front cover of Intuition in Medicine
Intuition in Medicine
A Philosophical Defense of Clinical Reasoning
Hillel D. Braude
University of Chicago Press, 2012

Intuition is central to discussions about the nature of scientific and philosophical reasoning and what it means to be human. In this bold and timely book, Hillel D. Braude marshals his dual training as a physician and philosopher to examine the place of intuition in medicine.

Rather than defining and using a single concept of intuition—philosophical, practical, or neuroscientific—Braude here examines intuition as it occurs at different levels and in different contexts of clinical reasoning. He argues that not only does intuition provide the bridge between medical reasoning and moral reasoning, but that it also links the epistemological, ontological, and ethical foundations of clinical decision making. In presenting his case, Braude takes readers on a journey through Aristotle’s Ethics—highlighting the significance of practical reasoning in relation to theoretical reasoning and the potential bridge between them—then through current debates between regulators and clinicians on evidence-based medicine, and finally applies the philosophical perspectives of Reichenbach, Popper, and Peirce to analyze the intuitive support for clinical equipoise, a key concept in research ethics. Through his phenomenological study of intuition Braude aims to demonstrate that ethical responsibility for the other lies at the heart of clinical judgment.
 
Braude’s original approach advances medical ethics by using philosophical rigor and history to analyze the tacit underpinnings of clinical reasoning and to introduce clear conceptual distinctions that simultaneously affirm and exacerbate the tension between ethical theory and practice. His study will be welcomed not only by philosophers but also by clinicians eager to justify how they use moral intuitions, and anyone interested in medical decision making.
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logo for Harvard University Press
Medical Problem Solving
An Analysis of Clinical Reasoning
Arthur S. Elstein, Lee S. Shulman, and Sarah A. Sprafka
Harvard University Press, 1978

Competent physicians make accurate diagnoses. How are accurate diagnoses made? This readable book gives some important answers to that question. Experienced physicians were presented with diagnostic problems and asked to solve them. Through the use of trained actors serving as “patients” and with a variety of supplementary techniques, the investigators were able to dissect the process by which diagnoses, right and wrong, are made.

Reporting on the most comprehensive investigation of clinical reasoning yet conducted, the authors present data and conclusions of importance not just to medical educators but to anyone interested in the psychology of problem solving. Rigorous attention to methods, thorough grounding in contemporary theories of problem solving, and a healthy respect for the complexity of real-life situations characterize this remarkable study.

A sampling of its salient findings only suggests the richness of this book. Successful diagnosticians begin to form hypotheses almost as soon as they encounter a patient. They entertain a limited number of hypotheses, but these are tested repeatedly during a workup. New findings are treated as confirming, refuting, or not contributing to the solution contemplated; more elaborate schemes based on a knowledge of probabilities are not used. A common error is to relate new information to a working hypothesis, although the information is, in fact, non-contributory. The performance of even an experienced physician varies markedly from case to case. Two of the most important determinants of competence are information and experience; problem-solving skills without a rich supply of facts are insufficient for diagnostic acumen.

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