Here is the most comprehensive and authoritative work to date on relationships between the economy and politics in the years from Eisenhower through Reagan. Extending and deepening his earlier work, which had major impact in both political science and economics, Douglas Hibbs traces the patterns in and sources of postwar growth, unemployment, and inflation. He identifies which groups “win” and “lose” from inflations and recessions. He also shows how voters’ perceptions and reactions to economic events affect the electoral fortunes of political parties and presidents.

Hibbs’s analyses demonstrate that political officials in a democratic society ignore the economic interests and demands of their constituents at their peril, because episodes of prosperity and austerity frequently have critical influence on voters’ behavior at the polls. The consequences of Eisenhower’s last recession, of Ford’s unwillingness to stimulate the economy, of Carter’s stalled recovery were electorally fatal, whereas Johnson’s, Nixon’s, and Reagan’s successes in presiding over rising employment and real incomes helped win elections.

The book develops a major theory of macroeconomic policy action that explains why priority is given to growth, unemployment, inflation, and income distribution shifts with changes in partisan control of the White House. The analysis shows how such policy priorities conform to the underlying economic interests and preferences of the governing party’s core political supporters. Throughout the study Hibbs is careful to take account of domestic institutional arrangements and international economic events that constrain domestic policy effectiveness and influence domestic economic outcomes.

Hibbs’s interdisciplinary approach yields more rigorous and more persuasive characterizations of the American political economy than either purely economic, apolitical analyses or purely partisan, politicized accounts. His book provides a useful benchmark for the advocacy of new policies for the 1990s—a handy volume for politicians and their staffs, as well as for students and teachers of politics and economics.

In the 1980s, troubled Americans saw interest rates in the United States climb to an alltime high, unemployment grow to over 10 percent, the federal deficit reach near monumental proportions, and the world economy as a whole fall stagnant.

Why did a once booming world economy give way to stagflation? Economist W. W. Rostow finds the roots of the problem in the phenomenon he terms the Barbaric Counter-Revolution—the effort to wring inflation out of the economic system by the rigorous application of a restricted rate of increase in the money supply. This policy was launched by the Carter administration in October 1979, reinforced by President Reagan in mid 1980, and abandoned in August 1982. In the end, it provided the United States with no mechanism for rapid recovery that did not bring with it a return to high interest rates, resumed inflation, and, soon, another recession.

In what he terms a Civilized Synthesis, Rostow sets forth a series of new policies that would permit rapid, sustained growth with inflation under control. He argues that fiscal and monetary policy must be joined by an incomes policy that would gear the rate of increase of wages and salaries to the average rate of increase in productivity. He explores how this could be accomplished within the context of American politics and existing institutions. Finally, Rostow identifies four directions for investment that, together, would yield economic and social benefits.

Supply-side economics, emphasizing tax cuts over government spending, has been much maligned and little understood. It first leaped to national attention during the budget policy debates of 1977–78, when the new ideas captured the imagination of Congress and challenged conventional Keynesian models. After Ronald Reagan was elected, the fight was on in 1981 for what was called “the largest tax cut in history.” A year later, the same administration presided over the “largest tax increase in history.” Nine months after that, President Reagan reemerged as a supply-side leader.

This book tells what happened, and how. It is the story of a revolution in economic theory from its origin in Congressman Jack Kemp's office in the summer of 1975 through the first thirty months of the Reagan Administration. It details the struggles of key figures such as Donald Regan, James Baker, David Stockman, and Alice Rivlin.

It is also the first presentation by a professional economist of the hard case for supply-side economics. Paul Craig Roberts played a major role in managing the issue of supply-side economics both in the congressional staff and the executive branch. He has written an astonishingly candid study of the policy process—how individual ego tends to prevail over common cause, how power plays by politicians are more likely to determine policy than is the ideology of an administration, how skill at manipulating the media prevails over solid economic data. It is a stunning analysis, and a sobering one, from an expert supply-sider who continues to believe that history is on his side, and that supply-side thinking must prevail in a healthy, democratic society.