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Predicting Politics: Essays in Empirical Public Choice explores politics in an empirical spirit. The topics covered are novel and important, including the impact of campaign finance on the size of government, the economics of gerrymandering, constitutional change, and budgetary politics. The approach is to formulate and to test interesting hypotheses about political behavior. The essential idea is to illustrate the power of public choice theory in explaining actual politics.The volume brings together the work of Crain and Tollison and other scholars who have worked in this public choice tradition, and shows the power of empirical approaches in explaining the origin and inner working of political institutions and processes.

The Theory of Public Choice is a landmark volume that brings together key essays and articles charting the rapid evolution of public choice theory during its most formative decade. Edited by James M. Buchanan and Robert D. Tollison—leading figures in the “Virginian School” of political economy—this collection synthesizes the major advances of public choice as it applies the tools of economic analysis to the workings of democratic and political institutions.The volume begins with overviews of the field’s development, highlighting public choice’s foundational challenge to “romantic” notions of government and its turn toward a more realistic, empirical understanding of collective decision-making. Renowned contributors—including Buchanan, Dennis Mueller, Gordon Tullock, and many others—explore subjects from voting theory and constitutional economics to rent-seeking, bureaucracy, and the political economy of welfare and regulation.Organized into topical sections covering theoretical advances, applications, empirical studies, and philosophical issues, The Theory of Public Choice illuminates how economics, political science, and policy analysis intersect. Whether addressing topics like political resource allocation, the logic of majority rule, or the emergence of tax and spending limitations, these essays demonstrate how public choice theory has reshaped the way scholars, policymakers, and citizens think about government.Accessible yet rigorous, this collection is essential for anyone seeking insight into the mechanisms of collective action, constitutional design, and the ongoing challenge of ensuring accountability and efficiency in public institutions. It stands as a vital resource for students and scholars in economics, political science, public policy, and related fields.

The Theory of Public Choice, edited by Nobel Laureate James M. Buchanan and Robert D. Tollison, serves as a landmark volume synthesizing the foundational principles of the "Virginia School" of political economy. The collection famously strips away the "romantic" assumption that politicians and bureaucrats act solely as benevolent public servants, analyzing political behavior instead through the lens of economic self-interest and utility maximization. Across its collected essays, the book demonstrates how the analytical tools of marketplace economics can be systematically applied to collective decision-making, exploring critical concepts such as voting rules, bureaucracy, special interest groups, and the mechanics of rent-seeking. Ultimately, this essential text provides a realistic, empirical framework for understanding institutional design and government limitations, making it a foundational resource for students and scholars of political science, public policy, and constitutional economics