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3 books match the query 'American Trade Policy'

cover of Empowering Exporters: Reciprocity, Delegation, and Collective Action in American Trade Policy

Empowering Exporters

Reciprocity, Delegation, and Collective Action in American Trade Policy

Michael J. Gilligan

University of Michigan Press, 1997

Until the New Deal, most groups seeking protection from imports were successful in obtaining relief from Congress. In general the cost of paying the tariffs for consumers was less than the cost of mounting collective action to stop the tariffs. In 1934, with the passage of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, all of this changed. The six decades that followed have produced a remarkable liberalization of trade policy in the United States. This occurred despite the fact that domestic politics, according to some of the best developed theories, should have prevented this liberalization.
Michael Gilligan argues that liberalization has succeeded because it has been reciprocal with liberalization in other countries. Our trade barriers have been reduced as an explicit quid pro quo for reduction of trade barriers in other countries. Reciprocity, Gilligan argues, gives exporters the incentive to support free trade policies because it gives them a clear gain from free trade and thus enables the exporters to overcome collective action problems. The lobbying by exporters, balancing the interests of groups seeking protection, changes the preferences of political leaders in favor of more liberalization.
Gilligan tests his theory in a detailed exploration of the history of American trade policy and in a quantitative analysis showing increases in the demand for liberalization as the result of reciprocity in trade legislation from 1890 to the present. This book should appeal to political scientists, economists, and those who want to understand the political underpinnings of American trade policy.
Michael J. Gilligan is Assistant Professor of Politics, New York University.
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cover of Politics, Process, and American Trade Policy

Politics, Process, and American Trade Policy

Sharyn O'Halloran

University of Michigan Press, 1994

Relying on the New Economics of Organizations (NEO), or New Institutionalism, Politics, Process, and American Trade Policy shows why conventional models do not adequately describe the formation of American trade policy. Rejecting both the pressure group model and the presidential-ascendancy model, this study's institution-based approach emphasizes the influence Congress has in setting trade policy, connecting theories of institutional design with the procedural details of regulating trade policy.To reach her conclusions, Sharyn O'Halloran uses time series data and econometric analysis to test a set of propositions concerning trade policy. She examines detailed case studies and provides a comprehensive history of the institutions that govern trade policy making. Unlike most scholars who see trade policy as disparate and ad hoc, O'Halloran is able to explain both early and contemporary American trade policy in a consistent and integrated fashion. She argues that a single set of procedures may lead to apparently different outcomes under differing initial conditions; therefore, the key is to identify the common logic, derived from constitutional imperatives, that underlies all policy outcomes.
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cover of The Political Economy of American Trade Policy

The Political Economy of American Trade Policy

Edited by Anne O. Krueger

University of Chicago Press, 1995

Exploring the political and economic determinants of trade protection, this study provides a wealth of information on key American industries and documents the process of seeking and conferring protection.

Eight analytical histories of the automobile, steel, semiconductor, lumber, wheat, and textile and apparel industries demonstrate that trade barriers rarely have unequivocal benefits and may be counterproductive. They show that criteria for awarding protection do not take into account the interests of consumers or other industries and that political influence and an organized lobby are major sources of protection.

Based on these findings, a final essay suggests that current policy fails to consider adequately economic efficiency, the public good, and indirect negative effects. This volume will interest scholars in economics, business, and public policy who deal with trade issues.
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