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97 books match the query 'United States. Congress' and 7 start with p

cover of POLITICAL CONSULTANTS IN US CONGRESS ELECTIONS

POLITICAL CONSULTANTS IN US CONGRESS ELECTIONS

STEPHEN K. MEDVIC

The Ohio State University Press, 2001

Campaign consultants are arguably now as famous in the United States as the politicians themselves. During the past decade, those who know the names Bill Clinton, George Bush, Newt Gingrich, and Christine Todd Whitman also recognize the names James Carville, Mary Matalin, Frank Luntz, and Ed Rollins. Professional consultants, once part of the privileged inner circle of presidential and gubernatorial candidates, are increasingly found at all levels of politics. Indeed, more than half of congressional candidates hire campaign consultants. These professional have become as important to a candidate's success as money. In this innovative study, Stephen K. Medvic explores all aspects of political consultancy and develops an empirically based theory that ensures the impact consultants have on elections.

Political Consultants in U.S. Congressional Elections answers two simple questions: What do professional political consultants do? and How successful are they? Medvic analyzes the way consultants shape political dialogue and uses empirical data to show the benefits—and limits—of a consultant's involvement in a campaign. He focuses on issues as diverse as vote shares, outcomes, and fundraising. Finally, the author demonstrates how the adversarial nature of campaigns fosters the kind of electioneering advocated by most political consultants and argues that this process may not be as harmful for the country as is often suggested.
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cover of POWER OF THE PEOPLE: Congressional Competition, Public Attention, and Voter Retribution

POWER OF THE PEOPLE

Congressional Competition, Public Attention, and Voter Retribution

Sean M. Theriault

The Ohio State University Press, 2005

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cover of Poindexter of Washington: A Study in Progressive Politics

Poindexter of Washington

A Study in Progressive Politics

Howard W Allen

Southern Illinois University Press, 1981

In this study of Miles Poindexter, Insurgent Republican turned conservative, Howard W. Allen reaches beyond the traditional bounds of biography to present a history of the United States Congress during the Progressive era and the early years after World War I.

A congressman (1909–13)and a senator (1913–23), Miles Poindexter of Washington State was an outspoken, progressive reformer before World War I. He struggled to protect “the people” from “special interests,” particularly defending the in­terest of his section against eastern “colonialism.” A man with a penchant for absolute positions, Poindexter became caught up in the emotionalism of the Insurgent Republican revolt. At one time or another he championed Socialists, the IWW, the strik­ing textile workers in Lawrence, Massachusetts—all unlikely causes for a middle-class lawyer from Spokane.

Regarding foreign policy, Poindexter was an uncompromis­ing nationalist who, with Theodore Roosevelt, declared himself a member of the Progressive party in 1912.

After 1917 Poindexter actively tried to suppress opponents of the war. Following the war his targets were “Bolshevists” and other radicals. He also developed intense hostility toward So­cialists, the IWW, and organized labor, fearing radicalism and labor. Reversing his former position, he allied himself with the eastern businessmen and regular Republicans in the Senate. Campaigning for the presidency in 1920, he appealed without success to the most conservative members of the party. He was defeated b a progressive Democrat in his 1922 bid for reelection to the Senate.

Allen examines the traditional sources—archival collections, newspaper files, and congressional reports. When he combines this material with a quantitative analysis of roll-call votes throughout Senator Poindexter’s years in Congress, he creates a remarkably useful method never before attempted in political biography.

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cover of Politics Over Process: Partisan Conflict and Post-Passage Processes in the U.S. Congress

Politics Over Process

Partisan Conflict and Post-Passage Processes in the U.S. Congress

Hong Min Park, Steven S. Smith, and Ryan J. Vander Wielen

University of Michigan Press, 2018

Although the U.S. Constitution requires that the House of Representatives and the Senate pass legislation in identical form before it can be sent to the president for final approval, the process of resolving differences between the chambers has received surprisingly little scholarly attention. Hong Min Park, Steven S. Smith, and Ryan J. Vander Wielen document the dramatic changes in intercameral resolution that have occurred over recent decades, and examine the various considerations made by the chambers when determining the manner in which the House and Senate pursue conciliation. Politics Over Process demonstrates that partisan competition, increasing party polarization, and institutional reforms have encouraged the majority party to more creatively restructure post-passage processes, often avoiding the traditional standing committee and conference processes altogether.
 
