8 books match the query 'Intergovernmental fiscal relations'
Edited by Harvey S. Rosen
University of Chicago Press, 1988

William Anderson
University of Minnesota Press, 1956
By David M. Welborn and Jesse Burkhead
University of Texas Press, 1989
During the 1960s, President Lyndon Johnson and his administration substantially altered the structure of the American administrative state. Creating intergovernmental programs to forward the goal of the Great Society, they changed the contours of national-state-local relationships, and these changes largely have remained, despite the attempts of later administrations to reverse them. Intergovernmental Relations in the American Administrative State is the first comprehensive study of how and why these changes occurred.
Drawn from a wealth of primary material in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, the study probes the objectives of the president and other framers of new policies and programs, within the institutional and political context of the time. The authors give special attention to the inherent incongruities that arise when intergovernmental programs are used to address problems defined in national terms. In addition, they reveal how certain programs actually challenged the power of established national bureaucracies. They conclude with a thoughtful overview of the Johnson legacy in intergovernmental relations during subsequent administrations.
Ester R. Fuchs
University of Chicago Press, 1992
Edited by David R. Agrawal, James M. Poterba, and Owen M. Zidar
University of Chicago Press, 2025
A critical examination of the effects of tax competition.
Policy Responses to Tax Competition provides an in-depth exploration of how jurisdictions design taxes on mobile economic factors. Tax competition between jurisdictions that seek to attract businesses and residents presents both opportunities and challenges. It can foster government efficiency and provide a counterweight to lobbying for increased spending, but it can also result in inefficiently low tax rates and revenue shortfalls as jurisdictions vie for tax bases. This volume examines the economic drivers and consequences of tax competition and presents empirical evidence on its effects.
Divided into three parts, the book first reviews existing research on the determinants and consequences of tax competition and related policy initiatives such as development incentives. The second section focuses on specific policies, such as the Kansas-Missouri noncompete pact and international measures like the OECD’s Base Erosion and Profit Shifting initiative, that are designed to limit tax competition. It also considers the economic responses to these policies, the distributional impact of competition-reducing policies, and potential strategic reactions of other governments. The final section presents case studies of the effects of various policies, including inter-municipal cooperation in France and corporate tax equalization in Switzerland.
Altogether, this volume provides new insights into the nature of inter-jurisdictional tax competition and the range of potential responses available to jurisdictions at various levels in federal systems.
Leah Rosenstiel
University of Chicago Press, 2026
A clear-eyed study that reveals how politics shapes and often distorts important federal programs, driving inequalities across states.
From Medicaid to Section 8 Housing Choice Vouchers, a large percentage of the annual US federal budget (approximately $1 trillion) is distributed through grants-in-aid, a policy tool that allocates aid to state and local governments rather than to individual Americans. When members of Congress use grants-in-aid to fund healthcare, housing, and other forms of support, they are not solely determining how much assistance one person receives. Instead, they can allot certain localities larger grants, which carry big implications for the quality of public services available to citizens living in different states.
Many reasonably assume that these assistance programs distribute funding to states impartially because they use statistical formulas based on population levels, poverty, and other characteristics that, ostensibly, measure need. However, in Politics by Formula, Leah Rosenstiel shows how this seemingly technocratic aspect of federal policymaking is deeply affected by both the structure of political institutions and the motivations of elected officials. Key congressional committees—and especially their leaders—design formulas to benefit their constituencies. Superficially neutral formulas can shield these political decisions from scrutiny, but formulas also constrain congressmembers. Drawing on formal modeling and quantitative and qualitative evidence, Rosenstiel elucidates how these dynamics shape whose and what needs are met and where.
Peter K. Eisinger
University of Wisconsin Press, 1989
Gerald Benjamin
Russell Sage Foundation, 1988