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The George W. Bush administration’s ambitious—even breathtaking—claims of unilateral executive authority raised deep concerns among constitutional scholars, civil libertarians, and ordinary citizens alike. But Bush’s attempts to assert his power are only the culmination of a near-thirty-year assault on the basic checks and balances of the U.S. government—a battle waged by presidents of both parties, and one that, as Peter M. Shane warns in Madison’s Nightmare, threatens to utterly subvert the founders’ vision of representative government.

Tracing this tendency back to the first Reagan administration, Shane shows how this era of "aggressive presidentialism" has seen presidents exerting ever more control over nearly every arena of policy, from military affairs and national security to domestic programs. Driven by political ambition and a growing culture of entitlement in the executive branch—and abetted by a complaisant Congress, riven by partisanship—this presidential aggrandizement has too often undermined wise policy making and led to shallow, ideological, and sometimes outright lawless decisions. The solution, Shane argues, will require a multipronged program of reform, including both specific changes in government practice and broader institutional changes aimed at supporting a renewed culture of government accountability.

From the war on science to the mismanaged war on terror, Madison’s Nightmare outlines the disastrous consequences of the unchecked executive—and issues a stern wake-up call to all who care about the fate of our long democratic experiment.

The 2006 Peruvian elections are an appropriate moment to reflect on Alejandro Toledo's term as president and on the broader agenda for building a more inclusive and democratic government. In a country of extreme social inequality, such an aspiration represents an enormous challenge. The sudden collapse of the which Fujimori regime --which had dominated Peru for the 1990s --and Toledo's election victory in 2001 seemed to provide an opportunity for institutional reform and rebuilding. The impetus proved short-lived, as the new president's popularity sank to unprecedented levels and public support for Peru's democratic institutions continued to hemorrhage. This book suggests that the challenges of institutional development run very deep and are not peculiar to any one government. Institutional change in Peru is part of a much wider process of transformation from an oligarchic society.

Contributors include Paulo Drino (University of Manchester), Cynthia Sanborn (Centro de Investigaciones, Universidad del Pacifico, Lima), Carlos Monge (Participacion Ciudadana, Lima), Fernando Rospigliosi (Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, Lima), Pedro Franck (Departamento de Economia, Universidad Catolica, Lima), Fernando Eguren (Centro Peruano de Ciencias Sociales, Lima), Rosemary Thorp (Queen Elizabeth House/St Antony's College, Oxford), Eduardo Dargent (University of Texas,Austin), Coletta Youngers (Washington Office on Latin America,Washington D.C.), Francisco Durand (University of Texas, San Antonio), Jose Tavara (Departamento de Economia, Universidad Catolica, Lima, and OSIPTEL), and Richard Webb (Instituto Cuanto and Central Bank of Peru).

Reformers have promoted mixed-member electoral systems as the “best of both worlds.” In this volume, internationally recognized political scientists evaluate the ways in which the introduction of a mixed-member electoral system affects the configuration of political parties. The contributors examine several political phenomena, including cabinet post allocation, nominations, preelectoral coalitions, split-ticket voting, and the size of party systems and faction systems. Significantly, they also consider various ways in which the constitutional system—especially whether the head of government is elected directly or indirectly—can modify the incentives created by the electoral system.  

The findings presented here demonstrate that the success of electoral reform depends not only on the specification of new electoral rules per se but also on the political context—and especially the constitutional framework—within which such rules are embedded.