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4 books match the query 'Judge-made law'

cover of Judges and Unjust Laws: Common Law Constitutionalism and the Foundations of Judicial Review

Judges and Unjust Laws

Common Law Constitutionalism and the Foundations of Judicial Review

Douglas E. Edlin

University of Michigan Press, 2010

"With keen insight into the common law mind, Edlin argues that there are rich resources within the law for judges to ground their opposition to morally outrageous laws, and a legal obligation on them to overturn it, consequent on the general common law obligation to develop the law. Thus, seriously unjust laws pose for common law judges a dilemma within the law, not just a moral challenge to the law, a conflict of obligations, not just a crisis of conscience. While rooted firmly in the history of common law jurisprudence, Edlin offers an entirely fresh perspective on an age-old jurisprudential conundrum. Edlin's case for his thesis is compelling."
---Gerald J. Postema, Cary C. Boshamer Professor of Philosophy and Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and author of Bentham and the Common Law Tradition

"Douglas Edlin builds a powerful historical, conceptual, and moral case for the proposition that judges on common law grounds should refuse to enforce unjust legislation. This is sure to be controversial in an age in which critics already excoriate judges for excessive activism when conducting constitutional judicial review. Edlin's challenge to conventional views is bold and compelling."
---Brian Z. Tamanaha, Chief Judge Benjamin N. Cardozo Professor of Law, St. John's University, and author of Law as a Means to an End: Threat to the Rule of Law

"Professor Edlin's fascinating and well-researched distinction between constitutional review and common law review should influence substantially both scholarship on the history of judicial power in the United States and contemporary jurisprudential debates on the appropriate use of that power."
---Mark Graber, Professor of Law and Government, University of Maryland, and author of Dred Scott and the Problem of Constitutional Evil

Is a judge legally obligated to enforce an unjust law?

In Judges and Unjust Laws, Douglas E. Edlin uses case law analysis, legal theory, constitutional history, and political philosophy to examine the power of judicial review in the common law tradition. He finds that common law tradition gives judges a dual mandate: to apply the law and to develop it. There is no conflict between their official duty and their moral responsibility. Consequently, judges have the authority---perhaps even the obligation---to refuse to enforce laws that they determine unjust. As Edlin demonstrates, exploring the problems posed by unjust laws helps to illuminate the institutional role and responsibilities of common law judges.

Douglas E. Edlin is Associate Professor of Political Science at Dickinson College.

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cover of Supreme Court and Judicial Choice: The Role of Provisional Review in a Democracy

Supreme Court and Judicial Choice

The Role of Provisional Review in a Democracy

Paul R. Dimond

University of Michigan Press, 1989

The conventional wisdom holds that the Supreme Court provides the final word as the Court tells the people what the Constitution commands. In interpreting uncertain constitutional text, however, the Court is not provided with a single answer but must, itself, make hard choices. Such choices by an unelected Court appear to conflict with the basic principle of majority rule by the people through their elected representatives in our democracy. Over time, through public debate, new arguments before the Court, legislation, new appointments to the Court, and constitutional amendments, however, the Court's prior judgements evolve, are distinguished or modified, and are even directly overturned. Viewed from this longer term perspective, the Court's supposedly final rulings can therefore be seen as an integral part of an ongoing national dialogue over the meaning of the Constitution. This understanding makes judicial review more consistent with our tradition of government by the people rather than by the Court. To explore this understanding, The Supreme Court and Judicial Choice develops a provisional approach to judicial review under which a surprisingly large number of judicial rulings would be subject to modification by ordinary legistlation enacted by Congress. Far from rendering the Court a powerless subject of Congress, this proposal would enhance the vital role of the Court in stimulating and shaping the ongoing dialogue with the people over the meaning of the Constitution.
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cover of The Judicial Power of the Purse: How Courts Fund National Defense in Times of Crisis

The Judicial Power of the Purse

How Courts Fund National Defense in Times of Crisis

Nancy Staudt

University of Chicago Press, 2011

Congress and the president are not the only branches that deal with fiscal issues in times of war. In this innovative book, Nancy Staudt focuses on the role of federal courts in fiscal matters during warfare and high-cost national defense emergencies. There is, she argues, a judicial power of the purse that becomes evident upon examining the budgetary effects of judicial decision making. The book provides substantial evidence that judges are willing—maybe even eager—to redirect private monies into government hands when the country is in peril, but when the judges receive convincing cues that ongoing wartime activities undermine the nation’s interests, they are more likely to withhold funds from the government by deciding cases in favor of private individuals and entities who show up in court.

In stark contrast with conventional legal, political, and institutional thought that privileges factors associated with individual preferences, The Judicial Power of the Purse sheds light on environmental factors in judicial decision making and will be an excellent read for students of judicial behavior in political science and law.

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cover of What Process is Due?: Courts and Science-Policy Disputes

What Process is Due?

Courts and Science-Policy Disputes

David M. O'Brien

Russell Sage Foundation, 1987

Are judges competent to decide complex scientific disputes over toxic chemicals and hazardous wastes? Have courts gone too far in awarding damages to victims? Does the judiciary unreasonably constrain free market forces and usurp power from democratically elected branches of government? What constitutes judicial "due process" in the regulation of health-safety and environmental risks? David O'Brien addresses these and other key questions in a comprehensive survey of the role of courts in resolving science-policy disputes. He theorizes that such disputes, with their burden of scientific uncertainty and intense value conflict, become judicialized in the United States because they pose an uncomfortable trilemma for policy makers: how to accommodate competing demands for scientific certainty, political compromise, and procedural fairness in the regulation of risks. When policy negotiations break down, courts are called on not to settle scientific controversies per se, but in their traditional role as independent tribunals for settling value conflicts and imposing norms in a pluralistic society. This interpretation is enhanced by a unique set of case studies, including DES and asbestos litigation and the ban on Tris (a carcinogenic flame-retardent). O'Brien's analytical framework and his detailed examples illuminate the extent, the implications, and the underlying causes of the judicialization of risk regulation.
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