front cover of Frege’s Philosophy of Mathematics
Frege’s Philosophy of Mathematics
William Demopoulos
Harvard University Press, 1995

Widespread interest in Frege’s general philosophical writings is, relatively speaking, a fairly recent phenomenon. But it is only very recently that his philosophy of mathematics has begun to attract the attention it now enjoys. This interest has been elicited by the discovery of the remarkable mathematical properties of Frege’s contextual definition of number and of the unique character of his proposals for a theory of the real numbers.

This collection of essays addresses three main developments in recent work on Frege’s philosophy of mathematics: the emerging interest in the intellectual background to his logicism; the rediscovery of Frege’s theorem; and the reevaluation of the mathematical content of The Basic Laws of Arithmetic. Each essay attempts a sympathetic, if not uncritical, reconstruction, evaluation, or extension of a facet of Frege’s theory of arithmetic. Together they form an accessible and authoritative introduction to aspects of Frege’s thought that have, until now, been largely missed by the philosophical community.

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The Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy
Michael Dummett
Harvard University Press, 1981
The philosophy of Gottlob Frege is the starting point for the entire modern analytical movement; it profoundly influenced Russell, Wittgenstein, and Quine. Michael Dummett here expands upon his interpretation of Frege, and answers criticisms and objections that have been raised.
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front cover of Reflections on Frege's Philosophy
Reflections on Frege's Philosophy
Reinhardt Grossmann
Northwestern University Press, 1969
In Reflections on Frege’s Philosophy, Reinhardt Grossmann investigates the most important themes in the philosophy of Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob Frege (1848-1925): his distinction between objects and functions, his characterization of numbers as nonmental classes, his theory of sense and reference, and his ontology of truth-values. Grossmann examines Frege’s solutions to basic philosophical problems, and where he finds them inadequate provides what he considers to be more viable alternatives. Grossmann argues that an ontology should contain states of affairs rather than Fregean senses, and that the sense-reference distinction, Frege’s most original and famous metaphysical innovation, must ultimately be rejected. This study is both an exposition of Frege’s philosophy and an original contribution to the philosophical enterprise.
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