The concept of faith has remained inscrutable to thinkers for centuries. The late Nathan Rotenstreich believed that faith was such a difficult topic for so many because of its inextricable links to theology and religion. On Faith, Rotenstreich's last work which was edited and prepared for publication by Paul Mendes-Flohr, attempts to detach the concept from its religious underpinnings and consider it in its own right, as a human phenomenon and cognitive attitude. Faith, Rotenstreich contends, should not be confused with its historical manifestations. By making faith a philosophical rather than a theological matter, he explores its essence as an awareness of how we relate within mundane reality to all that is beyond the human world. Arguing for the intentionality of faith, Rotenstreich shows how it structures a variety of relations that range from the experience of the holy to the nature of cults, traditional religion, and the idea of servitude to God.

Rotenstreich's phenomenological study will be of great importance for religious scholars as well as for philosophers.

Nathan Rotenstreich (1913-93) was professor of philosophy at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He was elected to the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, and his works include Jews and German Philosophy and Reason and Its Manifestations: A Study of Kant and Hegel.

This collection contains original translations of essays, discussions, and papers including six previously unpublished works from the International Colloquium on Heidegger’s Conception of Language, held at The Pennsylvania State University in 1969. This volume endeavors to place Martin Heidegger’s ideas within a wide range of philosophical thought. It contains critical reflections on his conception of speech in Being and Time, linguistic meditations on Heidegger’s use of language, and analysis of his view on the relationship between thought and the language in which it is expressed. In this book, Heidegger scholars will find additional insights into his conception of language and his philosophy as a whole.

     One of the most significant philosophical works of the twentieth century, Contributions to Philosophy is also one of the most difficult. Parvis Emad, in this collection of interpretive and critical essays, unravels and clarifies this challenging work with a rare depth and originality. In addition to grappling with other commentaries on Heidegger, he highlights Heidegger's "being-historical thinking" as thinking that sheds new light on theological, technological, and scientific interpretations of reality. At the crux of Emad's interpretation is his elucidation of the issue of "the turning" in Heidegger's thought and his "enactment" of Heidegger's thinking. He finds that only when Heidegger's work is enacted is his thinking truly revealed.

On Time and Being charts the so-called "turn" in Martin Heidegger's philosophy away from his earlier metaphysics in Being and Time to his later thoughts after "the end of philosophy." The title lecture, "Time and Being," shows how Heidegger reconceived both "Being" and "time," introducing the new concept of "the event of Appropriation" to help give his metaphysical ideas nonmetaphysical meanings. On Time and Being also contains a summary of six seminar sessions that Heidegger conducted on "Time and Being," a lecture called "The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking," and an autobiographical sketch of Heidegger's intellectual history in "My Way of Phenomenology."

"This collection may well vie with Vom Wesen des Grundes and Identität and Differenz as definitive statements of Heidegger's ontology."—Library Journal

"The title of the English translation is that of the lead essay, the highly celebrated lecture which Heidegger gave in 1962 and which bears the same title as the never published 'third division' of the 'first half' of Being and Time. This lecture is perhaps the most significant document to be added to the Heideggerian corpus since the Letter of Humanism. . . . Stambaugh's translation is superb."—Stanley O. Hoerr and staff, The Review of Metaphysics

M. C. Dillon (1938–2005) was widely regarded as a world-leading Merleau-Ponty scholar. His book Merleau-Ponty’s Ontology (1988) is recognized as a classic text that revolutionized the philosophical conversation about the great French phenomenologist. Dillon followed that book with two others: Semiological Reductionism, a critique of early-1990s linguistic reductionism, and Beyond Romance, a richly developed theory of love. At the time of his death, Dillon had nearly completed two further books to which he was passionately committed. The first one offers a highly original interpretation of Nietzsche’s ontology of becoming. The second offers a detailed ethical theory based on Merleau-Ponty’s account of carnal intersubjectivity. The Ontology of Becoming and the Ethics of Particularity collects these two manuscripts written by a distinguished philosopher at the peak of his powers—manuscripts that, taken together, offer a distinctive and powerful view of human life and ethical relations.

In Original Forgiveness, Nicolas de Warren challenges the widespread assumption that forgiveness is always a response to something that has incited it. Rather than considering forgiveness exclusively in terms of an encounter between individuals or groups after injury, he argues that availability for the possibility of forgiveness represents an original forgiveness, an essential condition for the prospect of human relations. De Warren develops this notion of original forgiveness through a reflection on the indispensability of trust for human existence, as well as an examination of the refusal or unavailability to forgive in the aftermath of moral harms.

De Warren engages in a critical discussion of philosophical figures, including Martin Heidegger, Hannah Arendt, Mikhail Bakhtin, Edmund Husserl, Gabriel Marcel, Emmanuel Levinas, and Jean Améry, and of literary works by William Shakespeare, Fyodor Dostoevsky, Heinrich von Kleist, Simon Wiesenthal, Herman Melville, and Maurice Sendak. He uses this discussion to show that in trusting another person, we must trust in ourselves to remain available to the possibility of forgiveness for those occasions when the other person betrays a trust, without thereby forgiving anything in advance. Original forgiveness is to remain the other person’s keeper—even when the other has caused harm. Likewise, being another’s keeper calls upon an original beseeching for forgiveness, given the inevitable possibility of blemish or betrayal.