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This book presents and interprets archival records of the meetings between Mikhail Gorbachev and George W. Bush between 1989 and 1991, including transcripts of conversations between top leaders on the rapid and monumental events of the final days of the Cold War. Particularly effective interlocutors were the foreign ministers Eduard Shevardnadze and James Baker, especially interesting when they interacted directly with Bush or Gorbachev. The documents were obtained from the Gorbachev Foundation and the Russian State Archives and from the United States government through requests under the Freedom of Information Act. Taking place at a time of revolutionary change in Eastern Europe, stimulated in part by Gorbachev and by Eastern Europeans (the Solidarity movement, dissidents, reform communists), the Malta Summit of 1989 and subsequent meetings helped defuse any potential for superpower conflict. Each of the five summits is covered in a separate chapter, introduced by an essay that places the transcripts in historical context. The anthology offers a fascinating glimpse into the relationship that defined the last, waning years of the Cold War—a unique record of these historic, highest-level conversations that effectively brought it to a close. The quality and scope of the dialogue between these world leaders was unprecedented and is likely never to be repeated.

As we face new challenges from climate change and the rise of populism in Western politics and beyond, there is little doubt that we are entering a new configuration of world politics. Driven by nostalgia for past certainties or fear of what is coming next, references to normalcy have been creeping into political discourse, with people either vying for a return to a past normalcy  or coping with the new normal. 

This book traces main discourses and practices associated with normalcy in world politics. Visoka and Lemay-Hébert mostly focus on how dominant states and international organizations try to manage global affairs through imposing normalcy over fragile states, restoring normalcy over disaster-affected states, and accepting normalcy over suppressive states. They show how discourses and practices come together in constituting normalization interventions and how in turn they play in shaping the dynamics of continuity and change in world politics.

This book publishes for the first time in print every word the American and Soviet leaders – Ronald Reagan, Mikhail Gorbachev, and George H.W. Bush – said to each other in their superpower summits from 1985 to 1991. Obtained by the authors through the Freedom of Information Act in the U.S., from the Gorbachev Foundation and the State Archive of the Russian Federation in Moscow, and from the personal donation of Anatoly Chernyaev, these previously Top Secret verbatim transcripts combine with key declassified preparatory and after-action documents from both sides to create a unique interactive documentary record of these historic highest-level talks – the conversations that ended the Cold War. The summits fueled a process of learning on both sides, as the authors argue in contextual essays on each summit and detailed headnotes on each document. Geneva 1985 and Reykjavik 1986 reduced Moscow's sense of threat and unleashed Reagan's inner abolitionist. Malta 1989 and Washington 1990 helped dampen any superpower sparks that might have flown in a time of revolutionary change in Eastern Europe, set off by Gorbachev and by Eastern Europeans (Solidarity, dissidents, reform Communists). The high level and scope of the dialogue between these world leaders was unprecedented, and is likely never to be repeated.

This book presents pieces of evidence, which – taken together – lead to an argument that goes against the grain of the established Cold War narrative. The argument is that a “long détente” existed between East and West from the 1950s to the 1980s, that it existed and lasted for good (economic, national security, societal) reasons, and that it had a profound impact on the outcome of the conflict between East and West and the quintessentially peaceful framework in which this “endgame” was played. New, Euro-centered narratives are offered, including both West and East European perspectives. These contributions point to critical inconsistencies and inherent problems in the traditional U.S. dominated narrative of the “Victory in the Cold War.” The argument of a “long détente” does not need to replace the ruling American narrative. Rather, it can and needs to be augmented with European experiences and perceptions. After all, it was Europe – its peoples, societies, and states – that stood both at the ideological and military frontline of the conflict between East and West, and it was here that the struggle between liberalism and communism was eventually decided.