For nearly thirty years, from the late 1920s to the late 1950s, the keystone of the entire Soviet collective farm system was the network of MTS (machine-tractor stations) which owned, housed, operated, and repaired heavy farm machinery for the surrounding farms. The MTS played fundamental roles in the development of the political, administrative, and ideological, as well as the economic, foundations of Soviet agriculture. Now, years after the demise of the MTS system, its influence can still be discerned in the structural and operational patterns of the agricultural organization. The story of the MTS, of considerable historical interest in its own right, offers numerous vantage points for studying the evolution of Soviet rule in the countryside. In this exhaustive work Robert Miller analyzes the history of the MTS and relates his findings to the development of Soviet administrative policies.

Using data obtained from provincial Party newspapers, official Soviet documents, fictional literature on village life, and interviews with Soviet agricultural specialists familiar with the MTS, Miller explores the combination of economic and political pressures embodied in the MTS system and traces the growth of a characteristically Soviet approach to the problems of administration. In addition to these broad questions of the interaction of the economics and politics, the author examines several specific problem areas, including the function of ideology in the Soviet domestic decision-making process, the principles and practices of Soviet public administration as applied to agriculture, and the development of patterns of Party control in the countryside.

Miller’s study of the MTS reveals the method of Soviet policy-making and policy-implementation to be highly influenced by the leadership style of such men as Stalin and Khrushchev, though practical economic considerations certainly took precedence in important cases. The author observes that ideologically correct procedure was not always felt to be sufficiently effective in times of crises. Two basic modes of administrative control thus became apparent—one for critical periods and another for relatively “normal” periods. An exceptionally thorough work, One Hundred Thousand Tractors will interest students of comparative politics and comparative public administration as well as Soviet specialists.

In 1955 the United States and the Soviet Union were matching steps in a race to develop missiles tipped with thermonuclear weapons. American officials were frustrated and alarmed by their inability to learn the scale and progress of the Soviet program, which directly threatened the security of the United States, and they were convinced that serious arms control measures required reliable means for mutual inspection. The result: President Dwight D. Eisenhower's dramatic Open Skies proposal, advanced—and rejected—at the Geneva summit of 1955.

Vetoed by Nikita Khrushchev, Eisenhower's proposal to allow mutual aerial inspection between the United States and the U.S.S.R. was accepted as policy only after satellite photography became feasible. But at the time of the 1955 summit, it was a stunning, if transient, psychological and political victory for the United States and its president.

W. W. Rostow was an active participant in this important episode in American history, and his is the first authoritative account of how Eisenhower's Open Skies proposal came to be. His insider's knowledge, combined with data from hitherto unexploited documentary sources, vividly brings to life the discussions and events that preceded the president's proposal.

Rostow explores the diplomatic forces that led to Eisenhower's reluctant acceptance of a summit with the Soviets. He tracks the origins of the Open Skies concept to an obscure meeting organized at Quantico Marine Corps Base by presidential adviser Nelson Rockefeller. He describes the tensions between Rockefeller and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles that complicated Eisenhower's task in mounting the initiative for Open Skies and explains the differences between Eisenhower himself and Rockefeller over postsummit policy that provoked the latter's resignation. He examines Soviet motives and objectives at Geneva. Finally, Rostow reflects on the meaning of this fascinating episode in American history, in particular its importance to later arms control negotiations.