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3 books match the query 'Public Choice'
Law and Public Choice
A Critical IntroductionPhilip P. Frickey and Daniel A. Farber
University of Chicago Press, 1991
In Law and Public Choice, Daniel Farber and Philip Frickey present a remarkably rich and accessible introduction to the driving principles of public choice. In this, the first systematic look at the implications of social choice for legal doctrine, Farber and Frickey carefully review both the empirical and theoretical literature about interest group influence and provide a nonmathematical introduction to formal models of legislative action. Ideal for course use, this volume offers a balanced and perceptive analysis and critique of an approach which, within limits, can illuminate the dynamics of government decision-making.
“Law and Public Choice is a most valuable contribution to the burgeoning literature. It
should be of great interest to lawyers, political scientists, and all others interested in issues at the intersection of government and law.”—Cass R. Sunstein, University of Chicago Law
School
“Law and Public Choice is a most valuable contribution to the burgeoning literature. It
should be of great interest to lawyers, political scientists, and all others interested in issues at the intersection of government and law.”—Cass R. Sunstein, University of Chicago Law
School
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Signaling Goodness
Social Rules and Public ChoicePhillip J. Nelson and Kenneth V. Greene
University of Michigan Press, 2003
Political, intellectual, and academic discourse in the United States has been awash in political correctness, which has itself been berated and defended -- yet little understood. As a corrective, Nelson and Greene look at a more general process: adopting political positions to enhance one's reputation for trustworthiness both to others and to oneself.
Phillip Nelson and Kenneth Greene are Professors of Economics in the Department of Economics at the State University of New York, Binghamton.
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Theory of Public Choice
Political Applications of EconomicsJames M. Buchanan and Robert D. Tollison, Editors
University of Michigan Press, 1981
The Theory of Public Choice, edited by Nobel Laureate James M. Buchanan and Robert D. Tollison, serves as a landmark volume synthesizing the foundational principles of the "Virginia School" of political economy. The collection famously strips away the "romantic" assumption that politicians and bureaucrats act solely as benevolent public servants, analyzing political behavior instead through the lens of economic self-interest and utility maximization. Across its collected essays, the book demonstrates how the analytical tools of marketplace economics can be systematically applied to collective decision-making, exploring critical concepts such as voting rules, bureaucracy, special interest groups, and the mechanics of rent-seeking. Ultimately, this essential text provides a realistic, empirical framework for understanding institutional design and government limitations, making it a foundational resource for students and scholars of political science, public policy, and constitutional economics
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