with publicity. Parties compete with one another. When internal bargaining is combined with external competition, a natural equilibrium emerges, which Roemer calls party-unanimity Nash equilibrium.

Assuming only the distribution of voter preferences and the endowments of the population, he deduces the nature of the parties that will form. He then applies the theory to several empirical puzzles, including income distribution, patterns of electoral success, and why there is no labor party in the United States.

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front cover of Political Complexity
Political Complexity
Nonlinear Models of Politics
Diana Richards, Editor
University of Michigan Press, 2000
This collection illustrates how nonlinear methods can provide new insight into existing political questions. Politics is often characterized by unexpected consequences, sensitivity to small changes, non-equilibrium dynamics, the emergence of patterns, and sudden changes in outcomes. These are all attributes of nonlinear processes. Bringing together a variety of recent nonlinear modeling approaches, Political Complexity explores what happens when political actors operate in a dynamic and complex social environment.
The contributions to this collection are organized in terms of three branches within non-linear theory: spatial nonlinearity, temporal nonlinearity, and functional nonlinearity. The chapters advance beyond analogy towards developing rigorous nonlinear models capable of empirical verification.
Contributions to this volume cover the areas of landscape theory, computational modeling, time series analysis, cross-sectional analysis, dynamic game theory, duration models, neural networks, and hidden Markov models. They address such questions as: Is international cooperation necessary for effective economic sanctions? Is it possible to predict alliance configurations in the international system? Is a bureaucratic agency harder to remove as time goes on? Is it possible to predict which international crises will result in war and which will avoid conflict? Is decentralization in a federal system always beneficial?
The contributors are David Bearce, Scott Bennett, Chris Brooks, Daniel Carpenter, Melvin Hinich, Ken Kollman, Susanne Lohmann, Walter Mebane, John Miller, Robert E. Molyneaux, Scott Page, Philip Schrodt, and Langche Zeng.
This book will be of interest to a broad group of political scientists, ranging from those who employ nonlinear methods to those curious to see what it is about. Scholars in other social science disciplines will find the new methodologies insightful for their own substantive work.
Diana Richards is Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota.
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