With military maneuvers in Taiwan and the South China Sea and the eruption of war in Ukraine, the past few years have brought deteriorating diplomatic relations and increasing military and economic tensions between the United States, China, and Russia. After benefiting from the geopolitical and financial advantages conferred by a privileged status as a global superpower for three decades, the United States needs to adapt to a geopolitical shift toward competition and confrontation in order to contain China’s quest for global superpower status.
 
No Peer Rivals takes a major staple of International Relations scholarship—the offensive realist paradigm—and develops a comprehensive and practical grand strategy for the United States in this new era of Great Power Competition. The No Peer Rival framework is grounded in a realistic assessment of the most likely courses of action adopted by China, Russia, and other important regional powers. It prioritizes great power rivalry over other strategic goals, and identifies China as the biggest threat to America’s unique position in the international system. This grand strategic approach carefully aligns the domestic sources of national power (economic strength, energy security, and technological prowess) to America’s foreign policy and national security objectives. In addition to recommending necessary changes to America’s military and diplomatic strategies, No Peer Rivals also demonstrates that a realistic approach to industrial policy, international trade, energy production, and technological superiority offers the best chance for developing the sinews of power needed to outcompete Beijing in the long run.

Joko Widodo—popularly called Jokowi—ruled Indonesia for a decade, from 2014 to 2024. The world’s fourth-largest nation and third-largest democracy, Indonesia had embarked on a messy democratic transition in the late 1990s, with the country’s ethnic and religious heterogeneity posing significant challenges to governance. Initially seen as a reformer who might challenge oligarchic structures, Jokowi slowly but steadily acquired an image of being a threat to democracy himself. By the time Jokowi wrapped up his presidency, he had achieved the highest approval ratings among Indonesia’s post-authoritarian presidents—and became the president with the tightest grip over Indonesia’s political elite.

Based on exclusive interviews with Jokowi and many of Indonesia’s top leaders, Ruling Indonesia shows Jokowi as a president obsessively preoccupied with his economic development agenda, subordinating all other aspects of governance to this goal. His focused approach delivered economic successes and unprecedented popularity, but also seriously undermined the health of Indonesia’s democratic institutions. Offering a holistic appraisal of his decade in office, Marcus Mietzner analyzes Jokowi’s domestic record in the context of his attempts to position Indonesia more favorably in the international competition for power and resources. Crucially, his obsession to push Indonesia closer to industrialized status while neglecting democratic development represented the ambitions and trials of many Global South leaders who are trying to juggle economic development, growing Sino-American tensions around the world, and concerns for democratic rights. As such, this book provides valuable insights into how the great power rivalry of the 21st century and the global recession of democracy are playing out in central arenas of the Global South.