With the nations of the world becoming more interdependent, it is imperative to take international influences into account in understanding the organization of industry within a country. This book extends the structure/conduct/performance framework of analysis to present a fully specified simultaneous equation model of an open economy—Canada.

By estimating a system of equations of all the major variables, the authors can identify which variables are dependent and which are independent. They are thus able to assess the relative importance of such factors as seller concentration, import competition, retailing structure, advertising expenditure, research and development spending, and technical and allocative efficiency in shaping the organization of industry in Canada. In addition, using both industry-level and firm-level data, the authors develop methods for assessing the effect of structural variables on diversification strategies and the consequences for market performance. They also study the effects of such variables on firms’ access to capital markets. The book concludes with a discussion of the implications of the findings for government policy.

Why should manufacturing firms in many national industries maintain multiple small scale plants when they might produce the same output at a lower unit cost in a single large establishment? What specific benefits are attained through the operation of multiple plants? To address these questions, the authors conducted 125 in-depth interviews with businessmen actively involved in plant size and multi-plant operating decisions. They investigated the experience of twelve industries in six countries (West Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Canada, and the United States).

The authors develop an economic theory of plant size and multi-plant decisions and apply it to analyze the statistical and qualitative evidence on factors affecting plant size choices. They then examine the extent of multi-plant operation, its statistical correlate, and the economy actually or potentially realizable from various modes of multi-plant operation. Implications are drawn from antitrust and foreign trade policy, the evolution of scientific business management, and the development of industrial organization knowledge.

When, how, and why did the state enterprise system of modern China take shape? The conventional argument is that China borrowed its economic system and development strategy wholesale from the Soviet Union in the 1950s. In an important new interpretation, Morris Bian shows instead that the basic institutional arrangement of state-owned enterprise—bureaucratic governance, management and incentive mechanisms, and the provision of social services and welfare—developed in China during the war years 1937–1945.

Bian offers a new theory of institutional change that explains the formation of China’s state enterprise system as the outcome of the sustained systemic crisis triggered by the Sino–Japanese war. This groundbreaking work combines critical analysis of government policies with case studies of little-studied enterprises in heavy industries and the ordnance industry. Drawing on extensive research in previously unavailable archives, Bian adds a valuable historical perspective to the current debate on how to reform China’s sluggish and unprofitable state-owned firms.

The concept of the “visible hand” in big business enterprise, so persuasively and brilliantly argued in Alfred D. Chandler, Jr.’s prize-winning The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business, is tested and extended in this book. These essays show that the growth and complexity of managerial hierarchies (“visible hands”) in large business firms are central to the organization of modern industrial activity. Leading American and European historians retrace and compare the historical evolution of the contemporary giant managerial hierarchies in the United States, Britain, Germany, and France.

The first group of essays—by Chandler, Leslie Hannah, Jürgen Kocka, and Maurice Lévy-Leboyer—explores the rise of modern industrial enterprise in the West. They suggest the mechanisms and causes of the shift from the invisible hand of market coordination to the visible hand of managerial hierarchies, and attempt to pinpoint cultural and economic reasons for the persistence of transitional forms of organization in Europe. Other essays—by Morton Keller and Oliver E. Williamson—describe the legal and regulatory responses to the rise of big business and the implications of the history of the managerial revolution for students of economic development and industrial organization. The final essay, by Herman Daems, provides an overall analysis of the reasons managerial hierarchies replaced market mechanisms and agreements among firms as devices for coordination and the allocation of resources in advanced market economies.

This fresh study of the managerial revolution presents recent theoretical reflections in institutional economics and industrial organization in the light of new historical findings.