BiblioVault - Books about Microeconomics

Game and Economic Theory

Selected Contributions in Honor of Robert J. Aumann

Sergiu Hart and Abraham Neyman, Editors

University of Michigan Press, 1995

Game and Economic Theory studies the interactions of decision makers whose decisions affect each other. The analysis is from a rational viewpoint: every participant would like to obtain the outcome that he prefers most. However, each one has to take into account that the others are doing the same--trying to get what they prefer most. At times this leads to fierce competition; at other times, to mutually beneficial cooperation; and in general, to an appropriate combination of these two extreme behaviors. Game theory, which may be viewed as a sort of "unified field" theory for the rational side of social science, develops the theoretical foundations for the analysis of such multi-person interactive situations, and then applies these to many disciplines: economics, political science, biology, psychology. computer science, statistics and law. Foremost among these is economic theory, where game theory is playing a central role.
This volume consists of twenty-two selected contributions to various areas of game and economic theory. These important and pathbreaking contributions are all by former students of Robert J. Aumann, to whom this volume is dedicated. The volume will no doubt shed light on the far-reaching pertinence of game theory and its application to economics, and also on the monumental impact of Aumann on this discipline.
Sergiu Hart is Alice Kusiel de Vorreuter Professor of Mathematical Economics and Director of the Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Abraham Neyman is Professor of Mathematics, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and Leading Professor of Economics and Mathematics, State University of New York at Stony Brook.

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Games, Information, and Politics

Applying Game Theoretic Models to Political Science

Scott Gates and Brian D. Humes

University of Michigan Press, 1997

To study the strategic interaction of individuals, we can use game theory. Despite the long history shared by game theory and political science, many political scientists remain unaware of the exciting game theoretic techniques that have been developed over the years. As a result they use overly simple games to illustrate complex processes. Games, Information, and Politics is written for political scientists who have an interest in game theory but really do not understand how it can be used to improve our understanding of politics. To address this problem, Gates and Humes write for scholars who have little or no training in formal theory and demonstrate how game theoretic analysis can be applied to politics. They apply game theoretic models to three subfields of political science: American politics, comparative politics, and international relations. They demonstrate how game theory can be applied to each of these subfields by drawing from three distinct pieces of research. By drawing on examples from current research projects the authors use real research problems--not hypothetical questions--to develop their discussion of various techniques and to demonstrate how to apply game theoretic models to help answer important political questions. Emphasizing the process of applying game theory, Gates and Humes clear up some common misperceptions about game theory and show how it can be used to improve our understanding of politics.

Games, Information, and Politics is written for scholars interested in understanding how game theory is used to model strategic interactions. It will appeal to sociologists and economists as well as political scientists.

Scott Gates is Assistant Professor of Political Science, Michigan State University. Brian D. Humes is Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Nebraska-Lincoln.

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General Equilibrium and Game Theory

Ten Papers

Andreu Mas-Colell

Harvard University Press, 2016

Andreu Mas-Colell revolutionized our understanding of competitive markets, price formation, and the behavior of market participants. General Equilibrium and Game Theory offers readers a compendium of his most important scholarly contributions, gathering in a single volume the groundbreaking papers that have solidified his standing as one of the preeminent economic theorists of our time.

Built upon the foundations of neoclassical economics, Mas-Colell’s work is distinguished by a mathematical and analytical elegance that brings theory closer to real-world situations. He overturns the standard assumption of general equilibrium theory—that markets are perfectly competitive and their participants are perfectly rational—and concludes that neither the law of supply and demand nor the existence of equilibrium prices depends on the rationality of agents. Similarly, Mas-Colell (working with Sergiu Hart) challenges classical game theory’s reliance on rational behavior, demonstrating that adaptation and learning shape the dynamics of repeated games.

Addressing central questions of finance, trade, industrial organization, and welfare economics, Mas-Colell shows the surprising power and versatility of differentiability and linear-space mathematical techniques, and he emphasizes the fruitfulness of cooperative game-theory approaches, such as Shapley value theory and the Bargaining Set, for understanding competition and distribution. General Equilibrium and Game Theory is a signal contribution to economic theory and an invaluable resource for anyone wishing to study the craft of a master of economic modeling.

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Generalized Microeconomics

Jirí Hlavácek and Michal Hlavácek

Karolinum Press, 2013

The generalization of microeconomics enables model descriptions of economic rationality, even in fields that standard microeconomics more or less avoids, like nonprofit sectors of market economies, altruism, or externalities. Here, the authors broaden the scope of microeconomics while treating standard profit maximization as a special case. They argue, ultimately, that the generalizing criterion is a Darwinian maximization of the probability of survival.

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Growth and Distribution

Second Edition

Duncan K. Foley, Thomas R. Michl, and Daniele Tavani

Harvard University Press, 2019

A major revision of an established textbook on the theory, measurement, and history of economic growth, with new material on climate change, corporate capitalism, and innovation.

Authors Duncan Foley, Thomas Michl, and Daniele Tavani present Classical and Keynesian approaches to growth theory, in parallel with Neoclassical ones, and introduce students to advanced tools of intertemporal economic analysis through carefully developed treatments of land- and resource-limited growth. They cover corporate finance, the impact of government debt and social security systems, theories of endogenous technical change, and the implications of climate change. Without excessive formal complication, the models emphasize rigorous reasoning from basic economic principles and insights, and respond to students’ interest in the history and policy dilemmas of real-world economies.

In addition to carefully worked out examples showing how to use the analytical techniques presented, Growth and Distribution presents many problems suitable for inclusion in problem sets and examinations. Detailed answers to these problems are available. This second edition includes fresh data throughout and new chapters on climate change, corporate capitalism, models of wealth inequality, and technical change.

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