This special volume, entitled "The rule of Law, Freedom, and Prosperity," presents symposium papers that attempt to understand the historical roots of the rule of law, its importance in freedom and economic growth, and the possibilities for exporting these lessons to developing countries.

Contributors include Joel Mokyr, Francesco Parisi, Peter Boettke, Paul J. Zak, Stephen Knack, James Buchanan, Robert Cooter, Bernie Black, Anna Tarrasova, and Susan Rose-Ackerman.

Supreme Court Economic Review is a peer-reviewed, interdisciplinary journal focusing on economic consequences, precedents, and reasoning based on the work and law-defining decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. The scholarship in Volume 11 includes evolution of patent law at the Federal Circuit and Supreme Court levels, censorship of economic theory, probability errors regarding tort and contract law, the psychology of punishment, and more.

The Supreme Court Economic Review is a peer-reviewed, interdisciplinary series focusing on economic consequences, precedents, and reasoning based on the work and decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. Recent topics have included the evolution of patent law at the Federal Circuit and Supreme Court levels, censorship of economic theory, probability errors regarding tort and contract law, the psychology of punishment, and more.

The Supreme Court Economic Review is a peer-reviewed, interdisciplinary series focusing on economic consequences, precedents, and reasoning based on the work and decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. Recent topics have included the evolution of patent law at the Federal Circuit and Supreme Court levels, censorship of economic theory, probability errors regarding tort and contract law, the psychology of punishment, and more.

Supreme Court Economic Review is an interdisciplinary, peer-reviewed series focusing on the economic consequences, precedents, and reasoning behind  United States Supreme Court decisions. Recent books have covered the evolution of patent law at the Federal Circuit and Supreme Court levels, censorship of economic theory, probability errors regarding tort and contract law, the psychology of punishment, and more.

Supreme Court Economic Review is an interdisciplinary journal that provides a forum for scholarship in law and economics, public choice, and constitutional political economy. Its approach is broad-ranging and the contributions it brings together apply explicit or implicit economic reasoning to the analysis of legal issues before the court, with special attention to Supreme Court decisions, judicial process, and institutional design.

The Supreme Court Economic Review is an interdisciplinary journal that seeks to provide a forum for scholarship in law and economics, public choice, and constitutional political economy. Its approach is broad ranging, and contributions employ explicit or implicit economic reasoning for the analysis of legal issues, with special attention to Supreme Court decisions, judicial process, and institutional design. 

Supreme Court Economic Review is an interdisciplinary journal that seeks to provide a forum for scholarship in law and economics, public choice, and constitutional political economy. Its approach is broad ranging and contributions employ explicit or implicit economic reasoning for the analysis of legal issues, with special attention to Supreme Court decisions, judicial process, and institutional design.

Supreme Court Economic Review is an interdisciplinary journal that seeks to provide a forum for scholarship in law and economics, public choice, and constitutional political economy. Its approach is broad ranging and contributions employ explicit or implicit economic reasoning for the analysis of legal issues, with special attention to Supreme Court decisions, judicial process, and institutional design.

Supreme Court Economic Review is a faculty-edited, peer-reviewed, interdisciplinary series that applies world class economic and legal scholarship to the work of the Supreme Court of the United States. Contributions typically provide an economic analysis of the events that generated the Court's cases, its functioning as an organization, the reasoning the Court employs in reaching its decisions, and the societal impact of these verdicts. Beyond academic analysis, SCER contributors stimulate interest in the economic dimension of the Supreme Court and explore solutions for its manifold and complex problems.

The Supreme Court Economic Review is a faculty-edited, peer-reviewed, interdisciplinary law and economics series with a particular focus on economic and social science analysis of judicial decision making, institutional analysis of law and legal structures, political economy and public choice issues regarding courts and other decision-makers, and the relationship between legal and political institutions and the institutions of a free society governed by constitutions and the rule of law. Contributors include renowned legal scholars, economists, and policy-makers, and consistently ranks among the most influential journals of law and economics.

The Supreme Court Economic Review is a faculty-edited, peer-reviewed, interdisciplinary law and economics series with a particular focus on economic and social science analysis of judicial decision making, institutional analysis of law and legal structures, political economy and public choice issues regarding courts and other decision-makers, and the relationship between legal and political institutions and the institutions of a free society governed by constitutions and the rule of law. Contributors include renowned legal scholars, economists, and policy-makers, and consistently ranks among the most influential journals of law and economics.

This interdisciplinary review series brings together the perspectives of legal scholars and economists on the work of the United States Supreme Court. Contributions to the SCER provide an economic analysis of the situations and events that generate a case or group of cases. Articles often consider the implicit or explicit economic reasoning employed by the U. S. Supreme Court to reach its decisions, and the economic consequences of the Court's decisions. The SCER also promotes analyses dealing with the functioning of the Court as an organization. As such, it is essential reading for legal scholars, economists, policy makers, and scholars specializing in law and economics.

Appearing in Volume 4 are "The Insurance Antitrust Suits and the Control of Competition in Insurance," by George L. Priest; "Daubert's Debut: The Supreme Court and the Economics of Scientific Evidence," by Jeffrey S. Parker; "The Supreme Court's Predation Odyssey: From Fruit Pies to Cigarettes," by Donald J. Boudreaux, Kenneth G. Elzinga, and David E. Mills; "The Constitutional Conception of the Corporation," by Larry E. Ribstein; "Interpreting Health Care Cost Containment Legislation: Good Samaritan Hospital v. Shalala and Relative Institutional Competence," by Simonetti Samuels; and "O'Melveny & Meyers v. FDIC: Imputation of Fraud and Optimal Monitoring," by A. V. Pritchard

This interdisciplinary review series provides an economic analysis of
the situations and events that generate a case or group of cases decided
by the United States Supreme Court, the implicit or explicit economic
reasoning employed by the Court to reach its decisions, and the economic
consequences of the Court's decisions.

SCER is sponsored by the Law & Economics Center of the George
Mason University School of Law.

This interdisciplinary review series provides an economic analysis of cases decided by the United States Supreme Court, the implicit or explicit economic reasoning employed by the Court, and the economic consequences of the Court's decisions.

The Supreme Court Economic Review series applies economic and legal scholarship to the work of the United States Supreme Court. Contributions provide economic analyses of events that generate the Court's cases, its organizational functioning, its rationale, and the societal impact of these verdicts.