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Many of today's new democracies are constrained by institutional forms designed by previous authoritarian rulers. In this timely and provocative study, Delia M. Boylan traces the emergence of these vestigial governance structures to strategic behavior by outgoing elites seeking to protect their interests from the vicissitudes of democratic rule.

One important outgrowth of this political insulation strategy--and the empirical centerpiece of Boylan's analysis--is the existence of new, highly independent central banks in countries throughout the developing world. This represents a striking transformation, for not only does central bank autonomy remove a key aspect of economic decision making from democratic control; in practice it has also kept many of the would-be expansionist governments that hold power today from overturning the neoliberal policies favored by authoritarian predecessors.

To illustrate these points, Defusing Democracy takes a fresh look at two transitional polities in Latin America--Chile and Mexico--where variation in the proximity of the democratic "threat" correspondingly yielded different levels of central bank autonomy.

Boylan concludes by extending her analysis to institutional contexts beyond Latin America and to insulation strategies other than central bank autonomy. Defusing Democracy will be of interest to anyone--political scientists, economists, and policymakers alike--concerned about the genesis and consolidation of democracy around the globe.

Delia M. Boylan is Assistant Professor, Harris Graduate School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago.

For many decades, underdevelopment in much of the world was blamed variously on capital deficits, exploitation by rich nations, and market-distorting economic policies. The chapters in this volume provide much of the evidence underpinning a growing consensus among development and growth economists that successful economic development depends more fundamentally on the way societies are organized and governed. They argue that "good governance" is a prerequisite to sustained increases in living standards.
The difference between developmental success and failure in this view has little to do with natural resource availability, climate, aid, or developed nations' policies. Rather, it is largely a function of whether incentives within a given society steer wealth-maximizing individuals toward producing new wealth or toward diverting it from others. The chapters, seminal essays written by Mancur Olson and his IRIS Center colleagues, provide theoretical and/or empirical underpinnings for the emerging consensus that differences in the way governments and societies are organized have enormous implications for the structure of incentives faced by politicians, bureaucrats, investors, and workers, which in turn determines the level of a nation's material well-being.
Overall this volume applies tools and concepts from the "New Institutional Economics" to some of the major issues in economic development. It will be of interest to scholars and students of various disciplines--including political science, law, and sociology as well as economics--interested in the determinants of economic development and global economic change. The book will also be of interest to many aid practitioners, particularly those working in anticorruption and public sector reform issues.
Stephen Knack is Senior Research Economist, Development Research Group, the World Bank.

Why are some countries richer than others? Why do some economies grow so much faster than others do? Do economies tend to converge at similar levels of per capita income? Or is catching up simply impossible? These questions have vast implications for human welfare. After a period of lack of interest in growth theory, they are back on the research agenda of mainstream economics. They have also been at the heart of development economics since its inception some decades ago. This book endeavors to answer such questions by blending classical contributions to development theory with recent developments in the economics of growth.

The unifying theme is that early theoretical insights and accumulated empirical knowledge of development economics have much to offer to research in the theory and empirics of economic growth. With the help of a number of recent contributions, the ideas and insights of the classical literature in development economics can be given simple and rigorous formulations. Together, they amount to an approach to growth theory that can overcome the long-recognized empirical shortcomings of neoclassical growth economics, while being free from the objections that can be raised against the new brand of endogenous growth theory.

In addition to an original thesis on the contribution that early development theory can make to the research program of modern growth economics, the book provides professional and research economists and graduate students with an evaluation of the strengths and limitations of the different strands of inquiry in the modern economics of growth. In addition it presents findings on comparative growth performance across countries.

Jaime Ros is Professor of Economics and Faculty Fellow of the Helen Kellogg Institute of International Studies, University of Notre Dame.

While endogenous growth theory has claimed success in modeling various factors of growth and providing an analysis of sustainable economic growth, most of the growth models in published work are for closed economies. The omission of international trade, which is often regarded as the engine of growth, greatly reduces their usefulness. The theory of international trade, on the other hand, is characterized by models that are mainly static. While interest in the dynamics of trade has been growing, there is still little work in this area. The success of the newly industrialized economies that have adopted trade-oriented policies suggests how limited present trade theory is in explaining and analyzing the growth of these economies.

The work collected here serves to bridge the "old" growth theory and "new" growth theory; merge growth and trade theory; suggest new analysis and techniques of economic growth; and provide analysis of new issues related to growth and trade. The first chapter surveys endogenous growth and international trade and critically reviews the endogenous growth theory with a unified framework, covering the work on both closed and open economies. Three chapters examine the dynamics of some basic trade models; two chapters focus on growth and trade with endogenous accumulation of human and public capital; two chapters on economic growth, technological progress, and international trade; and two chapters on growth and international factor movements.

Contributors include Eric W. Bond, Theo S. Eicher, Rolf Färe, Oded Galor, Shawna Grosskopf, Bjarne S. Jensen, Pantelis Kalaitzidakis, Shoukang Lin, Ngo Van Long, Kazuo Nishimura, Koji Shimomura, Kathleen Trask, Stephen J. Turnovsky, Pham Hoang Van, Henry Wan, Jr., Chunyan Wang, and Kar-yiu Wong.

Bjarne S. Jensen is Associate Professor of Economics, Copenhagen Business School. Kar-yiu Wong is Professor of Economics, University of Washington, Seattle.