front cover of The Battle for the Rhineland
The Battle for the Rhineland
Reginald W. Thompson
Westholme Publishing, 2012
An Engrossing Study of the British and American Victory Over the German Army in the West During World War II
In this fascinating account of the critical final campaign against Nazi Germany on the western front, Reginald W. Thompson focuses on both the command decisions by the British and American generals and the performance of the enlisted men in order to explain the complex series of events that led to the German defeat in World War II. During the planning and run-up to what was intended to be a massive joint British and American push across the Rhine River and into the heart of Germany, the Allies encountered unexpected setbacks. Operation Market-Garden, the Allied aerial assault of the Low Countries, ended in disaster, while the attack through the Hu¨rtgen Forest was met by unexpected heavy resistance due to the build-up for the German surprise counterstrike planned for December 1944, what would become known as the Battle of the Bulge. The author identifies the attack on the town of Schmidt in the Hu¨rtgen Forest as the key battle that set in motion a series of events that both prolonged the war and shaped Allied strategy in their effort to cross the Rhine. Here the reader will learn the chain of decisions that allowed the Allies to pressure German forces between the Roer and Rhine rivers and move on Cologne, Dusseldorf, and other key points, including the famous bridge over the Rhine at Remagen, near Bonn. Based on both American and British official reports and the author’s independent research and originally published in 1958, The Battle for the Rhineland is a lucid, balanced, and engaging account of a critical period in Western Europe during the Second World War.
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Battling to the End
Conversations with Benoit Chantre
René Girard
Michigan State University Press, 2010

Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831), the Prussian military theoretician who wrote On War, is known above all for his famous dictum: “War is the continuation of politics by other means.” In René Girard’s view, however, the strategist’s treatise offers up a more disturbing truth to the reader willing to extrapolate from its most daring observations: with modern warfare comes the insanity of tit-for-tat escalation, which political institutions have lost their ability to contain. Having witnessed the Napoleonic Wars firsthand, Girard argues, Clausewitz intuited that unbridled “reciprocal action” could eventually lead foes to total mutual annihilation. Haunted by the Franco-German conflict that was to ravage Europe, in Girard’s account Clausewitz is a prescient witness to the terrifying acceleration of history. Battling to the End issues a warning about the apocalyptic threats hanging over our planet and delivers an authoritative lesson on the mimetic laws of violence.
 

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Blinders, Blunders, and Wars
What America and China Can Learn
David C. Gompert
RAND Corporation, 2014
The history of wars caused by misjudgments, from Napoleon’s invasion of Russia to America’s invasion of Iraq, reveals that leaders relied on cognitive models that were seriously at odds with objective reality. Blinders, Blunders, and Wars analyzes eight historical examples of strategic blunders regarding war and peace and four examples of decisions that turned out well, and then applies those lessons to the current Sino-American case.
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The Broken Seal
"Operation Magic" and the Secret Road to Pearl Harbor
Ladislas Farago
Westholme Publishing, 1967
The Important Study That Evaluates the Intelligence War Behind the Japanese Surprise Attack
“In this fascinating account. . . . Mr. Farago’s investigation suggests that the real villain was the system itself.”—New York Times
“In this well-written and informative account. . . Mr. Farago provides many new facts from both American and Japanese sources.”—Library Journal
“A good history of Japanese and American code-breaking operations between 1921 and December 7, 1941. . . . Farago is important because in this technical study of cryptology he has arrived independently at the same general conclusion as did the non-revisionist diplomatic historians: there was no plot by Roosevelt or his advisers.”—Choice
“His conclusions should act as a corrective to the enthusiasts who claim that intelligence always provides the complete answer.”—Times Literary Supplement
The Broken Seal: The Story of “Operation Magic” and the Pearl Harbor Disaster explores the questions of why, if the United States knew the Japanese codes, did we not anticipate the December 7, 1941 surprise attack and how did the Japanese spy system in Hawaii operate? As a chief of research and planning in the Special Warfare Branch of the Office of Naval Intelligence, the author had access to both Japanese and American classified material to write this study. The author’s intent was to independently ascertain the validity of earlier claims that the Pearl Harbor attack could have been avoided. The result is an eminently readable and engrossing story, first published in 1968, of the relationship between America and Japan in the interwar years and the relentless cat-and-mouse intelligence game conducted by both sides. Despite more recent suppositions that there was a conspiracy among American and British officials to ignore warnings of a Japanese attack that had been gleaned from deciphered diplomatic codes in order to force America into a world war, the author confirms that human error and misjudgment and the actual state of intelligence interpretation at the time made an accurate assessment of Japanese intentions impossible.
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The Byzantine Art of War
Michael J. Decker
Westholme Publishing, 2013
A Complete Overview of One of the Most Important Military Forces in the History of the World
The Byzantine Art of War explores the military history of the thousand-year empire of the eastern Mediterranean, Byzantium. Throughout its history the empire faced a multitude of challenges from foreign invaders seeking to plunder its wealth and to occupy its lands, from the deadly Hunnic hordes of Attila, to the Arab armies of Islam, to the western Crusaders bent on carving out a place in the empire or its former lands. In order to survive the Byzantines relied on their army that was for centuries the only standing, professional force in Europe. Leadership provided another key to survival; Byzantine society produced a number of capable strategic thinkers and tacticians—and several brilliant ones. These officers maintained a level of professionalism and organization inherited and adapted from Roman models. The innovations of the Byzantine military reforms of the sixth century included the use of steppe nomad equipment and tactics, the most important of which was the refinement of the Roman mounted archer. Strategy and tactics evolved in the face of victory and defeat; the shock of the Arab conquests led to a sharp decline in the number and quality of imperial forces. By the eighth and ninth centuries Byzantine commanders mastered the art of the small war, waging guerrilla campaigns, raids, and flying column attacks that injured the enemy but avoided the decisive confrontation the empire was no longer capable of winning. A century later they began the most sustained, glorious military expansion of their history. This work further sketches the key campaigns, battles, and sieges that illustrate Byzantine military doctrine, vital changes from one era to another, the composition of forces and the major victories and defeats that defined the territory and material well-being of its citizens. Through a summary of their strategies, tactics, and innovations in the tools of war, the book closes with an analysis of the contributions of this remarkable empire to world military history.
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