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An inquiry into the problematic of perjury, or lying, and forgiveness from one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century.
  
“One only ever asks forgiveness for what is unforgivable.” From this contradiction begins Perjury and Pardon, a two-year series of seminars given by Jacques Derrida at the École des hautes études en sciences sociales in Paris in the late 1990s. In these sessions, Derrida focuses on the philosophical, ethical, juridical, and political stakes of the concept of responsibility. His primary goal is to develop what he calls a “problematic of lying” by studying diverse forms of betrayal: infidelity, denial, false testimony, perjury, unkept promises, desecration, sacrilege, and blasphemy.

Although forgiveness is a notion inherited from multiple traditions, the process of forgiveness eludes those traditions, disturbing the categories of knowledge, sense, history, and law that attempt to circumscribe it. Derrida insists on the unconditionality of forgiveness and shows how its complex temporality destabilizes all ideas of presence and even of subjecthood. For Derrida, forgiveness cannot be reduced to repentance, punishment, retribution, or salvation, and it is inseparable from, and haunted by, the notion of perjury. Through close readings of Kant, Kierkegaard, Shakespeare, Plato, Jankélévitch, Baudelaire, and Kafka, as well as biblical texts, Derrida explores diverse notions of the “evil” or malignancy of lying while developing a complex account of forgiveness across different traditions.

 

In Ennead I.5 Plotinus attempts to navigate a well-trodden path of inquiry by directly responding to a wide spectrum of popular theories on human flourishing, and insisting emphatically that well-being belongs to the present moment. Indeed, Aristotle—with his insistence that well-being be measured by “a complete life” (Nicomachean Ethics 1098a16–20) or a life measured by virtue, a modus vivendi sustained via the development of appropriate habits (hexis) and the avoidance of misfortunes—is one of Plotinus’ central targets. Nevertheless, it is also obvious that the Hellenistic schools, with their almost evangelical insistence that happiness is available to practitioners in the immediacy of the “now,” take pride of place in Plotinus’ short treatise on the subject. Layne analyzes in depth Plotinus’ unique conception of the value of the present moment by highlighting his dialogue with Aristotle and Hellenistic conceptions of the soul, pleasure and pain, time and eternity, and so forth.

Ennead I.8 was written not long before Plotinus’ death in 270 AD, at a time when he was particularly concerned with ethical issues. The treatise’ primary purpose is to argue that evil is not intrinsic to the soul, but since Plotinus always considers ethical issues within a metaphysical framework, it includes an account of the ontological status of matter. Plotinus does his best to preserve a belief in the dependence of all things on a single, supremely good First Principle while admitting that there is evil in the world. He offers a subtle account of the origin of evil in the soul as caused not by either the soul or matter on its own but by the combination of the two. Sheppard shows how Plotinus is responding to ideas found in Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, and Middle Platonism as well as to the challenge presented by Gnosticism, and argues that the views expressed in I.8 are not inconsistent with what Plotinus has to say about matter and its generation elsewhere. She further considers the criticisms of Plotinus’ views put forward by Proclus and concludes that, despite its weaknesses, Plotinus’ account remains an ingenious attempt to defend monism and the essential goodness of the soul while recognizing the existence of evils.