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cover of Politics by Formula: How Congressional Policymaking Creates Disparities

Politics by Formula

How Congressional Policymaking Creates Disparities

Leah Rosenstiel

University of Chicago Press, 2026

A clear-eyed study that reveals how politics shapes and often distorts important federal programs, driving inequalities across states.

From Medicaid to Section 8 Housing Choice Vouchers, a large percentage of the annual US federal budget (approximately $1 trillion) is distributed through grants-in-aid, a policy tool that allocates aid to state and local governments rather than to individual Americans. When members of Congress use grants-in-aid to fund healthcare, housing, and other forms of support, they are not solely determining how much assistance one person receives. Instead, they can allot certain localities larger grants, which carry big implications for the quality of public services available to citizens living in different states.

Many reasonably assume that these assistance programs distribute funding to states impartially because they use statistical formulas based on population levels, poverty, and other characteristics that, ostensibly, measure need. However, in Politics by Formula, Leah Rosenstiel shows how this seemingly technocratic aspect of federal policymaking is deeply affected by both the structure of political institutions and the motivations of elected officials. Key congressional committees—and especially their leaders—design formulas to benefit their constituencies. Superficially neutral formulas can shield these political decisions from scrutiny, but formulas also constrain congressmembers. Drawing on formal modeling and quantitative and qualitative evidence, Rosenstiel elucidates how these dynamics shape whose and what needs are met and where.

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cover of Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions

Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions

Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry R. Weingast, Editors

University of Michigan Press, 1995

An ambitious synthesis, Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions attempts to reconcile a number of rational choice viewpoints to produce a comprehensive look at congressional institutions. While most theorists have presented their work as exclusive alternatives for understanding Congress, this volume reconsiders that basic premise. If, in fact, these approaches are mutually exclusive, what evidence favors one over the other? Could it be that these views focus on different aspects of a more complex puzzle? Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry R. Weingast have assembled leading proponents of rational choice approaches to debate these issues. Some emphasize the problems of legislative decisionmaking under uncertainty and the role institutions play in providing incentives for relevant actors to provide information. Other theorists focus on political parties and emphasize the conditions under which parties exercise institutional authority and monitor institutional practices (or fail to do so). Still others investigate legislative delegation, both within and without the legislature. In debating the relationships between these research strands, the contributors not only provide powerful evidence for the power of formal modelling but also invite those involved in other modes of research to join the discussion. Thus the volume suggests how a more satisfying and complete model might emerge. Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions is a timely volume that will provide the foundation for all future work in this area. Contributors include John H. Aldrich, David P. Baron, Gary W. Cox, John A. Ferejohn, Morris P. Fiorina, Thomas W. Gilligan, Keith Krehbiel, John Londregan, Arthur Lupia, Mathew D. McCubbins, Forrest Maltzman, David W. Rohde, Kenneth A. Shepsle, Barbara Sinclair, Steven S. Smith, James Snyder, and Barry R. Weingast.
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cover of Posting for Power: Congressional Partisanship on Social Media

Posting for Power

Congressional Partisanship on Social Media

Jeremy Gelman and Steven Lloyd Wilson

University of Michigan Press, 2026

Among the most common features of the modern US Congress is its partisanship, a deeply felt political divide that sometimes seems to be each side’s primary motivator. In Congress we have seen heated disagreements, a tendency to blame the opposing party for any bad outcome, and attempts to undermine the other side’s successes. For those watching Congress, it is easy to assume everyone on Capitol Hill participates equally in framing issues as pitting Democrats versus Republicans. Yet in Posting for Power, Jeremy Gelman and Steven Wilson show that partisanship varies a great deal among legislators: it is motivated by reelection and promotion-seeking considerations, and it comes with no substantial legislative or electoral consequences. 

In the US Congress, lawmakers regularly choose to bicker for political gain, whether or not they disagree on issues. By classifying millions of social media posts as partisan or not, Gelman and Wilson quantify a legislator’s partisan intensity through the time and effort they spend supporting their party and bickering with the opposition. The authors argue that the partisan personas politicians create are both a home style, to help them win reelection, and hill style, to help them become politically influential by showing off as good team players. Bringing together a wide range of data on leadership races, elections, voting records, cosponsorship patterns, and lawmaking outcomes, they demonstrate the nearly consequence-free way that legislators strategically deploy partisanship to impress their copartisans and voters. Gelman and Wilson closely examine what motivates members to differ so much in developing this part of their public personas and offer clear recommendations for how to turn down the partisan heat on Capitol Hill.
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