58 books match the query 'Representative government and representation' and 6 start with p

Sean M. Theriault
The Ohio State University Press, 2005
Erik J. Engstrom
University of Michigan Press, 2016
Erik J. Engstrom offers a historical perspective on the effects of gerrymandering on elections and party control of the U.S. national legislature. Aside from the requirements that districts be continuous and, after 1842, that each select only one representative, there were few restrictions on congressional districting. Unrestrained, state legislators drew and redrew districts to suit their own partisan agendas. With the rise of the “one-person, one-vote” doctrine and the implementation of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, however, redistricting became subject to court oversight.
Engstrom evaluates the abundant cross-sectional and temporal variation in redistricting plans and their electoral results from all the states, from 1789 through the 1960s, to identify the causes and consequences of partisan redistricting. His analysis reveals that districting practices across states and over time systematically affected the competitiveness of congressional elections, shaped the partisan composition of congressional delegations, and, on occasion, determined party control of the House of Representatives.
Michael R. Kistner
University of Chicago Press, 2026
A revealing, data-rich exploration of how American legislators transformed from active policymakers into party fundraisers.
Lawmakers in Congress and state legislatures across the United States spend enormous amounts of time and effort fundraising, not just for their own seats but for the party. Whether dialing for dollars or hosting high-priced fundraising events, the pursuit of campaign funds is now a massive part of the American legislator’s job description. What explains this transformation, and what are the consequences for public policy?
In Paying for the Party, Michael Kistner uses new theory and new data to answer these questions. He shows that state legislative party organizations—Democratic and Republican caucuses in capitols across the country—are responsible for turning their members into single-minded seekers of money. Parties reward legislators who contribute the most with powerful leadership and committee positions. Consequently, the members who now hold these agenda-setting positions are increasingly neither the most productive nor knowledgeable lawmakers, but rather those who can raise the most money. And when legislators are asked to raise more money, they skip committee hearings for fundraising events, enacting fewer substantive policies as a result. Paying for the Party shows that parties in contemporary American legislatures have hollowed out the policymaking capacity of their institutions and empowered a decidedly non-representative set of legislators.
Lawrence R. Jacobs and Robert Y. Shapiro
University of Chicago Press, 2000
Christina Wolbrecht
Temple University Press, 2005

Ian O'Flynn & David Russell, Editors
Pluto Press, 2005