front cover of Coordination and Information
Coordination and Information
Historical Perspectives on the Organization of Enterprise
Edited by Naomi R. Lamoreaux and Daniel M. G. Raff
University of Chicago Press, 1995
Case studies that examine how firms coordinate economic activity in the face of asymmetric information—information not equally available to all parties—are the focus of this volume.

In an ideal world, the market would be the optimal provider of coordination, but in the real world of incomplete information, some activities are better coordinated in other ways. Divided into three parts, this book addresses coordination within firms, at the borders of firms, and outside firms, providing a picture of the overall incidence and logic of economic coordination. The case studies—drawn from the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, when the modern business enterprise was evolving, address such issues as the relationship between coordination mechanisms and production techniques, the logic of coordination in industrial districts, and the consequences of regulation for coordination.

Continuing the work on information and organization presented in the influential Inside the Business Enterprise, this book provides material for business historians and economists who want to study the development of the dissemination of information and the coordination of economic activity within and between firms.
[more]

front cover of The Firm, the Market, and the Law
The Firm, the Market, and the Law
R. H. Coase
University of Chicago Press, 1987
Few other economists have been read and cited as often as R.H. Coase has been, even though, as he admits, "most economists have a different way of looking at economic problems and do not share my conception of the nature of our subject." Coase's particular interest has been that part of economic theory that deals with firms, industries, and markets—what is known as price theory or microeconomics. He has always urged his fellow economists to examine the foundations on which their theory exists, and this volume collects some of his classic articles probing those very foundations. "The Nature of the Firm" (1937) introduced the then-revolutionary concept of transaction costs into economic theory. "The Problem of Social Cost" (1960) further developed this concept, emphasizing the effect of the law on the working of the economic system. The remaining papers and new introductory essay clarify and extend Coarse's arguments and address his critics.

"These essays bear rereading. Coase's careful attention to actual institutions not only offers deep insight into economics but also provides the best argument for Coase's methodological position. The clarity of the exposition and the elegance of the style also make them a pleasure to read and a model worthy of emulation."—Lewis A. Kornhauser, Journal of Economic Literature

Ronald H. Coase was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economic Science in 1991.
[more]

logo for Harvard University Press
Inside the Firm
The Inefficiencies of Hierarchy
Harvey Leibenstein
Harvard University Press, 1987

front cover of Law & Capitalism
Law & Capitalism
What Corporate Crises Reveal about Legal Systems and Economic Development around the World
Curtis J. Milhaupt and Katharina Pistor
University of Chicago Press, 2008
Recent high-profile corporate scandals—such as those involving Enron in the United States, Yukos in Russia, and Livedoor in Japan—demonstrate challenges to legal regulation of business practices in capitalist economies. Setting forth a new analytic framework for understanding these problems, Law and Capitalism examines such contemporary corporate governance crises in six countries, to shed light on the interaction of legal systems and economic change. This provocative book debunks the simplistic view of law’s instrumental function for financial market development and economic growth.
            Using comparative case studies that address the United States, China, Germany, Japan, Korea, and Russia, Curtis J. Milhaupt and Katharina Pistor argue that a disparate blend of legal and nonlegal mechanisms have supported economic growth around the world. Their groundbreaking findings show that law and markets evolve together in a “rolling relationship,” and legal systems, including those of the most successful economies, therefore differ significantly in their organizational characteristics. Innovative and insightful, Law and Capitalism will change the way lawyers, economists, policy makers, and business leaders think about legal regulation in an increasingly global market for capital and corporate governance.
 
[more]

logo for Harvard University Press
Market Structure and Behavior
Martin Shubik
Harvard University Press, 1980

Martin Shubik brings classical oligopoly theory and research in mathematical economics close to new studies in industrial organization and simple game experiments in this imaginative and important new work. He engages the reader by creating a market model and by explaining its availability as a computer program, thus promoting interest in game experiments. In all, he admirably succeeds in increasing our understanding of the meaning of competitive and cooperative behavior and of market structure.

This unusual book covers a variety of topics: economic explanation, model building, analyses of duopoly and oligopoly, product differentiation, contingent demand, demand fluctuations, the study of non-symmetric markets, and advertising. All of these parts of Shubik's overall pattern of interpretation may also be used in a game which, more or less, coincides with the exposition of theory and the subject matter of accounting. A complete linking of basic accounting items to the oligopoly model and theory is made. Shubik bridges the gap between information as it appears to the businessman—the player in the game—and the economic model and abstraction of the market as it appears to the economic theorist.

[more]

logo for Harvard University Press
The New Competition
Institutions of Industrial Restructuring
Michael Best
Harvard University Press, 1990

Why is America losing its competitive edge in basic industries ranging from automobile manufacture to consumer electronics? The reason, Michael Best shows, is the rigid command and control structures that are typical of big business in America. America firms lack the organizational flexibility of the "new competition" practiced by companies in Italy, West Germany, and Japan. The secret to the success of these foreign firms is that they are organized from top to bottom to pursue continuous improvements in methods, products, and processes. They seek competitive advantage not through lowest-cost production but through superior product design. This requires an unusual degree of organizational flexibility, which in turn demands organizational commitments to problem solving, constant attention to detail, and an integration of thought and action in the work place.

The New Competition posits a strategic tension between market competition and cooperation in successful industrial societies. Instead of bargaining with suppliers and customers at arm's length, firms can forge consultative relations with them, facilitating the flow of valuable advice, suggestions, and information and crucially modifying a key processor design. Instead of engaging in price rivalry, companies can pursue product-related rivalries that increase their international competitiveness. Best envisions a new role for national industrial policy—one not of bailing out sick firms in dying industries but of shaping industrial sectors and markets. It would encourage firms to cooperate in terms of the form that competition takes, one that involves products instead of prices.

[more]

front cover of The Organization of Industry
The Organization of Industry
George J. Stigler
University of Chicago Press, 1983
The Organization of Industry collects essays written over two decades—pieces prepared especially for this volume, previously unpublished material, and reprinted articles drawn from numerous sources, many which include additional commentary by the author. The essays are unified by George J. Stigler's careful analysis and by his clear and witty style.

In part one, Stigler examines the nature of competition and monopoly. In part two he discusses the forces that determine the size structure of industry, including barriers to entry, economics of scale, and mergers. Part three contains articles on a wide range of topics, such as profitability, delivered price systems, block booking, the economics of information, and the kinky oligopoly demand curve and rigid price. Part four offers a discussion of antitrust policy and includes Stigler's recommendations for future policy as well as an examination of the effects of past policies.

"Stigler's writings might well be subtitled 'The Joys of Doing Economics.' He, more than any other contemporary American economist, dispels the gloom surrounding economic theory. It is impossible to confront the subject treated with such humor and verve and come away still believing that economics is the dismal science."—Shirley B. Johnson, American Scholar

[more]


Send via email Share on Facebook Share on Twitter