front cover of The Theory of Public Choice - II
The Theory of Public Choice - II
James M. Buchanan and Robert D. Tollison, Editors
University of Michigan Press, 1984

That economics can usefully explain politics is no longer a novel idea, it is a well-established fact brought about by the work of many public choice scholars. This book, which is a sequel to a similar volume published in 1972, brings together a fresh collection of recent work in the public choice tradition. The essays demonstrate the power of the public choice approach in the analysis of government. Among the issues considered are income redistribution, fiscal limitations on government, voting rules and processes, the demand for public goods, the political business cycle, international negotiations, interest groups, and legislators.

James M. Buchanan is University Distinguished Professor and direct, Center for Study of Public Choice at George Mason University.

Robert D. Tollison, formerly director, Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, is now Abney Professor of Economics at Clemson University.


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Time, Ignorance, and Uncertainty in Economic Models
Donald W. Katzner
University of Michigan Press, 1998
Emerging from the tradition of Marshall, Knight, Keynes, and Shackle, Time, Ignorance, and Uncertainty in Economic Models is concerned with the character of formal economic analysis when the notions of logical or mechanical time and probabilistic uncertainty and the relatively complete knowledge basis it requires, are replaced, respectively, by historical time, and nonprobabilistic uncertainty and ignorance. Examining that analytical character by constructing and exploring particular models, this book emphasizes doing actual economic analysis in a framework of historical time, nonprobabilistic uncertainty, and ignorance.
Donald W. Katzner begins with an extensive investigation of the distinction between potential surprise and probability. He presents a modified version of Shackle's model of decision-making in ignorance and examines in considerable detail its "comparative statics" and operationality properties. The meaning of aggregation and simultaneity under these conditions is also explored, and Shackle's model is applied to the construction of models of the consumer, the firm, microeconomics, and macroeconomics. Katzner concludes with discussions of the roles of history, hysteresis, and empirical investigation in economic inquiry.
Time, Ignorance, and Uncertainty in Economic Models will be of interest to economists and others engaged in the study of uncertainty, probability, aggregation, and simultaneity. Those interested in the microeconomics of consumer and firm behavior, general equilibrium, and macroeconomics will also benefit from this book.
Donald W. Katzner is Professor of Economics, University of Massachusetts.

front cover of Trust and Distrust In Organizations
Trust and Distrust In Organizations
Dilemmas and Approaches
Roderick M. Kramer
Russell Sage Foundation, 2004
The effective functioning of a democratic society—including social, business, and political interactions—largely depends on trust. Yet trust remains a fragile and elusive resource in many of the organizations that make up society's building blocks. In their timely volume, Trust and Distrust in Organizations, editors Roderick M. Kramer and Karen S. Cook have compiled the most important research on trust in organizations, illuminating the complex nature of how trust develops, functions, and often is thwarted in organizational settings. With contributions from social psychologists, sociologists, political scientists, economists, and organizational theorists, the volume examines trust and distrust within a variety of settings—from employer-employee and doctor-patient relationships, to geographically dispersed work teams and virtual teams on the internet. Trust and Distrust in Organizations opens with an in-depth examination of hierarchical relationships to determine how trust is established and maintained between people with unequal power. Kurt Dirks and Daniel Skarlicki find that trust between leaders and their followers is established when people perceive a shared background or identity and interact well with their leader. After trust is established, people are willing to assume greater risks and to work harder. In part II, the contributors focus on trust between people in teams and networks. Roxanne Zolin and Pamela Hinds discover that trust is more easily established in geographically dispersed teams when they are able to meet face-to-face initially. Trust and Distrust in Organizations moves on to an examination of how people create and foster trust and of the effects of power and betrayal on trust. Kimberly Elsbach reports that managers achieve trust by demonstrating concern, maintaining open communication, and behaving consistently. The final chapter by Roderick Kramer and Dana Gavrieli includes recently declassified data from secret conversations between President Lyndon Johnson and his advisors that provide a rich window into a leader's struggles with problems of trust and distrust in his administration. Broad in scope, Trust and Distrust in Organizations provides a captivating and insightful look at trust, power, and betrayal, and is essential reading for anyone wishing to understand the underpinnings of trust within a relationship or an organization. A Volume in the Russell Sage Foundation Series on Trust

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